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1. .
The Annuat Economic Review 1982-83 presents a detaited study of the
Communityrs economic situation as 1983 approachesl the document is orga-
nized around the major areas of macroeconomic anaLysis, discusses in turn
and in depth the short-term and medium-term overa[[ macroeconomic outtook,
th batance of payments, prices and costs, monetary and exchange-rate poLi-
cies, budgetary policies and erpLoyment. Speciat attention is paid to the
probLems of energy use and suppty, and trends in the Comrunityrs external
trade and structurat conpetitiveness.
Faced with the stiLL deepening probLem of stagfLation in the European
economy the present chapter concLudes with some brief refLections on the
fundamentaL design of econonic policy. The question is raised, in par-
ticuLar, whether a greater degree of consistency between monetary and
budgetary poLicy as rleLL as a clearer distribution of responsibiLity for
macro-economic decision making couLd be obtained by attaching more impor-
tance to the growth of nominaL GDP as a finat objective for economicpoticy. According to this vieu, tinanciaL poticies woutd be directed to
controLLing the evoLution of nominaL gross domestic product, whereas reaL
uage adjustments and suppty side poIicies wouLd be pri-ncipatLy responsibLe
for the Levet of enptoynent and productivity.
1.1 A short review of European economic performance and poLicies
The Comnr.rnity economy has continued to perform weakty ln 1982,
frustrating earlier hopes of a significant upturn in activity by mid-year
and of a stabiLization of unemptoyment by the end of the year. The per-
sistence of high interest rates during most of 1982 has added to the uncer-
tainty about the timing and strength of the upturn both in the Community
and in other industriaIized countries. The prospects for such an upturn
are discussed in Chapter 2, vhere it is suggested, on the basis both of
shortterm econometric forecasts and Ieading indicators, that a modest reco-
very may not get under way before the second haLf of 1983. A medium-term
projection presented in Chapter 2 suggests that it wi[[ not be easy for the
Community to break out of its stou growth pattern typicaI of the last
decade.
)_
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A retativeLy encouraging aspect of Commrnity performance in 1981
and 1982 has been the shifting of a substantia[ proportion of incrementaL
output into net exports in reaction to the second oiL-shock. This devetop-
ment, which, despite a further smatL terms-of-trade Loss in 1982, is LikeLy
to have reduced the Communityrs current account deficit considerabLy this
year is anaLysed in Chapter 5. That Chapter also shous that the deficits
of recent years have transformed the Communityrs investment income account
from surplus to deficit and that there have been net outfLows of private
Long-term capitat. The combined deficit on current and private long-term
capitat accounts has been financed mainty by a Large net inftow of private
short-term cap'itat, much of it originating from oil-exporting countries.
The disinftation process in the Comm.rnity has continued in 1982.
The stordown in the rate of increase of consumer prices gathered force,
helped by sharp faLts in the dotLar prices of commodities. Domestic reac-
tion to the oit-price and dottar shocks in the three years from 1979, when
the overaLL inport price rise was simjtar to that recorded in 1973174, have
so far been quite muted, aLthough a greater convergence of performance bet-
ueen countries is taking tonger to come about. The reasons behind these
deveLopments are anaLysed in Chapter 4, vhere the progress of income-
adjustment, graduaLty proceeding but stitL needing to be carried further,
is atso discussed.
1982 has been a particutarty eventful year in the area of exchange
rates, interest rates and monetary poLicies. The growth of the money
suppLy in the Comm.rnity has probably decelerated through 1982, for the
third successive yea?, but the deceLeration is this time very modest. This
degree of success in controLLing the expansion of the monetary aggregates
has hetped the Comm.rnity to avoid an explosion of inftation after the
second oit-price shock. Reat interest rates have remained very high during
1982, but European nominaI rates have not dispLayed such strong votatiLity
as those in the United Statesi in consequence there have been marked fLuc-
tuations in the doLLarrs exchange rate agajnst European currencies. hrithin
the European ltlonetary System (EI'|S) there have been three rea[ignments in
the period since October 1981, making it the most turbuLent in the history
of the System, A detai Led discussion of monetary, interest rate and
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exchange rate deveLopments is contained in Chapter 5, where there is also
an anaLysis of the conditions necessary for a Lasting reduction in reaL
interest rates and for the success of the EtrlS reaLignments and a return to
greater stabi Lity within the system.
Budgetary poLicy in the Community as a whote has, taking account of
the weakness of activity, again been restrictive in 1982 and the budget
deficit, , on average for the Community, has widened marginaLLy. The continued
grobrth of governement receipts and expenditure retative to GDP, the size of
budget deficjts, the growth of pubLic debt and the burden of financing it are
becoming more and more l.lorrying in severaL trlember States. Budgetary deveLopments
are discussed in Chapter 6, where speciaI attention is devoted to the inter-
action between infLation, pub[ic debt and budget deficits.
unemptoyment has continued to grow rapidty in 19gz and, as yet,
shows no signs of stabitizing. Chapter 7 examines in some detait the
undertying weak enployment growth and strong labour force growth. The
Communityrs experience is contrasted with the more favorabLe trends in the
United States and Japan, and a partiat explanation is sought in terms of
the various measures of reaL wage positions which are presented in the
C hapte r.
An important, and growing, infLuence on the community economy in
recent years has been the increased degree of integration of financiaL
markets. This increased integration has come about not so much as a resuLt
of the achievement of the originaL goaL of the Communityrs member countries
to buiLd a free and integrated capitaL market by breaking down controts and
restrictions but rather through the devetopment of private Euro-currency
markets. The growth of Euro-currency markets is described and its inpLica-
tions are anaLysed in Chapter 8, where it is argued that nationat monetary
poLicy is inevitabLy constrained by capitaL mobitity and efficientLy func-
tioning capitaI markets, irrespective of the exchange rate regime.
Lt
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An important question concerns the Communityrs abitity to economize in
its use of energy and to diversify its sources of energy suppLy. Despite
recent faL[s both in energy prices and in the Comm.rnjtyrs consumption of
energy there is stitL insufficient coherence of energy-price and energy-
jnvestment poLicies in the Community to secure the degree of adjustment
yhich is stitI required. Chapter 9 brings out the probtems and conctudes
that the highest priority shouLd be given to the implementation of a Com-
munity energy strategy.
Changes in the energy market have been part of a wider process of
change in patterns of world trade and conparative advantage. A feature of
the changing pattern, in which the growth of the newLy-industriaIized
countries has been a major factor, has been a very rapid increase in inport
penetratjon of the Communityrs domestjc markets, particu[arty for invest-
ment goods. Chapter 10 Looks at these trends and argues that a tack of
dynamism jn investment in the Community and thus a sLuggishness in the
adaptation of the productive structure to changing demands are at their
root.
1.2 A reappraisaL of poticy issues.
It is clear that far-reaching improvements are needed
in the basic performance of the European econorny, and it may be suspected
equalLy fundamentat progress aLso needs to be made in the conception of
economic poLicy in the European economy taken as a whote.
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Graph 1.1 and TabLe 1.1 i[lustrate how the European economy has been
sLiding progessiveLy into a worsening economic performance since 1973. The
growth of gross domestic product in nominaI terms (in short: nominaL GDP)
has been faster than during the 1960-73 period but the spLit of this aggre-
gate between inftation and reaL output has become progressive[y more
unfavourabLe. The averages over these rather Long periods, however, to some
extent conceaL the fact the the tendency for the trade off between infta-
tion and reaL grouth to worsen started aLready in the late rsixties with
the rise in the GDP defLator acceLerating fron a low of 2.3 7" in 1967 to
7.7 y. in 1973, the Last year before the first oiL crisis.
The acceteration of inftation was to some extent a consequence of
the monetary expansion which occured in the 0ECD area as a whote during
most of the rsixties. As shown in TabLe 1.1 the annuaL growth of money
suppty in the Community exceeded by 2 percentage points the growth of nomi-
naL GDP in the period 1960-73, entaiting thus a graduaL increase in the
Liquidity ratio of the Community. The economic expansion in the rsixties
was thus initiaLLy quite painless as interest rates were relativety low in
proportion to the grouth of nominaL GDP (see Graph 1.3). But the resulting
increase in the tiquidity ratio must have constributed importantLy to the
more substantiat boost to infLation and the financiat disturbancies met fn
the rseventies, when the growth of nominaI GDP graduaLLy caught up with the
growth of money suppLy whiLe the reaL performance hrorsened considerably. In
1981 and 1982 money supply growth has fatten betow the growth of nominaL
GDP and interest rates increased to record high Levets both in the Com-
munjty and in the United States.
The years from 1960 to 1973, however, sarr not onty a graduat
buiLding up of tiquidity in the Comrunity but atso a considerabte increase
in the part of gross domestic product aItocated through the pubLic sector.
Accumutated over the whoLe period, the share of pubLic expenditure in GDP
rose 7r7 7( points and taxation 614 t points (Tabte 1.1 and Graph 1.2r. The
overaLt spLit between consumption and investment was n'evertheLess favorab[e
with the former fatLing by 1rg Z points and the Latter increasing by 2rZ Z
points its share in GDP.
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A Large aggravation of overaIL resource aLLocation took pLace
during the subsequent seven years (1973-80) with pubLic expenditure and
taxes grouing further in excess of GDP nhiLe the growth of investment fe[[
considerabty short of GDP and the profitabiLity of enterprises sab, a targe
deterioration hrith the Labour income share (reat wage gap) increasing by
313 7. points.
Apart from a certain restoration of profit margins in the fotlowing
t1.;o years when the Labour income share feLt 1 point, the aLtocation of
resources became even more biased in favour of consumption. The investment
ratio in 1982 fetL to the lowest leveL in the Communityrs history.
The present re[ation between the current and prospective growth of
nominal GDP, monetary expansion and the LeveL of interest rates are at
the core of the present poLicy ditemma facing the Community; the ways in
which this di[emma is resoLved may determine economic trends for a tong
time ahead.
A pronounced reduction in the teveL of interest rates retative to
the growth of nominaL GDP is, at present, a necessary condition for a revi-
vaL of the Comrunity economy. I'lith prospects of a real rate of growth of
onLy about 1'A and with the GDP deftator tikety to increase by tess than
9% in1983, Long term jnterest rates substantiaLty above 10 Z on average
for the Community are not sustainabLe. But the teveL of interest rates is
not excLusivety determined by monetary poticy in the Commrnity. Interest
rates in the internationaL capitat markets, present and prospective govern-
ment borrowing requirements, and more generaLLy - the appreciation of
internationaL financiaL markets of the resotve of the Comm.rnity to danpen
infLation exert a strong irpact upon the exchange rates and thus upon the
strength of the externaL constraint in the conduct of monetary policy.
A discretionary retaxation of monetary poLicy in the Community
might perhaps terporari Ly heLp to bring interest rates down to low tevets
and thereby ease the financiaL constraints on some firms and countries.
But an expansion of money supply over and above the atready fast rate of
10-11 Z current[y foreseen for 1983 wouLd not etiminate the fundamental
T
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causes of the present European yeaknesses and coutd, in particuLar, be
expected to be acconpanied by an increase both in actuat inftation and in
the expected rate of inftation. The risk of buitding up a neb, wave of
inflation - but from a much higher starting LeveL than in the Late rsixties
- h,ouLd be considerabte.
It is therefore essentiat that a reduction of nominat interest
rates be brought about in the finst instance through a substantiat reduc-
tion in inflation expectations. This wiIL require, first an adjustment
of real wages Leading to a decline in the labour income ratio, second a
sLowdoun in domestic cost inftation and, third a Louering of government
borrowing requirement in countries where this has become so targe as to
entaiL an unsustajnabte increase in pubLic debt - (the latter ctearty
constitutes a risk of acceteration in inftation in the future).
hlith respect to the poLicy guideLines for 1983 the main issue woutd
therefore nou seem to be re[ated to the reaction of monetary and budgetary
policy to the downward revision of the forecast growth of nominat GDP for
that year (thus from 12.1 Z according to the ttlay/June forecasts by the Com-
mission services to 10 X according to the most recent revised forecastsl
atso bearing in mind the downward revision of the estimates for 1982>.
The question is uhether monetary and budgetary targets shouLd
be revised downward to accomodate the tower GDP figure. This wouLd involve
a risk: a downward adjustment of the norms for the monetary expansion and
attenpts to effect further cuts in the growth of pubLic expenditure might
increase the risk of a proLonged stagnation or even further decLines in
output, as the financiaL constraints witL be strongly refLected in cuts in
private investment. The maintenance of the growth of money suppty con-
siderab[y above 10 I for the Comm.rnity as a whote and with budgetary aggre-
gates equaL[y geared to a GDP growth somewhat above the pnesent forecasts
yould on the other hand create the risk of a revivat of infLation expec-
tations and of an aggravation of financiaI disequitibria if activity fai[ed
to recover in subsequent years.
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It might perhaps be argued that at present the risk of a continued
stagnation is Larger than the risk of rekindLing infLation. But the effec-
tiveness of a poLicy of combatting this risk of stagnation with a certain
reduction of interest rates wouLd be considerabty increased if it Here com-
bined with a sociat consensus to moderate the rise in wage costs. In prac-
ticaL terms this would for exampLe require that the totat vage bitL in the
economy rouLd have to increase somewhat tess than the growth of nominaL GDP
and that the tro sides of industry accepted to negotiate wage increases
h,ithin this ceiLing with sufficient margin to attow an increase in
employment, taking account of the expected increase in productivity.
tfhiLe the fixing of generaL guideLines for monetary and budgetary
aggregates and wage biLL for the Comm"rnity woutd seem to be an indispen-
sabLe first step in the design of poticies for 1983 and beyond, the transLa-
tion of these Commrnity averages'into guidetines for the individuat illember
states cLearLy adds a further dimension to the poticy issues. The dif-
ferentiation of targets rrithin the Community must take account of the need
to reduce the divergence wjthin the EttlS through a more than proportionate
adjustment effort by the countries with serious baLance of payments probtem
and/or high rates of inflation.
OveratL the poLicy-mix in the Commrnity for the period ahead may
best be managed in the framework of a ctear assignment of poticy instru-
ments, and of responsibitities of the main actors (government, centraL
banks, the sociaI partners) for the finaL objectives of economic poLicy.
Impticit in the foregoing summary is the view that financiaI poticies
(monetary, and the budget batance) shoutd, and can reaListica[[y be
addressed primari[y to achieving a given trajectory for nominat GDP. This
witL atready heavi[y constrain the infLation rate, but it sti[[ teaves open
the uttimate spLit between inftation and reaI economic actjvity (output,
productivity and erpLoyment) within the nominaL GDP aggregate. To obtain
favourabte results for reat economic activity, reLiance has to be placed on
income behaviour (be it guided by an rincomes poLicyr or not), and on
suppLy-side poticies.
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The income behaviour of the sociat partners has to be recognised as
the key to the enpLoynent objectives of society, given that government and
the central bank cannot be expected to go further in denand support than in
financing a particuLar nominaL GDP evotution - which in many countries
shoutd be a deceterating one. Suppty-side poIicies (contained in pubLic
expenditure, taxation and regutatory poIicies) witI primarity infLuence
investment and productivity trends, and so also enployment.
\a
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TabLe 1.1
NominaL GDP in the Eurooean
infLuences on reaL economic
Community: its
oerformance
components and determinants, and
1960-73 1973-80(annuaL average
1980-82 1983
growth rate)
1
2.
3.
Components of nominaL GDP:
inf Lation (GDP defLator)
reaL output (GDP voLume)
nominal GDP (GDP vaLue:1 x 2)
Primary determinants of nominaL GDP'
money supp Ly
Inf Luences on realg!3gr-
pubLic expenditure (1)
taxat i on (1 )
reaL wage gap (excess over
rwarrantedr leveL ( 2)
consumpt i on (1 )
i nvestment (1 )
11t8 1216 1ot6 1ot2
(cumuLated over whoLe period)
5'O
4r6
919
10,8
2,2
B13
713
415
??
.,.
3r5
1r6
10 t6
-ot1 '
1O15
98
1r1
1 0r0
4.
5.
6.
7.
+ 7t7 +
+614 +
* 3t7
+ 2rZ
- 9t2
+ 216
- 
2r3
+ or7
+ 0r8
- ?r3
- or2
- or2
- 0r2
- 1r8
+ 2t2
+
t
(1) % points change in the ratio to GDP
(2) therwarrantedr reaL wage is that which wouLd leave the profit share of the
enterprise sector unchanged (see TechnicaL Annex for methodoLogicaL detai Ls) .
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Graph 1.1 : Nominat GDP and its spLit between real output and infLation (EC totaL)
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GRAPH 1.3 Interest rates, monetary expansion and growth of GDP
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2.1
2. Economic outLook in the short and medium term
The worLd recession which started in 1980 has been very [ong, but a slugg'ish
recovery in activity may at tast get under way towards the end of 1982. The
volume of worLd trade has stagnated during the recession and the rise of 2r1Y.
expected for 1983 is modest by the standards of previous upturns. The weak-
ness of oiL imports and prices has [ed to a rapid adjustment of the balance
of payments imbaLances caused by the oiL price rises of 1979-80, and this ad-justment process is LikeLy to continue into 1983. In the Community a period
of essentia[Ly fLat output gave way to renewed falls in the middLe of 1982;
any recovery now seems t'ikeLy to be deLayed untiL early in 1983, and in any
case the pace of recovery is expected to be very graduaL. Community GDP is
forecast to rise by onty Or3'i4 in 198? and 1r1'l in 1983. The persistence of
very high interest rates (aLthough they have faILen a LittLe since August)
has added to the uncertainty about the timing and strength of the upturn
both in the Community and in other industriaLised countries. Further progressis being made on contain'ing infLation, but the number of unemployed continues
to rise to very disturbing LeveIs. The Communityrs curnent account deficit
should move somewhat cLoser towards baLance this year and next. Medium-term
prospects for growth in the Community beyond the usuaL short-term forecast'ing
horizon are anatysed.
?.1 The internationaL environment
The recession in worLd economic activity which began earLy in 1980
has been more proLonged than originaLLy expected. The persistence of high
reaL'interest rates and weakness in aLI the main components of demand have
everywhere delayed the upturn in activity which usuatLy foLLows the onset of
a faLL'in output w'ithin a period of about eighteen months. In the USA an
initiaL revivaL of output in the second half of 1980 and earLy in 1981 gave
way to renewed sharp faLLs in output during the remainder of 1981 and into
1982. In Japan domestic demand has rema'ined very weak, and real growth'in
GNP, at a rate much Lower than experienced in the past, was only achieved
in 1981 due to a strong export performance. In the countries of Europe, both
within and outside the Community, output has been stagnant aLmost everywhere
since the Autumn of 1980, with industriaL production fLat on average and with
at best onLy marg'inaL additions to GDP.
Accompany'ing the depressed LeveI of output in the industriaLised coun-
tries there have been gains on the infLation front but no end to the worsening
picture for unempLoyment. Thanks mainly to the weakness of doLLar prices of
basic materiaIs, notabLy oiL, and to some restraint in wage settLements,
infLation rates in the 0ECD countries have slowed markedty. Consumer prices
in OECD countries as a whole rose by 8r1i( in the tweLve months to JuLy 1982
and 10,6% in 1980 and 1981compared wi th
respecti vety.
year-on-year increases of 1219%
Particu[arly sharp reductions have occurred in the USA and Japan
\+
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and in Germany and the United Kingdom.0n the other hand, unemployment has
continued to rise everywhere. The number of unemployed in the OECD area as
a whole reached over 30 miLLion in the middLe of 1982 compared with some 20
miLLion at the end of 1979 just before the recession began.
The [atest indicators suggest that the faLI in output in the USA may
have come to an end in the Summer of 1982. There, and in the other industrial-
ised countries outside the Community, a sLow recovery in output is foreseen for
the second haLf of this year, aLthough cons'iderabLe uncertainties remain about
the precise tim'ing and strength of the upturn. This revivaL shoutd become
more solid and more widely based during 1983. The faLL in interest rates which
started in Augustr'if mainta'ined, shoutd heLp to [essen one of the dampening
infLuences which has heLd back recovery. The tatest Commission forecasts of
reat GDP/GNP growth in the OECD area as a whole show no rise in 1982 compared
with an increase of 1r1/, in 1981. The graduaLLy strengthening but sLow recovery
from towards the end of this year shou[d resuLt in a growth rate of some 1r8Z
in 1983 (see Table 2.1).
The voLume of wor[d trade has been depressed during the recession. A
stronger-'development in the second haLf of 1981 was foLlowed by renewed weak-
ness in the first half of 1982. due to falls in imports both by 0ECD countries
outside the Community, especiaL[y in North America, and by countries in the
other wortd zones. FaLIing o'iL revenues and fast-shrinking current account sur-
pluses for the OPEC countries mean a sharp cut-back in theirimports during this
year folLowing th,o years of rap'id expansion. The non-oiL-producing deveLoping
countries face decLining export revenues and increasingLy severe financiaI cons-
traints and are also being forced into substantiaL'import reductions. The
rother'countries, which incLude the centraLLy planned economies, are aLso
expected to have negative import growth this year. In the second haLf of 1982
the voLume of worLd trade is expected to fatI aga'in even more sharply than in
the first haLf, since in addition to weakness eIsewhere Community imports
(which showed some growth in the first haLf) are decLining once more. In 1982
as a whole the totaL voLume of wor[d imports'is Likely to faLL by 1%, and
imports by the wor[d outside the Community w'iLL be even.weaker, faLLing by
aLmost 3% (see Tabte 2.1).
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In 1983 the prospects are for a very sLow and graduaL strengthening
of worLd trade. Imports by oPEC and the non-oiL developing countries remain
very weak, at Least during the first haLf of the year, but as the year pro-
gresses there shouLd be a graduaL acceLerat'ion in imports aLmost everywhere
as the recovery in activity becomes more firmLy estabLished'
The figures for totaL world trade have contjnued to be affected by
the weakness of demand for and trade in oiL. In response to the recession in
activity and in further adjustment to the Large rise in real oiL prjces in
1g7g-80, consumption of oiL in the OECD area js expected to faLL again by over
4 % in 1982, after having aLready falLen by 13,9X between 1979 and 1981.
Large reductions in stocks and some substitution of domestic production and
non-gpEC product'ion for OPEC supplies have meant an even sharper decLine in
the demand for oPEC oiL. The volume of 0PEC exports of oiL is expected to
falI by over 15/" in 1982. Precise figures are not easiLy availabLe, but
the volume of world imports of oiL could decline by some 62 this year. This
implies that worLd trade in non-oiL goods is stronger, as in 1980 and 1981'
than suggested by the figures for totaL trade incLuding oit which are given
in TabLe 2.1. WorLd trade'in goods other than oiL couLd.rise marginaLLy
th.i's year, compared with a falL of 1% f or aLL goods. Simi LarLy the calcu-
[ations of Commurity export market growth in TabLe 2.1t uhich are based on
the totaL imports of partner countries, couLd this year again understate the
growth in demand for the kinds of goods the Community countries produce and
export. In 1983 demand for and trade in oiL is expected to be Less weak,
as economic recovery proceeds. Changes in the commodity structure of
trade shouLd therefore not distort the voLume growth figures so much next
yea r.
The weakness in the oiL markets Led ear[y in 1982 to a sharp faLL in
spot prices and to reductions in the prices charged by some non-OPEC oiL pro-
ducers and jn the premia on high quaLity oiLs from some OPEC suppLiers, but at
its meeting in Vienna on 19-20 llarch OPEC decided to defend its USD 34 per
barreL reference price by introducing an agreed product.ion Limit of 18 miLLion
barreLs per day (weLL beLow the average output of 22'5 miLLion barreLs per day
in 19E1). ALthough for a period OPEC oiL output feLL betor this agreed timit,
a degree of stabi Lity appeared for a whi Le to return to the oi L market, and
the very Large faLLs in oil- prices rrhich some commentators h,ere expecting did
not occur. However, with the apparent breakdown of the 0PEC cartel at the meeting
in JuLy, the outLook remains very uncertain. Average export prices of oiL in
dolLars are expected to be
(2)
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aLmost 5% Lower in 1982 than in 1981. The forecasts for 19E3 are based on
the assumption of no further changes in the nominaL doLLar price of o'iL,
sjnce it is expected that any strengthening in the demand for oiL can
easiLy be met without strain from increased 0PEC production.
The do[Lar prices of other primary commod'ities continued to dectine
in the first three quarters of 1982, foL[owjng sharp faLLs in 1981. Some
steadying of prices near to their present Low leveLs can be expected during
the next few months. Then as industriaL production starts to recover and
stocks of raw materiaLs are reconstituted, primary commodity prices shouLd
beg.in to edge up graduaLLy in the Latter part of 1983. The Latest forecasts
for the dottar prices of aLL non-oit primary commod'it'ies (UN index) are for
a faL[ of some 97. in 1982 (foLlowing a drop of 10% in 1981) and then a rise
of about 17. in 1983.
The prices of manufactured goods entering foreign trade were strongLy
influenced throughout 1981 and the first half of 1982 by movements in exchange
rates, and in particuLar the strength of the dolLar. In nationaI currency terms
there has generaLLy been a sLowing'in the increases in the prices of manufactured
goods (from gr8'A in 1981 to an expected 9r4% in 1982 and a forecast 7'O% in
1 983 for the maj or j ndust ri a L i sed count ri es i nc Ludi ng Communi ty count ri es) .
When expressed in doLtar terms, however, these exports of manufactured goods
feLL in plice by 4,8it in 1981 and are expected to faLL again by 1'1% in 198?
and then,on the assumption of no further apprec'iabLe change in the doLLar ex-
change rate from now on, to rise by 3t47. in 1983.
Some sharp changes in the terms of trade (in goods) have occurred in
1982 as a result of price and exchange rate deveLopments. Latest estimates
suggest a deterioration in the terms of trade of OPEC countries of about
1 1/2'/. and a worsening for the non-oiL deveLoping countries of some 4%. The
OECD countries as a whole shouLd show an improvement of about 2%, but th'is
wiLL be enjoyed majnly by the USA with its strong currency (abrms-of-trade
gain of some 3Z) and Japan (a gain of some 471). The Community countries are
expected to show a smaLLer terms-of-trade ga'in of about 1 'll2'A. In 1983
the forecasts show a further deterjoration in the position of 0PEC and the
devetoping countries, and some further gains for OECD countries, which wiLL
probably be more equat[y shared than this year.
\-I
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The severe current account imbaLances which arose as the resuLt
principaL[y of the oiI price rises in 1979 and 1980 have adjusted far more
rapidly than seemed [ike[y at the time when they were at their extreme (see
Table 2.2). The surpLus of the OPEC countries, which reached some USD 113 OOO
mitLion in 1980, felL to some USD 55 000 miLLion in 1981. In 1982 a smaL[
deficit seems Likety. This dramatic dectine in the 0PEC surp[us is mainty due
to the faLL in the voLume of oiI exports, and in 1981 to the rapid rise in
OPEC import voLumes which has now come to an end; in 1982 and 1983 the terms-
of-trade tosses due to the weakness of oiI prices are aLso expected to contri-
bute to this process. The industriaLised countries of the 0ECD area have
managed to reduce their deficit, which amounted in total to some USD 70 OO0
miILion in 1980, but no further improvement is expected next year. In 1981
import votumes were cut by more than export voLumes, and th'is year price
deveLopments, especiaLIy of oiI and other raw materiaLs, have been heLpfuL.
The most striking improvements have been seen in the position of Japan and
of the Community; of the USD 54 000 miLLion improvement in the totaL OECD
current batance expected between 1980 and 1982, Japan aLone'is responsibLe
for USD 18 000 miL[ion and the Community countries together for USD 23 OOO
miIL'ion.0n t]re other hand the non-oiI developing countries have not shared
in this adjustment as demand for and prices for their exports, mainLy of
primary commodit'ies, have remained very depressed. Their current account
position deteriorated further in 1981 and, aLthough an improvement of about
USD 9 000 m'iLLion seems possibLe in 1982, their aggregate deficit 'is expected
to remai n very h'igh both thi s year and next.
There i s a growing asymmetry in the wortd current account pos'it'ion;
the reducti'on in the OPEC surpLus over the Last tt"lo years does not appear to
have its fuLL counterpart in the improvement in the baLances of the other
wortd zones taken as a whoLe, In part this is due to the continuing probLem
of the growing discrepancy in the worLd batance on current account and its
component transact'ions wh'ich has recentLy been investigated (1). In 1982 there
also appear to be some specjaL factors associated with trade in oiL. Much of
the substantiaL destock'ing carried out by the major oiL companies during the
early months of th'is year has been in oiL travelLing in ships at sea. Imports
TTI-G aLso Chapter 3 beLow
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of oiL recorded by oiL-importing countries have not therefore faLLen by as
much as have recorded OPEC oiL exports and the importing couhtrjes current
account baLances have not'improved to the extent of the deterioration in
the SPEC surpLus. If stocks at sea remain at thejr present depressed Level
then this discrepancy wiLL not correct itseLf in due course. This interpre-
tatjon remains highLy specu[ative, however, and in generat, aIthough the
trend for each zone in TabLe 2.2 appears reasonabLe, there must be considerable
doubt about the precise magnitudes invoLved'
2.? Short-term economic outLook for the Community
FoILowing the sharp decLine during 1980, output in the Community
remained virtuaLLy fLat throughout 1981. Some tentative indications of a
sLight upturn in activity in the earLy months of 1982 have not been fuLfiLLed
by subsequent devetopments. IndustriaI production in the Community as a
whoLe stayed stagnant during 1981 at a [evel about 5% below that reached in
the first quarter of 1980. Figures for the first quarter of 1982 showed only
a very modest increase and there was then a renewed decLine in production in
the second quarter, with particuLar[y sharp fa[[s in severaI Community countries
in June (see TabLe 2.3). Gross domestic product djd not faLL by as much as
industriaL production in 1980, and a modest increase was aLready recorded
in the second part of 1981. Quarterly figures for the four major Commun'ity
countries show a rise in reaL GDP in the finaL quarter of 1981 compared with
the prev'ious quarter at an annual rate of 4r3%, but the results for the first
quarter of 1982 were bareLy pos'itive, and prov'isionaL figures for the second
quarter show a slight faLL again. In the Community as a whoLe GDP appears to
have risen marginaLLy in the first haLf of 1982 at an annual rate of Qr8%.
The majn factor behind this sLight rise was some reconstitution of stocks,
which may have been partIy'invoLuntary; with fixed investment stiLL faLLing,
final domestic demand was f[at, and weakness of exports meant a negative con-
tribution to growth from the reaL foreign baLance (see TabLe 2.4).
Graph 2.1 presents a comparison of the present cycL'icaL pos'ition in the
Community with that foLLowing the prev'ious oiL shock. Although the Latest re-
cession has been m'iLder than that of 1974-75r'in terms of the reLat'ion of the
lowest values of gross domestic product or industriaL production to the fore-
going peaks, the duration of the period in which output has remained beLow
these peak values is Longer. FoLLowing the third quarter 1974 peak' gross
domestjc product recovered its peak vaLue 5 quarters later, but in the
present cycLe domestic product has stiLL (Latest data
rol
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available - second quarter 1982) not regained the peak teve[ of the first
quarter 1980. It can aLso be seen from the graph that the Latest avajlabLe
figures for industriaL production are Lower reLative to the preceding peak
than the corresponding data of the 1974-76 cyc[e, even though the trough of
the tatest recession (about 6 per cent below value at peak) was markedLy
Less deep than that of the earlier cycLe (about 12 per cent below value at
peak). Despite the varying duration and degrees of severity of the two
episodes, the de[ayed recovery of industriaL production is a factor common
to both. The trough'in gross domestic product occurred two quarters after
the third quarter 1974 peak, whiLe the downturn in industriaL production
[asted five quarters. In the present cycLe, the Lowest point in gross
domestic product occurred five quarters after the peak, but the trough in
industriaL production cannot yet be cLearty identified, more than tbro years
after the preceding peak.
A composite index of indicators of econom'ic sentiment (see Graph 2.2>,
using data from the Community-wide business and consumer surveys together
with an index of share prices, ind'icates a hes'itant recovery of output during
the next few months. The sentiment index, presented in the Lower part of the
graph with its component series, tends to Lead the deveLopment of output by
about six months, so that the sLight'improvement recorded between end-1981
and May 1982 suggested a higher LeveL of output during the second haLf of 1982.
The prognessive worsening of sent'iment between May and September, however,
resuIting in particuLar from a deterioration in the short-term industrial
outLook, as indicated by the business survey, sheds doubt on the timing and
strength of this recovery.
This evidence from the Leading ind'icators, together with forecasts
through to the end of 1983rsuggests that after a Lack of growth in the second
half of 1982 a recovery should graduaL[y get under way but that it wiil.
strengthen only very sLowLy. Private consumption in the Community is expected
to rise very modestLy this year, in Line with real disposable income, but it
shou[d increase sIightLy faster in 1983. The growth of government consumption
is expected to be re[at'iveLy restrained and wi LL not prov'ide much support to
totaL demand. Fixed investment is expected to continue.to faLL during the
second haLf of 19E2, but thereafter some sLight recovery shouLd ensue. After
some renewed weakness in the second hatf of this year it is expected that
stocks wiLL be graduaLLy reconstituted during 1983; the recent fatI in interest
rates may heLp this process. The components of finat domestic demand
2.8
are Iikety to contribute increasingLy to the sLowLy acceIerating expansion
of GDP next year. As stocks are rebuiLt and demand picks uF, imports by
Community countries are expected to rjse after faLLing back in the Latter
part of 1982. t,lith its exports highLy competitive because of the depreciation
of Commun'ity currencies against the doItar, some further ga'ins in export
market shares are forecast, but with worLd demand outside the Community not
very buoyant, totaI export volumes are unLikety to grow faster than imports
and so the contrjbution from the reaL foreign baLance to GDP growth is ex-
pected to be negtig'ibl-e.
Taken as a whoLe the forecasts show that, after a faLt of Or67"in
1981, Community GDP 'is expected to grow in red. terms by 0,3%in 1982 and by
1r1'A in 1983. ConsiderabIe uncertainty remains about whether even this Limited
rate of expansion wiLL be achieved. The damage to growth prospects resuLt'ing
from an extended period of high interest rates and the Likely reaction to
the recent reductions in rates are difficuLt to gauge. There is a cLear
poss'ibiLity that the recovery in the rest of the world wiLL be slower
getting under way than has been assumed, with consequences for Commun'ity ex-
ports. Despite the fact that the Community business surveys aIready signatLed
a turning point at the end of 1980, the improvement in business sentiment has
faltered in recent months, and there is as yet no clear-cut evidence of a
resumption of steady growth. ALthough it is possible to picture scenarios
which are more optimistic than those on which the forecasts are based, the
main risks are cIearLy on ttre downs'ide.
Forecasts of the growth of GDP and its components for each of the
Community countries are g'iven in Table 2.5. A weak outturn is expected for
aLL the countries in 1982, with severaL of them ['ikely to experience a
further smalL dectine in reaL GDP. In 1983 slow growth shouLd be resumed
h a[L countries (except the NetherLands), but this recovery w'iIL be very
fragi Le.
LI
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UnempLoyment in the Community has been rising rapidly ever since
the end of 1979. ALthough the rate of increase in the number unemployed
has stowed sLightLy during 1982 it stiLL remains appreciabLe. By August 1982
there were 11r0 miLLion unempLoyed in the Community (seasonaLly adjusted
figure for EC-9), representing 9r9/"oif the civi Lian Labour force. The
recovery in activity which is forecast should sLow the increase in un-
empLoyment, but jt is unlikeLy to be sufficient to haLt the rise before
the end of 1983.
Price trends within the Community have benefited from a stower
rise in import prices during the earLy part of 1982 than in 1981. There
has also been a slightLy slower rise in nominal earnings per head, which
both contributes to and is part[y a resuLt of dectining infLation and
which atso refLects the difficuLt Labour market situation. In the rest of
1982 and in 1983 a further decLjne'in import prices is expected (the in-
crease'in the impLicit price def[ator of imports of goods and services by
Community countries is forecast to fatI fron 14r9i{ tn 1981 to 9.32 in 1982
and to 7r5Zin 1983).Wage increases, however, are not thought tikeLy to
moderate much further (average earnings per head, after a rise of 1119%
in 1981, are forecast to increase bylorSt and 91814 jn 1982 and 1983 res-
pectivety). Inf[ation in the Commun'ity (as measured by the jmpLicit price
def[ator for private consumption) shoutd stow further, from a year-on-year
increase of 11,8% in 1981, to rises of 1or5'A in 1982 and 8r8Z in 1983.
The Communityrs current account deficit narrowed sharpLy from USD
38 000 miLlion in 1980 to USD 21 000 miLLion in 1981, due to a strong export
performance and weak import volumes and despite a terms-of-trade Loss. A
further stight improvement in the deficit to USD 16 0OO miILion is expected.in
1982' The voLume of exports has been weak throughout most of thi s year, whi Le
import voLumes rose in the first haLf before a decLine in the second haLf.
The improvement in the deficit is therefore due to the weakness of import prices,
especiaLty of oiI and raw materiaLs, which should Lead to an improvement in the
terms of trade for the first time since 1978. rn 1983r.on the basis of present
assumptions about brorLd prices and exchange rates, the Communjty is expected
to enjoy a further terms-of-trade ga'in. t,lith import voLumes growing at much
the same rate as export voLumes, this should aLlow some further improvement
'in the Communityrs current account, the deficit on uthich couLd shrink to
about USD 11 000 miLlion.
D-)-
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The previous sections suggest that the bottom of the recession has been
passed in the Community but that recovery from the exceptionaLLy Long recession
uiLL be stow and hesitant. For poLicy purposes it is important to Look
beyond the short term to an appreciation of the probable devetopments
in the medium term. t,liLL, for instance, the Level of unempLoyment peak in
1983 or is it on a rising trend beyond the Limits of the short-term fore-
cast ?
The most recent quantified medium-term nrojection for the Community
as a whoLe published by the Commission services is that which accompanied
the Fifth trledium-Term Economic PoLicy Programme (1). The present projection
has been prepared to aLtow a direct comparison with that of the Fifth
programme, although it has now been extended to a horizon of 1987. The past
reference period has been adjusted however to give a better cycticat coinci-
dence - both the 1980/74 and the 1987180 periods begin with a year of
recess i on.
The projection has been made with the aid of the Comet medium-term
model and covers the period 1981 to 1987. The base year 1981 has been adjusted
to correspond to theestimates used for the short-term forecast which was com-
pleted.inOctoberlgS2.ThemodeLhasbeenconstrainedtorespectthisshort-
term forecast for 1982 and 1983 as far as possible'
The !q,g,O!le,t. cgg,e,l, medium-term projection assumes that present economic
policy objectives remain the basis of government poticy in the Conmunity.
policy'is therefore LikeLy to be more restrictive than it was after the first
oit shock, with the controL of infLation as the principaI objective. Monetary
poLicy wiLL be tight relative to the policy foLLowed in some member states after
the first oiL shock. This impLies pos'itive and high reaL rates of interest in
contrast to the previous period. The battLe to contain the budget deficit witL
dominate fjscaL poLicy. This is IikeLy to excLude any major expansionary fiscaL
policy'initiatives at Least in the first part of the medium-term period-
#TiTEFopean Economyt no. 9, JuLy 1981
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Though the projection shows some rise in the budget deficit, this resutts
from the automatic effect of the buiLt-in stabiLisers and not from expan-
sionary fiscaL poIicy.
The exogenous assumptions, which for 1982 and 1983 are of course the
same as those in the short-term forecasting exercise, are subject to consider-
ab[e uncertainty. In comparison with the base projection made for the Fifth
Programme, the assumption on reat oiL prices has been considerabty modified
(Table 2.O.It is noh, assumed in the central projection, that with very
moderate economjc growth and considerabLe energy savings, there is LikeLy to
be stability or even a slight faLL in real oiL prices from now to the end of
the projection period.Obviousty there is some risk that with a certain recovery
in GDP growth, reaL oiL prices cou[d rise, even though the current situation
on oiL markets appears to be one of downward pressure on nominaL prices,
The exchange rate assumption is that in spite of the relativeLy un-
competitive situation of the USA on wortd export markets in mid-1982,
there wjLL onLy be a very modest faLL in the US doLlar against the ECU over
the period 1983-1987. t,ithin the Community however it is expected that the
D.Mark and the GuiLder wiLL rise considerabLy against the doLlar over the
medium term. These exchange rate assumptions are Linked to assumptions about
interest rates. The [ong-term interest rate in the USA is expected to stay high
(around 12iO throughout the period. This is infLuenced by the prospect of a budget
defjcjt over the medium term and the p'ick-up of economic activit.y in 198i in the
face of nqn-accommodating monetary poIicy.t'lith inftatioh deceLerating to end-1984
reaL intenest rates stay high or even increasb in the first pdrt of thi period.
After 1984 with some increase in inf[ation, reaI interest rates decIine some-
what but even in 1987 they are substant'iaLLy positive and considerabty above
rates prevailing in the 1970rs.
The outlook for worLd trade in this fair[y sombre environment is not
encouraging (Tabte 2.7>. ExcLuding the Community,1t is expected to grow by
only just over 3Z per year, somewhat Lower than even the reLat'iveLy dis..
appointing second-haLf of the nineteen-seventies. The main difference with
respect to the Last decade, wiLL be the only modest rjse in OPEC and LDCs
imports, resuIting from the combination of low growth in industriaI countries
and financiaL pressures imposed by Less easy access to credit and high
interest rates. The projection assumes no significant increase in protectionism,
even though considerabte pressure for increased protection is Likel.y to result
from the poor outLook for growth and emp[oyment in the industriaLised countries.
9\
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Any further rise in protection in the industriaLised countries wouLd have
a severe effect on the LDCs and uLtimateLy on the industriaLised countries
themsetves.
The centraI projection suggests that output growth in the Community
in the present cycLe wiIL be lower than in the previous one. Recovery from
the partLy o'it-price-induced stump d 1974-75 was far faster than the hes'itant
upswing after the simiLar 1979-80 ojL shock. This is LargeLy due to d'ifferent
policy reactions to the transfer of purchasing power out of the Community.
Many countries in the EC folLowed an expansionary fiscaL policy and an
accommodat'ing monetary poL'icy after 1975. As mentioned above, policy has been
and is assumed to continue to be far tighter in the current cycte; the very
high budget deficit'in severaI countries is accompanied by reLat'ively strict
monetary poLicies.
Output is expected to rise at an annual average rate of 116% over the
whole period 1981-87. This average implies a recovery of output in the second
half of 1983 reaching a cycL'ical peak (at annuat rates) in 1985 and then de-
cLining towards the end of the period (Graph 2.3>. Average GDP growth over
the Last four years of the period (beyond the range of the short-term fore-
cast), 'is not expected to exceed 2r5% per annum.
It is some recovery in private consumption and jnvestment which [eads
to the recovery of GDP from 1983. Private consumption growth up to the end of
1983 is restrained by the relatively Low increase'in reaL wages and the Loss
of emptoyment. From mid-1983 on however it is expected that there wiLL be
h'igher increases in reaL wages and a slowing of the rise'in unempLoyment.
The Low rate of investment in the Community (1975-1980 : +1r37. per
year) is seen as a major probLem for the medium-term gronth of product'ive
potentiaL and, in the Light of the need for structuraL adjustments in the stock
of capitaL in the Community, an important constraint on future growth. The over-
aLI jnvestment growth rate forecast for the period'1981-87 ls just as weak asjn the prev'ious cycLe. With somewhat stronger demand towards the end of the
period, a recovery in company profitabi L'ity, systems of investment incentives
becoming more generaLized and some p'ick-up in pubLic investment, fixed
capitaL formation shou[d grow faster than output after 1983 (3,6% per year).
l5
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It should however not be forgotten that at the margin the amount of capital
investment required for the creation of an addit'ionaL job today has risen
considerabty over the Last decade, and if much of the equipment now lying
unused has in fact been rendered unusab[e by changes in reLative prices and
technology, a very high rate of investnent over the medium and long term
witL be required to reach acceptable Levels of output and empLoyment (1).
In the earty part of the period the growth of EC exports is reduced
in the general downswing in worLd trade; imports foLLow in the wake of low
output growth. Towards the end of the projection period, howeverrthere is a
recovery of imports as output expands again. Combined w'ith a sLight deteriora-
tion in the Communityrs terms of trade in the mid-1980s, these deveLopments
lead to an increase in the externaL deficit on goods and services of the
Community towards the end of the period.
Inftation is dece[erating fast in the Community and this is expected
to continue wetI into the middLe of the projection period, both as a resu[t
of weaker import prices and favourabLe internaL cost developments. ReaL wages
over the period grow far more sLowty than in the previous period and there is
a cont'inuing faLL in the corrected wage share. NevertheIess, towards the end
of the period infLation turns up somewhat in response to highelimport prices
and a renewed acceLeration in reaI wages.
The [eve[ of unemployment in the Community is expected to reach over
10 1/2% of the tabour force by the end of 1983. This is equivatent t.o 12 114
miLLion peopLe, a [eve[ not reached since the 1930s. This totaL wjLL have
been produced by the coincidence of a very poor empLoyment-creation perfor-
mance in the 1970s and a rise in the [abour force dependent on both demo-
graphic factors and on a rise in the participation rate (TabLe 2.9>.
ffi-ffiffiate in the Vth illedium-Term Econom'ic PoLicy Programme suggested that
the creation of an extra 1 mi[[ion jobs woutd require 2 114% of GDP as
additionaL investment. A more recent internaL study suggests that, whiIe this
figure is consistent with average capitaL intensity figures in the past,
capitat requirements for new jobs, i.e. at the margin, are much higher.
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Betreen 1983 and the end of the forecasting period the emptoyment prospects
shouLd improve with a net job creation of about Qr3% per annum. This wiLL
however not be enough to reduce unemp[oyment as the Labour suppLy w'itL be
growing at an even faster rate. It is true that from the mid-1980s the demo-
graphic grouth factor jn the increase'in the Labour supply is expected to
diminish but this does not affect the situation in the medium term.0n
unchanged pot'icy the unempLoyment rate couLd then reach 11/uor 13 mi LLion
peop[e, by the end of the period.
FinaLly, it is the Levet of unemployment that is one of the main
factors Leading to the high [eveL of the budget deficit in the end year of
the forecast, in spite of government efforts to reduce that deficit.
The medium-term outIook suggests therefore that, on the hypothesis
of unchanged poticy, the Community is unlikeLy to break out of its slow
growth pattern typicat of the last decade. The main objectives of economic
poLicy, reducing the teveIs of unemptoyment and infLation, are not achieved,
and'indeed the cruciaI unemptoyment probtem becomes more difficuLt.
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TabIe 2.3
Recent deveLopments in GDP and industriaL production in the commun.ity
(% change on previous quarter, seasonaLLy adjusted annuaI rate)
1 9E0 1981 '1982
ffiffiT_T_
ReaL GDp (Ec-4) (1) 3r9 -5rz -216 1r4 i ro -zr3 -or4 4r3 i r? -1,j
l!i:;;;taL production 0,e -5,1 -s,s -4,4 -o,3 -0,4 0,3 o,3 1,5 -1,8
(1) Estimates based on quarterty nationaL accounts data for the FederaL RepubLic
of Germany, France, ItaLy and the United Kingdom
Source : EUR0STAT and nationaI statistics
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TabLe 2.6
0iI prices in the centraL projection (annuaL average growth rates Z)
'1980t1974 1987 /1980
OPEC export prices in US dolLars
OPEC import prices in US doltars
14.3
611
414
411
Rea[ oiI price jn US dolLars 8rZ o13
Souree : COltlET model data and simuLation banks
2.2'l
Tab[e 2.7
Import voLumes (goods and services ) in the centraI projection(annuaI average growth rates
't965 | 60 1970t 65 1975t70 1980t74 1987 t80
1,)
u. s. A.
J apan
0ther OECD
oPEc 
I
DeveLoping countries ,
State-t rad'i ng count ri es
711
1216
10 15
313
614
loro
17 ,3
9rO
713
811
216
4r0
314
'lo17
711
10 17
512
212
214
15,7
318
316
311
414
214
4r0
218
3ro
tlorId excIudjng EC 619 9r? 6r1 5rO 311
Source : COMET modeL data and simuLation banks
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Tabl.e 2.8
lledium-term forecast - EC-10 (annuat average growth rates Z)
1973t60 19EOt74
vth
P rog ramme
1985t80
Nett CentraL Case
19E5/80 1987t80 19E7tE3
GDP
GDP pri ces
Investment
Emptoynent
Purchasing pover of
per-capita wage
Corrected wage share
Unemptoyment rate at
end of period
GeneraL government net
Lending at end of
period (GDP Z points)
Batance of goods and
servi ces at end of
period (GDP Z points)
416
419
514
0r?
5to
o12
?,5
- OrE
Q14
213
1o,5
113
o11
?ro
' or1
611
- 3r5
'1r4
119
811
111
- or2
orE
- 1r1
1012
- 3rO
' ot?
112
8rZ
o16
- ot4
0r8
- or7
1',t ,o
- 319
- or8
116
8ro
1r2
- o,?
111
- or7
11,1
- 3r8
- 1r2
215
7r8
316
013
1rE
- 016
11 ,1
- 3rE
- 1r2
Source : COilET modeL
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TabLe 2.9
The demographic component of tabour force grouth (1)
Average annuaI growth(t housands )
Yea rs
TotaL Neu Entrants
1961-1973
1974-1980
1 980-1 987
1987-2000
393
792
703
16
2911
3262
3324
?760
(1) The demograph'ic increase in the totat labour force and the number of new entrantsinto the Labour force assuming constant 197E participat.ion rates
Source : Commission Services
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qraph 2.1 : Conparjson of cycLes in the Community 1974-77 and 1979-82
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Graph 2.2 :Output and econonric sentiment jndex - European Community
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3.1
3. BaLance of payments
The two "oiL crises" of the nineteen seventies have produced massive changesin the terms of trade of oiI exporters, industriaL countries (jncLuding the
European Community) and non-oil deveLoping countries. Industrial countries
have responded by shifting a substantiaL proportjon of their incrementaL
output into net exports and the Communityrs achievement in this respect,
especiaLLy during the last two years, has been impressive. Energy saving and
the substitution of North Sea oil for imported energy have p[ayed a major roLein this process. In spite of this the Community, in common with most other
oiL importing countries, has been in deficit on current account for most of
the Last ten years and has yet to emerge from this condition. The borrowing
necessary to finance these deficits has transformed the Community,s baLance on
investment income account from surpLus to deficit. The current deficit
of the Community as a whole has been aggravated by a net outfLow of private[ong-term capitaL and this combined current and private [ong-term capitaLdeficit has been financed mainLy by a Large net infLow of private short-term
capitaL, much of it originating from oiL exporting countries. OfficiaLfinancing, aLthough it has been significant in certain individuaL cases, has
not made a major contrjbution to the Community as a whoLe.
3.1 Internationat payments adjustment 1972-1982
In considering the deveLopment of the balance of payments of the
Community as a whoLe, and of its individuaL members during recent years, it is
heLpfu[ to set it in a wider context covering the other major groups of
countries in the wortd. The successive oit price increases of 1973-1974 and
1979'1981 produced huge changes in the terms of trade of these major groups.
Since 197?, the Last fuIL year before the first "oiL crisis", the terms of
trade of the oiI exporting countries have improved more than four and a haLf fo[d.
Since the oit export'ing countries account for a retativety sma[| proportion
of totaL worLd trade, the deterjoration in the terms of trade of the other
major groups - industriaL countries and non-oiL developing countries - that
was the necessary counterpart to the improvement in the oiL exporters terms
of trade, has been proportionate[y much smaL[er, but very substantial nonethe-
Less - 20% in the case of the industriaL countries and 1O% in the case of the
non-oit deveLop'ing countries (see TabLe 3.1).These unprecedentedty Large and
abrupt terms of trade shifts had an immediate destabiLizing effect on worLd
payments. In 1974 and 1980, foLLowing each of the two oiL crises, the sum
of worLd current surpLuses and deficits (regardtess of sign) rose very steeply
in abso[ute terms and quite considerabty in retation to output and trade.
3.2
At the risk of some oversimpLification it may be said that the two
main groups of oiL importing countries - industriaL countries and non-oiL
deveLop'ing countries - have so far reacted quite differentLy to the shocks
infLicted on their economies by the two oiL crises. In the industriaL countries
the threat - and in some cases the reaLity - of runaway infLation and the
emergence 6f payments deficits of a size such that they couLd obviousLy not
be fjnanced for very Long induced the authorities to take nestrictive measures,
jn some cases rather beLatedty, in order to stabiLize their economies both inter-
naLLy and externaLLy. In the non-oil deveLoping countries, by contrast, higher
priolity hasr'in generaL, been attached to the maintenance of reaL economic
growth, whi l.e price stabi L'ity and externaL baLance have been considered of
secondary'importance. As a resuLt reaL growth of output has sLowed down very
sharply in the industriaL countries, whiLe in the non-oit deveLop'ing countries
the deceLeration has been Less pronounced.
The sLower growth of output hasr'in its turn, produced a marked
deceLeratjon in the rate of growth of world trade, which has faLLen by about
two thirds (see Table 3"2). As might have been expected, it is the
imports of industriaL countries - which account for nearLy three quarters of
totaL worLd trade - that have been the most seriousLy affected, since these
are the countries which have most effectiveLy restricted the growth of demand
and output for stabi Lizat'ion purposes. In these countries the eIasticity of
'imports with respect to output has contracted sharpLy. During the nineteen
sixties and earLy nineteen seventies the voLume of imports of industriaL
countries grew approximateLy twice as fast as output, with trade between
industriaL countries themseLves prov'ing by far the most dynamic eLement.
During the Last nine years the volume of imports has grown at aLmost exactLy
the same pace as output - i.e. theeLast'icity of import growth with respect to
output grobrth has faLlen from 2 to 1. This weakening of the propensity to
import is partLy the naturaL consequence of sLower output growth, sjnce with
so much spare capacity the incentive to seek out suppLiers from abroad is
greatLy reduced. Energy saving has aLso been an important factor, for most
industriaL countries depend on'imports for a Large proportion of their energy
suppLies. FjnaLty the increase in protectionism, wh'ich has itseLf been
encouraged by the Large payments deficits and h'igh unempLoyment which have
resuLted from the oiL crises and the attempts by ojL importing countries to
deaL with themr,ray aLso have had a negative impact on the growth of trade,
atthough it is cifficuIt to produce firm evidence in support of thjs
proposition.
*r
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The imports of the non-oi L developing countries have registered
a much Less marked deceteration and, in contrast to what has happened in
the industriaL countries, there has beenonly a sIight dectine in the eLast'ic'ity
imports wjth respect to output growth - i.e. there has been LittLe tendency to
sh'i f t expend'iture i n rea I terms towards home-produced goods at the expense
of imports. However, the most dynamic eLement in worLd trade since 1973
has been the demand for imports from the oil exporting countries, which has
grown very strongLy as a resutt of the improvement in their terms of trade,
aLthough the effect of improved terms of trade on their real purchasing
pobrer has been to some extent offset by a sharp faLL in the voLume of their
exports during the Last three years.
TabLe 3.3 iLLustrates how the externaL ba[ances of the three
major groups of countries have reacted to the oiL crises of the nineteen
seventies. The increase in the vaLue of the oiL exporting countriesr exports
during 1973-1974 (due aLmost entireLy to the increase in oiL prices) produced a
huge current surpLus for these countries in 1974. Over the next few years
worLd oiL market conditions weakened as a resuLt of changes in the baLance
between the demand for and the suppLy of oiL throughout the uorld. Demand
for oiL grew much more sLowly, partLy in response to the reLative increase
in its price and partly in response to the sLower rate of growth of the world
economy. At the same time the higher reaL price of oiL stimulated production
from new sources which began to dispLace traditionaL suppLiers. The oi L
exporting countriesr exports therefore grew much more sLowLy in teaL terms
during the mid nineteen seventies. Their imports, however, continued to
gnow very rap'idLy in response to the huge increase in their purchasing
power. Thei r net imports of services aLso increased substant'iaL Ly,
so that by 1978 the current surpLus of th'is group of countrjes
of
4)_
3.4
as a t.lhoLe, at teast as recorded in the officiaL statistics (1), had dis-
appeared. The second round of oil price increases produced a nel, and even
more massive surpLus in 1980, but this has been meLting away even more rapidLy
than the first one. 0n this occasion, however, adjustment has mainLy taken the form
of a decIine jn the voLume of ojL exporters! exports, with oiL jmportinq countries
reacting more vigorousLy and effectiveLy to the second round of price increases
than they had done to the first.
The current account of the industrial countries constitutes the
mirnor image of that of the oiI exporters, swinging from a smaLL surpIus'in
the earty seventies to a substantiaL defjcjt'in 1974, then back again to
surplus by 1978 as a resuLt of a massive increase 'in the vaLue of exports to
the oiL exporting countries. The second round of oiL price increases produced
another sharp deterioration in the current account, cuLminating in a deficit of
967 000 miILion or nearLy 1% of industriat countries' GDP, in 1980. This in
turn js expected, on the basis of preLiminary est'imates, to have been LargeLy
(1) ConceptuaLLy the trade baLances and current batances of aLL countries jn
the world must necessariLy sum to zero, and since the three groups of
countries whose trade and current ba[ances are summarized in TabLe 3.3
account between them for about 95i'/ of totaL worLd trade, the sum of their
trade and current baLances shouLd'in theory be fairLy cLose to zero.In fact merchandise trade batances (on a fob/fob basis) show a consistent
tendency to sum to a surplus. There are severaL factors which can be
cited 'in expLanation of th'is phenomenon. One js the so-caLLed "timing
discrepancy" between exports and imports. A proportion of the goods
recorded as exports in a gjven year are not recorded as imports by the
recipient countries untjL the foILowing year and so Long as worLd trade
'is growing in vaLue terms the sjce of this discrepancy tends to increase
from year to year. Another factor is the export of ships to "flag of
convenience" countries. These are aLmost aLways recorded in the exports
of the producing country, but very seLdom in the imports of the purchaser
country. Current baLances, by contrast, show a consistent tendency to
sum to a deficit. Th'is appears to be majnly due to substantjaL under-
recording of investment income rece'ipts and to some extent of receipts in
payment of senvices. The countrjes whose current baLance seems to have
been most seriously misrepresented by these recording errors are the
oi L exporters. The current surpLus of these countries during 1980-1982is betieved to have been substantiaLly larger than the recorded figuresindicate. The current baLance of the 'industrial countries, taken as a
whoLe, has aLso probably been rather better than officjaLty reported.It is not beLieved, however, that record'ing errors have seriousLy distorted
the trade and current baLance figures for the non-oiL developing countries.In the case of these countries the recorded figures are thought to
correspond reasonabLy cLoseLy to reaLity.
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reversed by 1982t mainLy as a resuLtr on this occasion, of a very sharp drop
in the voLume of ojL imports. The net oiI imports of industriaL countries
this year are estimated to have sunk approximateLy one third betow the peak
leveL attained in 1977.
The non-oiL deveLoping countries atso suffered a very severe
deterioration in their current account, first in'1974-1975 and then again
in 1979-1980. ALthough smaL[er in absoLute terms, the adverse swing in the
combined current baLance of these countries was considerabl.y targer in retation
to their export earnings and GDP than that experienced by the industriaL
countries. In contrast to the industriaI countries, however, the non-ojL
deveLoping countries, taken as a whote, have so far madetittLe progress
towards externaL adjustment. Despite the recovery in their terms of trade
during the [ater nineteqr seventies, the current deficit of these countries
continued to run at around S30 000 mitl.ion a year. The second round of oiL price
increases in 1979-1980 infLicted a further serious terms of trade Loss upon
them, bringing their terms of trade by 1982 back to the same LeveL as in 1975,
and precipitating another [arge increase in their current deficit. The oiL
crises have deaLt a doubLe bLow to the externaL trade of these countries, both
infIating their import bitL through higher energy costs and damaging their
export performancersince a side-effect of the restrictive measures adopted
by most industria[ countries has been to reduce their demand for imports from
the deveLoping countries.
The right-hand section of Tabte 3.3 shows"required" and achieved
changes both in current baLances at current prices and in net exports of
goods and services at 1975 prices. rn this context the term "required
change" in the current baLance at current prices means the change between
1970-1972 and 1982 that woutd have been necessary for the current batance of
each group of countries, expressed as a percentage of exports of goods 
_
and services, to be the same in 1982 as it was in the three years lgTO-1972;
i-e. in the period immediatety before the severe payments imbaLances produced
by the first ojt crisis appeared. The changes in reaL net exports shown in
the same cotumn are those which woutd be consistent with such a distribution
of current surpLuses and deficits, at 198? [evels of trade and with the actuaL
1982 batance on investment income and uniLaterat transfers taken as given.
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It is arguabLe, of course, that the distribution of surp[uses and
def .ic.its that wouLd be consistent with worLd payments equi tibrium today is
rather different from that whichwas consistent hrith it ten years a9o- For
exampLe, foLLowing the redistnibution of weaLth and income in favour of the
oiI exporting countrjes that has occurred over this period, it might be
considered "normaL" for these countries to run a current surplus somewhat
Larger .in retation to thei r output and exports, whi Le at the same t'ime providing
a targer share of worLd capitaL exports, than they used to do. NevertheLess,
comparison of the reLationships prevai Ling today with those which prevai Ied
in 1970-1972 does provide a very rough and ready indication of the ground which
remains to be covered before internationaL payments equiLibrium may be said
to have been restored.
Comparison of the coLumn showing "required" changes with that showing
the changes actuaLLy achieved reveaLs that both the oiL exporting and the
industriaL countries have made very substantiaL progress in terms of both
nominaL and reaL adjustment over the Last ten years whi[e the progress made
by the non-oiL deveLopjng countries has been rather sLow and uncertain. The
o.it exporters had a current surpLus equivatent to about 57. of their exports
of goods and services in 1970'197?. The current surpLus of I 15 000 miLLim
forecast for '1982 bears roughLy the same proportion to exports of goods and
services today. The adjustnent by the oiL exporters to.theirinproved term's
of trade has been achieved by an increase in net imports of approximateLy
8 135 000 miLl.ion at 1975 prices, an enormous shift for such a smalI grouD
of countries.
The counterpart is to be seen in the performance of the industria[
and non-oiL deveIoping countries. Since 1972 the industriaL countries have
shifted approximateLy g130 OO0 mjl.Lion of resources at 1975 prices into net
exports, an amount equivaLent to some 3 112% of their GDP at the beginning of
the period and 12% of incrementaL output over the period. They have achieved
this by drasticaLLy reducing the rate of growth of imports in voLume terms,
whiLe their exports to the rest of the worLd have continued to grow at about
the same rate as during the years before the fjrst oiL crisis erupted. The
non-oiL devetoping countries, by contrast, have been unabLe to achieve any
shift of reat resources into net exports at aIL over the same period. Measured
at constant prices their def icit this year wi lL in fact be stightLy Largelin
tfrf)
3.7
absoLute terms (atthough smaILer in relation to exports) than it t.las ten years
ago. Their refusaL to accept a drastic cut-back in the reaL rates of growth
of demand and output of their ot.ln economies has prevented them from ach.ieving
a significant reduction in'import growth whiLe sLower growth in the industriaL
countries has proved an insuperabLe obstacte to acceLerating the rate of growth
of their exports.
However, in comparing progress towards external. adjustment made by
the industriaL and primary producing - both oil. and non-oiL - countries
respectivety it is necessary to bear in mind that, whereas tn 1970-1972 the
worLd economy was running at a fa'irLy high rate of capacity utiLization, today
it is plunged deep in recession. Recession tends to benefjt the current account
position of industriaL countries at the expense of primary producers and this has
ass'isted the process of externaL adjustment by the industriaL countries and the oil.
exporters (for this Latter group adjustment in the present context entails a reduct-
ion of the current surplus) whiLe impeding adjustment by the non-oiL deveLoping
countries. Thus the recession has depressed the voLume of oiI imports by the
'industriaL countries and this has been a najor factor contribut'ing to the
'improvement in the reaL trade baLance of this group and the deterioration
'in that of the oit exporters. But it has also depressed industriaI countriesl
imports of other products and this, whi te helpjng to 'improve the real trade
baLance of industrial countries, has made such improvement by the non-oiL
deve[oping contries more difficutt. The effecb of these changes in reat
demand on the current baLances of the various groups of countries are no11
being reinforced by movements in the terms of trade which, as is normat in
a brorLd recession, have begun to move back in favour of the industriaL countries
at the expense of the primary producers. However, once the worLd economy
recovers these factors are likeLy to be reversed. The current account of
the industriaL countries may then be expected to deteriorate, partLy through
a falL in real net exports and partLy through a deterioratjon in their terms of
trade; whiLe the reaL net exports, terms of trade and current baLances
of the ojL exporters and other primary producers are Li kety to 'improve.
In short, the cycL'icaLLy adjusted current baLance of the industriaL countries
today 'is somewhat Lrorse than thei r actuaL cunrent baLance, wh'i Le the reverse
is true of the other thro groups of countries.
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5.2 ExternaL adjustment by the European Community
The experience of the European Community since 1972 has been broadty
simi Lar to that of jndustrjaL countries general.Ly. The Communityrs terms of
trade deteriorated sharpLy in 1974, recovered over the next ferl years and then
decfined again during 1979-1981.since when they have stabiljzed at a Level
very sLightly above that to whjch they had sunk jn '1974. Houever, whereas the
oiL price increase of 1974 damaged the Communityrs terms of trade more than
those of jndustriaL countries generaLLy, due to the Conmunityrs greater than
average dependence on imported energy at that time, the emergence of the United
Kingdom as a major oil producer during the Later nineteen seventies has reduced
that dependence, with the resuLt that the Communityrs terms of trade have
suffered rather tess from the second round of oiL price increases than have those
of industrial countries as a whote.
The adverse shjft jn the Communityrs terms of trade produced a sharp
deterjoration in the baLance of goods and services in 1974 and again in 1980.
0n each occasion the recovery has been rapid and, according to the tetest
forecasts, the Comnunity wiLL once again have a surpLus on transactions in
goods and services this year. Houever, this js not yet targe enough to
'finance the steadiLy increasing net outfLor on uniLaterat transfers, so that
the current deficit is expected to be of approximateLy the same size as it
uas Last year.
In the three years '1970-1972. before the first ojL crisis broke,
the Community as a whoLe registered a current account surpLus equivaLent to 0.62
of GDp. The figures in the column headed "requ'ired changes" in the third column from
the right of TabLe 3.5 represent the changes jn current baLances since 1970-1972 that
would have been necessary for a current surplus equiva[ent to 0.67. of GDP to be
achieved by each of the more deveLoped Member States in 1982; and aLso the chanqes
in reaL net exports of goods and services that wouLd have been consjstent wjth these
nominaL current account swings, taking 1982 prices, import voLume, net investment
'income and net transfers as given. For the two Least developed Member
States, Ireland and Greece, for t,lhich a current deficit may be considered a
normaL and appropriate condition, the figures for "required" current batances
represent the 1970-1972 ratios of current deficits to GDP appL'ied to 1982
output LeveLs.
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The period 1970-1972 was one when the Community as a whoLe, if not
each one of its constituent members, may be considered to have been reasonabLy
c[ose to externaL equitibrium. ALthough there is no reason why the ratio of
current baLance to output shouLd be identicaI in aLl the deveLoped Community
countries, it is not without interest to compare such a hypotheticaL s'ituation
with that which actuaLly exists. The gap between the two may be taken as an
approximate measure of the ground still to be covered before the process of
externaL adjustment may be said to have been successfuLLy compIeted.
The progress made aLong this road has varied considerabLy from one
member country to another. The most successfut, aLthough'in very different ways,
have been the NetherLands and the United Kingdom. Indeed, were it not fon the
prospects of diminishing naturat gas exports, the Nethertands, with a current
surplus expected to amount to 47. of GDP this year, might appear to have over-
adjusted. The Nethentandsradjustment has been achieved by means of a massive
shift of real resources into the external sector, taith net exports accounting
for nearLy two fifths of the reaL increase in output over the Last ten years.
By contrast the United Kingdomts adjustment has been ach'ieved entireLy through
a favourabLe movement of the terms of trade. The United Kingdom terms of trade,
after deteriorating sharpLy in the earIy seventies, have recovered strongLy in
recent years, Largety as a result of the deveLopment of North Sea o'i L, and are
now back where they were before the first oiL crisis erupted, whiLe most other
Community countries have suffered a deterioration of around 20'l in their terms
of trade over the same period. As a result the Un'ited Kingdom has been able
to achieve a modest surpLus on current account this ycar without any increase
in real net exports at alL compared with 1970-1972.
The FederaI RepubIic of Germany has aLso achjeved a fairly successfuL
externat adjustment by means of a substantiaL shift of real resources as a
resuLt of which it is expected that the current account wiL[:once aga'in show
a smaLL surplus this year. Italy, the BLEU and IreLand have managed to shift
some 15% of their incrementat output over the decade into net exports but this
has been insufficient to offset the terms of trade [osses infLicted upon them
by higher oiL prices and exchange rate depreciation so that the cunrent batances
of aLL three countries have suffered a severe deterioration and are stiLL today
- especiaLLy those of the BLEU and lretand - a long way from satisfactory baLance.
(f)
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Somewhat surprisingLy, the country which has made proportionateLy by
far the most impressive reaL adjustment is Denmark, where more than haLf of the
addition to output over the Last ten years has been channeLLed into exports.
However, the increasing burden of debt service (see aLso section 3.4) has more
than offset the effect of this reaL improvement, so that Denmarkrs current
defjcit has grown inexorabLy over the years. The gap between present performance
and anything that can pLausibLy be described as equiLibrium is stiLL a wide one.
The same appLies to France, but in this case the cause is quite different, nameIy
a fa'iLure to make any significant and Lasting reaL adjustment. 0f the totaL
increment to French output since 1972 net exports have absorbed only 3%.
Taken as a whoLe the Community, by severeLy nestricting the growth of
demand and output, has shifted some ECU 33 000 miLLion (at 1975 prices)
into net exports during the Last ten years, equivaLent to 3% of 1972 GDP or
about 147. of the increase in production over the whole period. In spite of this,
however, the combined current baLance of the ten ltlember States is stitL some
ECU 25 000 mitlion short of what might reasonabLy be considered an equiLibrium
LeveL - and thjs despite the fact that cycticaI factors have been favourabte
to the baLance of payments of the Community and industriaI countries generaLLy.
3.3 Energy and the Community current account
The increase in the price of o'il has been the most important single
factor contribut'ing to the worsening of the Community's terms of trade and
current baLance since 1972, and the Communjty's efforts to reduce its dependence
on imported energy have been a major factor in the process of reaL adjustment
described in the preceding paragraphs.
Beth,een 1972 and'1982 the unit price of oiI imported by the Community
increased twelvefoLd and the unit price of energy of aLI types by only a
fraction Less. If the votume of the Communityrs net energy imports had remained
unchanged the import bill. in 1982 wouLd have been ECU 117 000 milLion higher
than it tlas in 1972. In fact the communityhas, over this period, sl.ightLy
reduced the absoLute leveL of its energy consumption (despite the fact that
GDP has neanwhiLe risen by ZZD and has substantiaLLv increased its oun
production of energy, with the resuLt that dependence on imported sources of
energy has decLined significantLy and the voIume of such imports has faLLen
by 27%. consequentty the net energy impor.t bi[[ has risen by "onLy" ECU
83 000 mitLion. 0f the totaI improvement in the Communityrs reaL trade baLance of
ECU 38 000 miLIion (at '1975 prices) since 1972. more than a quarter can be
attributed to the reduction in net energy imports achieved by energy saving
and the substitution of domesticaLLy produced for imported sources of energy
(see TabLe 3.6).
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3.4 Exchange rate changes and trade in price-eLastic goods and services
Community countries have experienced substantiaL changes in exchange
rates during the past tweIve years. 0n a trade-weighted basis the deutschmark
has appreciated by 62 per cent since 1970 and the Lira has depreciated by 54
per cent. Ster['in9 has experienced very Large movements in both directions, the net
result of these being a faLL of 29 per cent over the period as a who[e (see
TabLe 3.7).goth the drachma and the Irish pound have also depreciated heaviLy.
Sometimes these movements have gone further than was necessary to
offset infLation differentiaLs; at other times they have not gone far enough
to produce this resuLt. ConsequentLy there have been quite sizeabte shifts
in reaL (i.e. inflation adjusted) exchange rates. Among
the currencies of the four Iargest ltlember States, the deutschmark appreciated
in reaL terms (i.e. Lost competitiveness) in the years up to 1978, since when
it has depreciated in reaL terms and the Loss of competitiveness in the
preced'ing years has been uiped out. The mirror image of the deutschmarkrs
behaviour is to be found in that of sterling and the Lira. The French franc
experienced comparativeLy LittLe reaL variatibn untiL a downward movement
commenced in 1981.
Doubts are sti[[ expressed from time to time as to whether changes in
reaL exchange rates have much positive effect on the tradjng performance of the
countries concerned. It is indeed true that, if attention is directed at the
totaL trade or current account, there seLdom appears to be much correLation
between reaL exchange rate movements and swings in the trade or current
baLance. This is partLy because exchange rate changes have not always oeen
backed up by appropriate internaL economic policies. But it is also because
many types of trade and payments fLows are insensitive to changes in reLatjve prices.
This is true, for example, as regards trade in many foodstuffs, raw materiaLs
and fueIs, the price-eLasticity.of demand for which js generaLty very Low.
It is aLso true as regards many "invisibLe" transactions, for exampLe
government overseas expenditure and investment income fLows. If these items
are excLuded and attention is concentrated on those goods and services (i.e.
manufactures and tourism) which are in generaL thought to be reLativeLy price-
eLastic, the position, not aLtogether surprisingLy, Looks rather different.
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GraphJ.l shows the movement of the reaL exchange rate index and
the trade baLance in price-eLastic goods and services in current prices,
expressed as a percentage of GDP, for the four major Community countries
over the Last twelve years, and it is ctear from the graph that the trade of
each of the four countries in such goods and services has, on the whole,
responded fairLy effectively and promptLy to changes in competitiveness.
UnfortunateLy the effect on trade'in price-etastic goods and services has
frequentLy been totaLLy obscured by the behaviour of the non price-eLastic
elements in the goods and services baLance.
The importance of price-eLastic Aoods and services in totaL exports and
imports varies from country to country, and aLso vithin a given country over time
(see Table 3.8). Germany and Ita[y are the t]ro countries for which.price-eLastic aoods
and services account for the hjghest proportion of totaL exports, aL.though the
ratio has been rising slowly in Italy over the [ast ten years whiLe it has
been decLinJng in Germany. In theory, other things being equaL, these are the
two countries whose exports shouLd prove the most responsive to reLative price
changes. In France the share of price sensitive goods and services in totaI
exports has fatLen quite significantLy over the decade. This appears to be
the resuLt not so much of changes in the structure of French merchandise trade
as of an increase in the share of non price-eLastic invisibl"e earn'i nqs, in
particutar investment income receipts. Nevertheless, the impLication wouLd
seem to be that totaL exports of aLL goods and services may now be Less respon-
sive to reLative price changes than they used to be. There has been LittLe
change in the share of price-eLastic goods and services in totaL United K'ingdom
exports, at Least untiL 1980 (figures on the commodity composition of United
K1ngdom trade in 1981 are not yet availabLe). This is rather surprising in view of
the growing importance of petroLeum exports in the totaL and the deterioration in
United Kjngdom competitiveness. It appears that the rising reaL exchange rate of
sterLing has affected not so much the exporters of price-etastic goods, which
presumabLy comprise the most speciaLized and efficient sectors of British
industry, but rather producers serving the home market, who have been severeLy
buffeted by foreign competition. The share of price-eLastic aoods and services
in totaL United Kingdom imports has rjsen very sharply over the Last ten years.
ASa result totaL United Kingdom imports should in future prove to be more
responsive to reLative price changes than they were ten years ago. In the
other three countries, aLL heaviLy dependent on imported energy, the rise in
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3.5 The changing batance on investment income account
During the years before the first oit crisis, when the Community
as a whoLe was regutar[y in current account surpLus, it buiLt up a stock of
foreign assets with the resutt that by the earLy n'ineteen seventies its net
receipts of foreign investment income amounted to some ECU 2 000 mil.Lion
a year. Since 1974 the Community has been more often in deficit than in
surpLus and most of its members have, at one time or another, had to borrow
substantiaL sums from abroad jn order to finance their defic'its, thus
reducing their net foreign assets or increasing the'ir LiabiLities. This
deterioration in the Cmmunityrs net externaL investment oosition has come
at an unfortunate tirne, since it has coincided with a stee6 wofLd-wide
rise in interest rates. This year, according to Commission estimates, the
Community may have a deficit on investment income account of about ECU 75OO
miLtion (see Tabte 3.9).
For the Community as a whoLe this is stiLL a fairLy modest amount,
equivatent to Less than 1% of exports of aLL goods and services. But for certain
individuaL countries the proportion is much h'igher than th'is; in Denmark the
deficit on investment income account is estimated now to be equaL to about
1O7,of totaL exports of goods and services and in lreLand the figure may be
cLose to 5%.
In Denmark the accumuLation of externat debt resuLting from aLmost
twenty years of uninterrupted current account defic'its, financed, it wouLd
appear, LargeLy by debt-creat'ing capitaL infLows (rather than by direct invest-
ment) has greatLy hampered the countryrs efforts to achieve successfut
externaL adjustment. ALthough very substantiaL and inpressive efforts have
been made towards reducing the deficit on other current account items -
not onLy in real, but aLso in nominal terms - they have been
rendered nuLL and void by the ever-increasing cost of debt service. Between
1972 and 1982 the baLance on aLL current items other than investment income
improved by ECU 200 miILion, but the baLance on investment income deteriorated
by ECU ? 400 miLLion, so that the totaL current account deficit increased
from ECU 100 miL[ion to ECU 2 300 million. So Long as the deficit persists
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it has to be financed, with the resuLt that new debt is incurred and the
amount of interest that has to be paid increases. the rise in interest rates
has undoubtedLy exacerbated the probLem and, if interest rates now faLL, this
witL bring some reLief. However, so Long as Denmark reLies heav'iLy on
debt-creating capitaI fLows to finance its current defic'it, progress towards
reducing that deficit is tikeLy to be both painful and sLow. So far Denmark
is the onLy Commun'it country where debt service is proving a serious
obstacLe to baLance of payments recovery, but there are others which
couLd find themsetves in a somewhat simi[ar situation in the future, if
present trends continue. In IreLand, for exampIe, the accumuLated current
defjcits of the Last four years amount to 30% of 1982 GDP and in Betgium
the equivaLent figure is 187.. Both countries have, as a resuLt, experienced a
significant deterioration in their baLance on investment income account, as atso
has Ita ty.
3.6 Financing current account imbaLances
The Community as a whoLe accumuLated a current deficit of nearLy
ECU 63 000 miLLion over the eight years 1974-1981. To this has been added
a net outfLow of private Long-term cap'itaL of ECU 38 000 miLLion, most of it
during 1979-1981. Thjs deficit on current and private Long-term cap'itaL
combined has been financed almost entireLy by a net infLow of private short-term
capitaL, much of it originat'ing f rom the o'i L export'ing countries. For the
Community as a whote therefore officiaL financing, whether in the form of
offic'iaL borrowing (narrowLy defined here to excLude borrowing by nationaLized
industlies, etc.) or of reserve use has not been a major source of support
(see Table 3,10),aLtho.rgh certain individuaL Member States have, at one time
or another, made extensive use of such faci lities.
ALthough the Community as a whoLe registered substantiaL current
deficits in 1974-1976 and again in 1979-1981 there have on each of these
occasions been some member countries in comfortabLe surpLus - the FederaL
RepubLic of Germany, the Nethertands and BeLgium-Luxemburg in 1974-1976
and the United Kingdom during 1979-1951. Thus within the Community itself,
as t"leLl as between the Community and the outside worLd, there has been a need
to generate capitat fLows to finance these current account imbaLances, with
surptus countries export'ing cap'itaL and deficit countries importing it.
q.\(JJ
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' Exchange rate movements have p[ayed an important rote in producing
this resutt. As a generat rute changes'in Community exchange rates appear
to have occurred in response to, or at least concomitantLy with, changes.in
the current account. Thus for most of the countries during most of the
periods coveredran improvement in the current baLance, or the maintenance
of an aLready strong current account performance, has been accompanied by
an effective appreciation (or a reduced rate of depreciation in the case of
certain traditionaLIy weak currencies); and a deterjoration of the current
baLance has been accompan'ied by an effective depreciation (or, in the case
of certain traditionaLLy strong currencies, by a much reduced rate of
appreciation). The Communityrs experience aLso suggests that exchange rate
changes have, on the whoLe, encounaged stabitizing capital movements. Thus
it can be seen from Graph 3.2 that for most Commun'ity countries, with the
notabLe exception of Germany, during most of the periods considered, pr.ivate
capitaL fLows have, to a substantiaL extent, offset current account jmbaLances.
other factors, notabLy interest rate differentials, have, of course, aLso
contributed to this resuLt. But the necord seems to show that exchange rate
movements, provjded that they are sustained over reasonabLy tong periods,
such as two or three years, have been accompanied by net private capitaL
f Lows at Least in the requ'ired di rection, if not aLways on the requ'ired scaLe,
and thus to have p Layed a stabi I i z.ing ro Le.
There have been interesting differences between deficit countries
with regard to the methods used to finance imbaLances. Iretand and Greece
have, on the whoLe, been abLe to finance most of their current deficits by
attract'ing private Long-term capitaL, aLthough in the tast few years IreLand
has had to have jncreasing recourse to officiaL borrow'ing. ItaLy has atso
financed its deficits by a combination of private cap'itaL infLow and officiaL
borrowing. BeLgium-Luxemburg, on the other hand, since its current account
moved into deficit in the middle seventies has made increasing use of short-
term finance to brjdge the gap - nearty 6O% of the net private cap.itaL infLow
during the five years 1977''1981 was short-term. France, which has continued
to export Long-term capitaL despite the worsening of its current account,
has reLied entirety on short-term funds to meet its financing needs, a course
which may have contributed to making the currency more vuLnerabLe to specutative
pressure. In recent years Germanyts current deficit, Like that of France,
has been aggravated by a net outfLow of private tong-term capitaL, but unLike
France it has not reLied on short-term funds to cover its financing needs.
Instead it has had recourse to a combination of officiaL, mainLy Long-term,
borrowing and use of its foreign exchange reserves.
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TabLe 3.1
Terms of trade of major country groups
Index : 1975 = 100
0i L exporting
count r i es
Industria L countries
Tota L EC
lJon-oi L
deveLoping
count r i es
1972
1973
1974
1978
1 980
1981
1 982 ( est i mate)
40
45
105
95
173
193
184
112
110
98
100
110
109
94
101
95
95
96
111
118
110
110
105
103
100
90
89
90
Sources : I.M. F., Eunostat.
TabLe 3.2
Growth of voLume of worLd
(annuaL average percentage
'import s
rates of change)
Wor Ld Industria I
count ri es
Non-oi L
deve Lopi n9
countries
Oi L exporting
countries
1969-1973
1974-1978
1979-1982
1974-198?
9.5
4.3
1.8
3.2
9.7
4.3
1.1
2.8
6.0
4,5
3.0
3.8
12.0
23.5
4.7
14.8
Source : I.M. F.
55
s.17
TabLe 3.3
NominaI and real externaL adjustment by major country groups
r000 miLLion I
1970-7? 1974 1978
a verage
1980 1981 1982 Chanses
Reoui red
1982ffiACnleveo
0i L exportjng countries
i) at current prices
Merchandise exports (fob)
Merchandise imports (fob)
Merchandise trade baIance
Servi ces (net)
UniLateraL transfers (net)
Current batance
'i i ) at constant 1975 pr i ces
Exports of goods & services
Imports of goods & services
BaLance on goods & services
?2 118 142 297 275 2.012 36 101 130 154 1s0
-8 -13 -33 -44 -40 -40
-1 -4 -7 -12 -14 -1s
+1 +65 +1 +111 +67 +15 +1 4 +14
114 ',t33 139 120 107 9410 64 125 131 154 154
+74 +69 +14 
-11 -47 -60 -134 -134
Industriat countries
-:
'i ) at current pri ces
Merchandise exports (fob)
Merchandise imports (fob)
Merchandise trade batance
Services (net)
UniLateraL transfers (net)
Current batance
i'i) at constant 1975 pri ces
Exports of goods & services
Imports of goods & services
BaLance on goods & services
2 19 528
210 551
84E 1211 1197 119s
838 1276 1215 1200
+9 
-23 +10
+7 +14 +27
-8 -17 -24
-65 -18
+29 +23
-31 -30
-5
+8
-30
+8 
-26 +13 -67 -25 -12 +25 -20
575 720 865 970 990 980615 745 860 g2o 900 890
-40 -25 +5 +50 +90 +90 +155 +130
Non-oi L deveLoping countries
i) at current prices
Merchandise exports (fob)
Merchandise imports (fob)
Merchandise trade baLance
Services (net)
Uni Lateral transfers (net)
Current baLance
ii) at constant 1975 prices
Exports of goods & services
Imports of goods & services
Batance on goods & services
5 0 114 195 317 327 30058 147 228 s88 402 365
-8 -ss -33 -71 -75 -65
-3 -6 -1? -25 -34 -36
+4 +9 +14 +22 +23 +26
-7 -30 -31 -74 -86' -75 - 48 -68
1 18 138 179 201 210 210
1 t+8 186 22? 250 255 240
- 30 -48 -43 -49 -45 -30 +10 0
Sources : I.M.F.r 0.E.C.D., E.C. Commission.
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TabLe 3.4
The Community current account
r000 mi L L ion ECU
1972 1974 1978 1 980 1981 1982(est. )
Merchandjse exports (fob)
Merchandise imports (fob)
Merchandise trade baLance
Services (net)
UniLateraL transfers (net)
Current ba lance
132.7
126.1
226.?
231.3
348.1
334.3
480. 5
506.0
560.0 625.0
56 5.0 626.0
+ 6.6
+ 3.6
- 5.1
+ 3.2
- 8.1
+1 3.8
+10.0
-11.8
-25.5
+11 
.8
-15.6
- 5.0 + 1.0
+ 4.0 + 5.0
-19. 0 
-21 .0
+ 5.0 -10. 0 +12.0 -29.3 - 20.0 -17.0
Sources : Eurostat, E.C. Commission.
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Tabtc 3.5
NominaI and reat adjustrrcnt in thc European Conmunity
1970-7?
a ve ra9e
1974 197E 1 9E0 1981 19E2(fo chanses ffi
Requi red
'000 ni l.tion
ECU
Achieved
aslot
rea I
GOP
g roHt h
1972-19E2,
r) Current batance in r000 mittion ECU at current prices
BL
DK
D
GR
f
IRL
I
NL
UK
+0.6
-0.3
+0.8
-0.3
+0.2
-0.2
+1.3
+0. ?
+1.7
+0. E
-0.6
+E.2
-1 .0
-5.0
-0.6
-6.7
+1 
.7
-6.6
-0.8
-1 .?
+6.9
-0.7
+2.9
-0.3
+4.9
-1.2
+1 
.4
-3.5
-2.3
+1 
.0
-0.9
-1 4.0
.-1 ?
-4.6
rq, 7
+3.7
-1.2 Jt.8
-1 .6 -1 .7
-11 .5 -6. 8
-1.6 
-O.7
-5.4 -10.3
-1.0 
-2.0
-7.0 
-7.3
-1 .9 +2.9
+5.1 +11.0
-0.3 -4.3
+0.6 -2,0
+3.2 +0.2
-1.5 -0.6
+5.5 
-14.2
-0.5 
-1 .5
+O.7 
-5 . 9+0.8 +5.5
+1.3 +Z.O
EC +1.? -10.0 +12.0 -29.3 -20.0 -16.6 +7.E -20.8
b) Current batance as I of GDP at current prices
BL +2.E
DK -1 .7
D *0.4
GR -2.8
F +0.1
IRL -1.5
t +1.2
NL +0.6
uK +1.3
+1.8
-3.0
+2.6
-6.3
-2.2
-9.9
-1.7
+ 2.9
-1.1
-1 .1
-2.7
+1 
.4
-2.8
+0. E
-3.3
+?.4
-1 
'1,
+0.6
-5.0 -5.2 -3.9
-3.8 
-s.2 -4.1
-'t .9 
-1 .1 +0.1
-5.5 
-z.z -2.4
-1.2 
-z.o -z.c
-8.1 
-8.1 -9.0
-2.5 
-z.s -lr.3
-1 .6 +2.3 +4. o+1.4 +2.4 +o.g
EC + 0.6 -1.0 + 0.8 -1.5 -0.9 -0.7
c) Goods and services batance in r000 mittion ECU at 1975 prices
BL
DK
D
GR
t
IRL
I
NL
UK
0
-1.0
+8.5
-1 .?
+3.5
-0.6
+3.0
0
0
+2.5
+2.1
+19.0
-1 q
+0.5
-nq
+2.0
+5.0
+1.0 +0.5
-0.8 -0.5
+4.0 +1E.0
-1.5 -1.3
-1 .5 -'l .5
-0.7 -1.0
-1.0 -5.0
-1.0 +?.0
-5.0 -6.0
g +1.5
+1.3 +2.0
+5.0 +15.0
-1.2 -1.3
+2.0 +3-5
-0.7 -4.7
-5.0 +1.0
+1.5 +4.5
-0.5 
-1 .5
+1.5 +1 
.5
+1.3 +2.9
+17 .5 + 15.0
+0.2 0
+12.5 +2.0
+0.7 +0.2
+10.5 +6.0
+5.5 +6.0
+0.5 0
15
55
20
0
3
16
14
39
0
EC -9.5 +5.0 + 12.0 +2 .5 +24.0 +24.0
jil)urccs : Eurostat, E.C. Conmission
+54.0 +33.5 11
E$
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TabLe 3.6
Energy imports and the Commun'i ty t s baLance of trade
Uni t 1972 197 4 1978 1 980 1981 1ae2 Change1972-1982
VoLume of
net energy
'i mports
Unit pri ce
of energy
imports
Ba Lance on
energy
t rade
Trade
ba L ance(goods and
servi ces)
at current
pni ces
Ba Lance on
ene rgy
trade at
1975
pri ces
Trade
ba L ance(goods and
servi ces)
at 1975
pri ces
r 000
miLlion ECU
'000
mi L tion ECU
r 000
mi ! lion ECU
mi L Lion TOE 595 616 540 527 445 437
ECU per TOE 18.5
| 000
miLLion ECU -11.0
62.4 75.0 144.0 199.4 ?15.1 +196.6
-38.4 -40.5 -75.9 -88.7 -94.0 -83
-1 58
+10 -2 +?4 -14 -1 +4
-39.5 -41.0 -36.0 -35.0 -29.5 -29.0 + 10.5
-13 .5 + 5 . 0 + 17 .O +2.5 +24 .0 +24 .0 +37.5
-6
Source : E.C. Commission.
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TabLe 3.7 (1\
Trade-weighted nominaL and rea[''' exchange rate movements in four major
Comnunity countries
Indices : 1970-1975 average = 100
1970 1974 1978 1 980 1981 198?(J anua ryl August )
D nominaL
rea L
F nominaL
rea I
I nominaL
rea L
UK nominat
rea L
89
93
98
100
110
105
110
104
100
106
97
96
89
94
92
93
136
106
98
100
62
89
69
92
144
101
101
105
58
98
81
126
137
91
92
99
51
94
81
130
144
86
48
78
(1) The measure of reaL exchange
corrected for exchange rate
Source : E.C. Commission.
rate movement used here is reLative GDP prices
changes.
Tabte 3.8
The share of price-eLastic goods and servjces
Community countries
in the exports of four major
1970-1971
exports 'imPorts
1980-1981
export s imports
D
F
I
UK
78
61
68
59
56
54
46
43
73
54
72
58
53
46
42
56
Source : E. C. Commi ss'ion.
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Tab Le 3.9
Net foreign 'investment income of Community countries, 1972-198?
1972 1978 1981 1982 (estimate) Change 1972-1982
r000 miLLion ECU
as%of
export s
of goods
and
servi ces
r000 miLLion ECU
BL
DK
D
GR
F
IRL
I
NL
UK
+0.15
-0.1 1
+0.31
-0.05
+0.32
+0.04
-0.08
+O.14
+1.20
+O.49
-0.69
+1.79
-0.1 1
+1.11
-0.19
-0.87
-0.03
+0.89
-0.19
-1.78
-o.44
-0.25
+0.70
-0.30
-2.87
-0.32
+2.08
-1 .0
-2.5
-1.5
-0.3
U
-0.5
-?q
-0.2
+2.0
-1 .1
-IU.U
-0.6
-3.3
0
-4.8
-3.3
-4.2
+1.3
-1.?
-2.4
-1.8
-0,3
-0.3
-0.5
-3.4
-0.3
+0.8
EC +1.92 +2.39 -3.O7 -7.5 -0.8 -9.4
Sources : Eurostat, E.C. Commission.
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TabLe 3.10
Financing current imbatances
ECU r000 mitLion
1974-1976 1977-1978 1979-1981 1974-1981
BL Current baLance
Private Long-term capitaL (net)
Private short-term capitaL (net) (1 )
TotaL requ'iring officiat financing
0fficiaI caoitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-0.8 -3.7 -4.2
+1 
.3
-o.4
-nA
-1.4
+n2
+0.4
-11.5
+3.4
-11 .7
+3.7
+4.4 +4.2
+0.5
-o.2
-u. I
+1.1 
t
-0.3
+s.7 t
a
+4.2
DK Current ba Iance
Private capital. (net) (2)
TotaI requiring officiaI financing
0fficiaL capitat (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-2.9
+2.4
-?.7
+4.6
-5 .5 -11 .1
+4.8 +11 .8
-nq +1.9 -o.7 +0.7
+0.1
*:'o
-nl
-1 R
0
+0.7
0
-n7
Current ba Lance
Private Long-term capitaL (net)
Pri vate short-term capitat (n"t) (1 )
TotaI requiring officiaL financing
0ffi ciaL capitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
+14.9
-9.0
-<A
+10. 1
-4.7
+7 
.Q
-??.3
-5.5
-3.3
+2.7
-19.2
+0.3 +1?.4
-31.1 -18.4
+1.8
-2.1
+1.0
-13.4
+19.0
+1?.1
+?1.8
-3.4
GR Current ba Lance
Private long-term capitaL (net)
Pri vate short-term capitat (net) (1 )
TotaI requiring offic'iaI financing
0fficiaL capitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-2.6
+1.3
+0.6
-1 .7
+1 
.3
-4.1
+3.0
+1.2
-E.4
+5.6
+2.1+0.3
-0.7 -0.1 +0.1 -o.7
+0.4
+0.3
+0.3
-0.?
+0.7
Current ba Lance
Private Iong-term capitaL (net)
Private short-term capitaL (net) (1)
TotaL requ'iring officiaI financing
0f f i ciaL cap'i tat (net)
Change in reserves (* = decrease)
+o.7 +?.7 +3.6 +7.0
-10.6
-2.O
+13.3
0
-2. I
+4.8
-14.5
-15.7
+33.8
-?5.1
-19.8
+5'1 
- 
9
0
-o.7
+0.1
-?.7
-1 .1
-2.5 -5.9
br-
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TabLe 3.10 (contlnued) ECU !000 miLtion
1974-1976 1977-1978 1979'1981 1974-1981
IRL Current baLance
Private Long-term caPitaL (net)
Private short-term capitaL (net)(1)
TotaL requiring officiaL financing
0fficiaL caPitat (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-0.9
+0.8
+0.1
-0.6
+o.7
+0.'l
- 4.0
+1.0
+ 0.3
-5. 5
+?.5
+0. 5
+0.8
-0.8
'-Z'.'o | "'' t +2.5
Current baLance
Prjvate tong-term capitaL (net) /4\
Private short-term capita[ (net)' "
TotaI requiring officiat financing
0fficiaL capitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-9.7
+3.5
+0.8
+7.O
+0.3
+1 
.9
-10.3
+5.6
+3 
-6
-13.0
+9 
-4
+6.3
-5.4 +9.2 -1.1 +2.7
+5.4
0
-1.6
-7.6
+6.E
-5.7
+1 0.6
-13.3
NL Current baLance
Private tong-term caPitaL (net)
Private short-term capital (net) (1 )
TotaL requ'iring officiat financing
0fficial capitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-0.9
-"n
+3.6
+1.6 -0.3 +0.2 11.5 
-+o.2 -0.7 -'t.3
-0.2+0.1 +0.5
+5.5
-4.5
+0.6
-0.4
-2.8
+3.4
+4.2
-1 0.3
+7.6
-0.9
-0.7
UK Current baLance
Private long-term caPitaL (net)
Private short-term capitat (net) (1)
TotaL requiring officiaL financing
0fficiaL capitaL (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
+1.4 +14.2 +4.9
-21.1
-1.6 -23.5
+1.8 +8.2 +3.1 1f3.1 
-
-4.9 +8.0 -6.2 '3-1
-10.7
+4.0
+0.9
+4.0
+3.0 +4.3
-11.0 +1-9
+8.2
-5.1
EC Current account 
- e)Private tong-term capitat (net)"
Private short-term capitaL (n.tl(1)
TotaL requiring officiaI financing
0fficiaL capita[ (net)
Change in reserves (+ = decrease)
-15.7 +11 .2 -5 8.4
-3.9 -4.3 -29 -7
'62.9
-37.9
+11 .0 +26.3 +46.5 +83.8
-8.6 +33.? '41.6 '17.0 
-+8.3
+0.3
+17.0
-:T.: | *+r-o I
(1) Net private short-term capitaL jncLudes(2) No break-dovn betreen private Long and
In the total for the EC as a uhoLe thejn Private Long-term caPital'
Source : Eurostat.
errors and omissions.
short-term capjtaL is avaiLabte for Denmark'
net capjtaL fLow for Denmark is included
-lLan
:
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GRAPH 3.1
ReaL exchange rate movements and trade in price-eLastic
goods and services
ReaL exchange rate index measured by reLative GDP prices (teft-hand
Trade baLance in price-etastic goods and services scaLe)
as a percentage of GDP (right-hand scaLe)
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GRAPH 3.2
Current ba[ances and private capital ftows in EC countries
tr
tr
Current baLances
Private capitaL
DK
as a percentage of GDP
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4.1
4. Prices and Costs
ALthough no rapid slowdown in Community infLation occurred in 1962 Iin ccntrast to progress made in the United States and
more notabty, Japan, important strides have been made in some countries as
a resuLt of which the trend rate of infLation in the Unjted Kingdom, the
FederaL RepubLic of Germany and the Nethertands is [o], or much reduced.
Etsewhere the stowdown in prices is taking considerabty Longer to appear
than after the first oiI price rise, refLecting the graduatist approach
adopted in some countries as against a more severe poticy prescription in
others. Contributions to inflation by commodity group'ing have shifted some-
what recentty, rith energy prices [ess of a factor and higher food prices
beginning to become important. This coutd be important for the adjustment
process because of the greateri mpact whi ch pri ces of non-di scretionary
goods have on perceived inflation, price expectations and wage moderation.
As regards wage adjustments, greater f[exibiLity has been evident in the
United States and in Japan than in the Community. ttlember States have varied
substantiaLLy in the speed and magnitude of their adjustment to the energyprice and terms of trade shocks of recent years. In 1981 in parti.cular, reaL
h,ages uere adjusted sharpLy downwards in the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, the
Nethertands and BeLgium whiLe they co-ntinued to grow significantLy in that year inFrance, ItaLy and the United Kingdom. The adjustment in incones which has
so far been achjeved has not been sufficient to restore previous compet'itive-
ness tevets for the Community as a whole and it has only been the substantial
depreciation in effective exchange rates which has eased the pressure on
European industry.
1.1 Price inftation in the Community
The disinflatjon process in the Community continued in 1982 after
ceasing for a rhiLe in1981 when2 in the first seven months of that yea?,
the dot[ar apprecjated sharply against E[tlS currencies. The reversaI of the
dotlarrs movement with respect to the ECU in the second haLf of 1981, together
rlith the continued sharp decline in the dotLar price of non-oiL commodity
prices, as weLL as faLLing o'iL prices have resuLted in
generat dec[ine in European inftatjon rates in the first ha[f of the year.
From a high point of just over 167" in ttlay'1980, the deceteration in in-
flation, interrupted during most of 1981, continued apace in 1982 untiL in
l{ay the rate had fa[en below 102. Estimates for 1982 (TabLe 4.3) suggest some
faLL in inftation, as measured by the deflator of private consumption, to 10,5% lor
the year as a trhole. Forecasts for atI countries in 1983 show that further
fatLs in inflation are expected for aIL Community countries, bringing the
Community average down to 8rB %.
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Comparisons of the performance of Europe, the United States and
Japan, during the periods foLLowing the first and second oiL shocks, are
instructive in assessing the performance of current stabitisation poLicies.
Comparing first the iniLationary peaks of those two
episodes - 1975 and 1981 - the European community on the vhoLe did somewhat
better on the second occasion in timiting the rise of inftation (to'1016%
compared to 15rO% in the eartier year, for the GDP defLator). This reflects
the stricter financiaL poLicies folLowed in the second case, and is reLated,
no doubt, to the more moderate hrage reaction (to be anatysed further belov).
In the United States the inf[ationary peaks uere similar in both years. In
Japan, however, whiLe substantiaL infLation uas experienced in 1975, a
dramaticaLty better performance uas managed after the second oit shock. In
1981 the GDP defLator in the Latter country rose by Less than 3 7., which
means that the second oi L shock was kept from having any adverse impact on
domestic infLation.
t.Jith respect to the periods of disinfLation foLLowing those peaks
the comparisons cannot yet be fuLLy concIusive. The disinfLation phase
after the first oil shock [asted four years - from 1975 to 1978, whereas in
the present episode the disinfLat'ion process is stiLL under way. In the
Community, inftation was cut aLmost by haLf from 1975 to 1978 (the
rise in thb GDP deflator fatLing from 15t to 8r3{)r 6nd substantial progress
was made aLso in the US and Japan - proportionateLy Less, but dovn to
lover Levels in 1978 (7142 for the US and 4r6X for Japan). In the present
episode, the US has made equatLy fast progress in reducing its domestic in-
ftation rate to a forecast of 6% for 1983 (moreover an even better price
performance is conceivabte), whi[e Japan seems to be retaining an impress-
ivety tow and steady 3il rate. Europe, on the other hand, has on the yhoLe
had much greater difficuLty in reducing its core average inflation rate
significantly beLow the 102 rate. Throughout'1981 and 1982 the weakness of
European currencies against the doLLar and yen inevitabty aggravated reIative
consumer pricetrendsthroughtheir import price content. Hovever the retative
stickiness of the GDP price defLator trends in Europe, conpared to the US and
Japan, has much more to do vith internal rigidities in cost pressures and
cost-price Links
b-l
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t.lithin the Community, the reaction to the second oiL shock has aLso
been more divergent than after the 1973-74 oiL shock. In the FederaL RepubLic
of Germany, the NetherLands and the United Kingdom, a repeat of -he 1975
spiral was avoided. In the first two countries this was achieved by a con-
tinuous process over the rseventies of trying to wind down inflation expecta-
tions. In the United Kingdom, after acceLerat'ing infLation in the Late
rseventies, a very strong f inanciaL stabi Lisat'ion poL'icy was introduced at
the time that the second oit shock was occurring; the petro-currency rote
of stert'ing then Led to strong externaL stabi L'isation inf Luences through
the exchange rate, reinforc'ing domestic stabiLisation pressures. As a resuLt
infLation (measured by the GDP defIator) has been reduced from nearly 19 %
in 1980 to under 7 % now forecast for 1983. As a consequence, in the
United Kjngdom the infLation rate projected for 1983 is significantLy Lower than
at any time during the second hatf of the rseventies. In BeLgium, Luxembourg
Denmark and lreland, price rises in the recent ep'isode have aLso been slower,
to varying degrees, than in 1975, but in aLt cases a new acceLenation has
occurred in 1982 (on an annuaL basis). For ltaLy and France, inflation
rates have been of simiLar orders of magnitude as in the previous episode
aLthough pnogress in reducing infLation is expected to be seen in 1983.
Greece is the onLy instance in which the current
rate of increase in prices (above 20 %) is very significantLy above that
recorded in the mid rseventies.
The overaLL European Community experience is refLected in the
evoLution of the standard deviation of infLation rates, which is the
best singLe measune of divergences in infLation performance. In 1981
the standard deviation for the GDP defLator was 516 %, substantialLy above
the 1978 low of 3r5 %, but stiLL Less than the 1975 point of extreme di-
vergence of 714 %. Some progress in stabi Lizing this standard deviation
was seen in 1982, and a [ower LeveL-of 5r?% shoutd aga'in be seen in 1983.
Measured on the [eveL of consumer prices the
divergence has however, not falLen as rapidLy since 1979 as in the years
after 1975.
bB
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As regards the commodity breakdown of infLation, fuet and energy
price rises have nox fatLen back ctoser to the average of other
conmodities (see graph. 4,2>. llanufactured goodst price rises atso
experienced a steady deceleration in the Last 24 months as greater efforts
were made to maintain market shares and cut production costs. The rate of
growth of food prices, after rising significantLy Less than the overatL
rate of infLation, climbed steadiLy through 1981 and into 1982 even before
the recent agricutturaL price settLement which coutd protong this trend
through 198?. The prices of services moderated during 19E1, principat[y
due to the significant energy conponent in thjs category. Rents behaved
erraticaLLy mainLy because of the timing of permitted increases which have
increasing[y become subject to controL, to annuat adjustments in pubIic
authority housing rents and aLso due to the fact that the rent conponent in
some countries covers mortgage interest rate charges, which rose quite
sharpty.
An aLternative method of Looking at the conponents of infLation, is
based on the contributions of the principat inputs (inports, labour costs,
indirect taxes and other factors) to the rise of totat finat expenditure
prices (see TabLe 4.2). The contribution of inports to the rise in the
totaf. price tevet continued at a high tevet in 1981, as the dottar shock
rep[aced the second oiL price rise as a causative eLement, so that the
contribution from jrport prices was of the same order of magnitude in
19?9-81 as in 1973-74. The contribution of tabour costs per unit of output
uas miLder than in the earLier of these periods but uas stiLt a significant
determinant of the Commlnityrs infLation rate. Indirect taxes (Less
subsidies) also show a markedty different reaction to the oit price rise
than previousty. Governments have been far tess retuctant to raise
indirect taxes than in the previous period uhen they had tried to cushion
the inpact of the rise in energy prices on the consumer. This shift in
poLicy also coincided with generaL increases in vatue added tax in the UK
and the Federat RepubLic of Germany in1979 and in ItaLy in 1980, and
generat attenpts to Limit budget deficits in most countries. Graph 4.2
shors the respective contributions of wage costs and imort prices to price
bl
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rises by count?yt in the past decade and in the forecast period. It
itLustrates quite cLearLy the difference in the reactjon of the domestic
economy to the externat shocks in 1973-74 and more recentty. Thus unit
labour costs contributed 7r1 Z and 8rO Z to price rises on totaL expen-
diture in 1974 and 1975 corpared to 5rO 7. and 4r1 I in 1981 and 1982.
0n the inportant question of infLationary expectations, Graph 4.3
give some encouraging signs. The expectations of heads of industry on pri-
ces in the months ahead has moved favourably since October 1981. The
modest upward movement in May can be ascribed to an adverse movement in
France where industriaLists have become tess confident on future price
deveLopments. According to the Juty survey, consumens, who in their rote
of wage earners are an irportant factor jn future inftation movements,
expect it to faLL marginaLly in the next tHelve months in the Community as
a whoLe; the jndex of their expectations is now Lower than at any time
since January 19?9, atthough rises Lrere recorded in Betgium, France and
Denmark. However, judging from these data a decisive break in infLationary
expectations has not yet been achieved.
4.2 l'lages and income distribution
A fatt in the growth of nominaL wages and sataries per head to 10182
was recorded in the Community in 1982 Gfter 12rBZ in 1981) and a further
reduction is expected in 1983 (Tabte 4.4). Although wage behaviour in most
trlember States has become more responsive to the tabour market situation and
increasingly at industry levet negotiations the financiat position of com-
panies has been taken into account, experience among Community countries
has not been uniform, given the substantiatLy different size and nature of
the uage response to tower infLation and weak tabour market conditions. At
the beginning of 1982, the year-to-year increase in nominat wages varied
1e
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from just over 51 in the Federa[ Repubtic of Germany to over 201 for ItaLy
and Greece. Some narroh,ing of overatL differentiaLs are expected for 1982
as a whote, as is shorn in the Lower standard deviation of nominal wage
increases in the Commlnity in the first part of TabLe 4.4. In 1983, some
further overaLL convergence is aIso forecast but, neverthetess, dispersion
between the highest and Lowest rates coutd remain simiLar. l4oreover, the
degree of divergence wouLd be narrower in 1982 and faL[ more in 1985 if
figures for Greece are exctuded. In this country comensation per head
increased by 2714 7 br just over 3% in real terms) as a resutt of
measures, introd.rced at the end of 1981 and beginning of 1982, to favour
the [ouer paid and introduce automatic indexation of pubtic (and, subject
to negotiation, private) sector blages.
After the first oiL shock reat conpensation in the Comnunjty and
Japan rose fast, with rates of 47( be'ing recorded in 1975 as inftation
sLowed down whiLe nominat wage c[aims were being pitched at a high tevel
(Tabf.e 4.4). In the United States, on the other hand, considerab[e
restraint was exercised with l-ittte change in reaI incomes. The adjustment
to lower increases in reaL purchasing power was, however, rapid in Japan
after 1975 uhiLe in the Commlnity, as a whole, Hage-earners continued to
gain substantiaL increases in reaL incomes. A further adjustment uas made
in the United States in the period 1979-1980 with successive faLl.s in reat
comensat i on (016 and 111 % respect i ve Ly) . A ma rked s towdown was
registered in reaL wages in Japan in 1980.indicatjng a substantiatty more
discipLined adjustment than in the earLier period. It is onty in 1982 that
signs of an overdue Community wage correction have generatty begun to
emerge and even noh, smatL reaL increases are stitL expected on average in
both 1982 and 1983.
Among the Comn:nity Plember States resuLts have been mixed. In the
FederaL RepubLic of Germany tt.lo years of reat wage adjustment have been
recorded in 1981 and 1982 and in Luxembourg a simjtar movement has been in
evi dence.
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In the Nethertands and Denmark, uhere modifications have been made to
indexat'ion systems in 1980 and 1981-82 respectivety, reaL conrpensation has
fatLen over a period 1979-1981, atthough in the former country some
increase in reat wages is expected in 1982 and 1983. In Betgium, yhere
indexation practices have recentLy been modified (in tine nith the
Commissionrs Communication of JuLy 1981 (1)), a falt of 119 Z in reaL
purchasing potrer shoutd be recorded in 1982, fotLorling a period of [arge
increases up to 1980, part'icu[arty in the years fotlouing the first oit
price shock when they L,ere even as high as 7 7 in one year (197O. A simi-
tar picture emerges for IreLand trith faLLs in 1982 and 1983 coinciding with
a return to free bargaining, in a period of soft Labour market conditions,
after the breakdown of the system of nationaIty negotjated agreements which
had been in force since 197'1. In the United Kingdom no adjustment in reaL
purchasing h,as recorded in 1982 after rapid increases in the years since
1977 but recent settLements suggest that a more pronounced downward revi-
sion is being made to real wage expectations. For France, aLthough the
massive real wage increase of 10 Z in 1975-76 has not been repeated in the
current period, the increases up to 1982 have nevertheLess been high and it
is onty in 1983 that some moderation in reaL nage cLaims is expected. In
ItaLy no adjustment has yet taken pLace and reaL increases in incomes of 2
% per annum have been the norm. In 1983 present forecasts suggest that an
acceLeration to 2r3 Z couLd even occur, aLthough some downward pressure on
incomes coutd resu[t from the decision of the Confederation of ItaLian
Indrstries to suspend indexation from January 1983. In Greece reaL per
capita conpensation is Likety, after a growth of 2 X in 1981, to rise by 3
1l? I in 1982 and then is forecast to stabiLize in 1983.
(1) 
"Commission Comnnrnication to the Councit on the principLes of indexa-
tion in the Comm,rnity" reproduced in European Economy nn10r
Novenber 19E1
$-
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A rise in reat corpensation may, however, be met to some extent
through productivity increases without giving rise to changes in the income
distribution. It may therefore be more appropriate to assess distribu-
tionaI issues on the basis of the "normaLised labour income ratio" which
measures Labour income as a percentage of net domestic product at factor
cost, incLuding an inputed Labour income for the setf enpLoyed jn order to
adjust for changes in the structure of enpLoyment. This measure of the
"reaL Hage" in the Com munity as a whoLe increased in 1979 to 1981 but not
nearLy as sharpLy as in1973-1975. A faLL was recorded in 1982 and may
atso be expected in 1983; nevertheLess, the tevet wiLL stiLI be nearty 4
percentage points higher than the average tevet of the 1960s (Tabte 4.5).
A cross-country conparison of normaIised LeveLs can be hazardous,
given the fact that in some economies wage and satary earners accgunt for a
reLativeLy Low proportion of totaL erployment, and given the assumption
made that the seLf-erpLoyed receive the average Hage. Thus considerabLe
caution is needed in drawing hard and fast concLusions from the absoLute
LeveL of the figures contained in Tabte 4.5. Despite these reservations,
certain striking resutts do emerge on how countries are proceeding to soLve
their income adjustment probLems of the 1970s.
- In the forecast and estimation period <1982 and 1983) a uniform
decrease in the Labour/income share is foreseen in atL countries,
except in Greece where a further targe increase is expected in
1982, in ltaLy were rises are expected in both years and in the
United Kingdom where some rise in forecast in 1983. In the latter
two countries the Levet of the Labour/income ratio witL be nearty 8
percentage points higher than in the sixties.
- The steady progress of the most recent adjustment process in the
Federat RepubLic of Germany has been quite remarkabte with the
Labour income share falLing back to the Levet of the sixties in the
period 1981-1983;
- In Denmark the
since 1979 and
- The Nethertands
share is stiLL
rapid rise in the period 1973-1975 has been reversed
the LeveL has now dropped back considerabty;
too has shown a similar trend but the Labour/income
substantiatty over that recorded in the 1960s;
Fr.lt5
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Iretand is expected in 1982 and 1983 to make substantiat progress
after the rapid upward movement in 1979 - 1981 aLthough the
s'ituation here is compLicated by cycLicaL movements in agricuLturaL
incomes which partLy account for the erratjc behaviour of this
seriesl
- In Be[gium and Luxembourg the tabour/income share remains substan-
tiatLy above the LeveLs of the sixties a[though some sLow decrease
i s forecast.
4.3 ReLative cost performance
A new and different tight on cost and price performance may be
obtained when measurement is done of costs in competing countries. The
method used for the caLcuLation of reLative costs is described in detaiL in
European Economy Nn 8r March 1981. This measure of reLative costs gives
unit Labour costs in each country in reLation to the weighted average of
unit Labour costs of 17 corpetitor countries, taking account not onLy of
biLateraL trade but aLso of the intensity of competition in third markets
and in the domestic market of each country. Data has now been incorporated
for the years back to 1960 and the whote series is reproduced in the Sta-
tisticaL Annex.
For the Comrunity as a whoLe, the data show a progressive worsening
of its competitive position. 0n the basis of unit Labour costs, over the
period untiI the first oiL crisis, the index (base 1970 = 100) moved from
89 in 1960 to 11615 ln 1973, more because of a 28 % rise in domestic Labour
costs than because of substantiaL movements in effective exchange rates
(appreciation of ?16 t). Devetopments thereafter have tended to move aLong
simiLar tines untiL 1980, i.e. an exchange rate appreciation of 2r1 iA
overshadowed by a 1313 Z increase in retative costs in nationaL currency (1).
(1) The index
i ndex of
effect i ve
peri od.
of reLative tabour
retative costs in a
exchange ratesl the
costs in nationat currency equaLs the
common currency divided by the index of
changes are cumuLated over the whoLe
'\*
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In 1981 and so far, in 1982, the improvement in Community competitiveness
back to the tevet of the earLy seventies has primarity been a resuLt of
substantiaL faLts jn effective exchange rates, but a[so due in part to more
moderate wage behaviour, as is shown by the modest growth in reLative costs
in nationaL currency of Or7 Z in 1981 and the projected faLt of 1r2 I in
1982.
In the United States, reLative Labour costs in nationaL currency
feLL by just under 20 X (cumuLated figure) in the period 1960-73. This
decLine tras suppLemented by a fatL of 15 Z in the effective exchange rate
concentrated in the earty seventies, and gave an improvement jn reLative
competitiveness in common currency terms of over 30 Z form 1960 to ',973.
This trend continued up to 1978, with continuing faLLs in reLative Labour
costs up to 1977 and an exchange rate faLL in 1978 to give a high point in
competitiveness in 1978 when the index for the US had fatten to 63. Since
then, there has been a progressive decLine in US competitiveness as higher
reLative costs in nationat currency have been considerabLy reinforced by a
strong appreciation in the effective exchange rate of the US doLLar in the
past two years. NevertheLess, the reLative cometitive position of the US
economy is stiLL more favourabte than at any time prior to the first oiI
shock, the index in 1982 standing at 81.
For Japan, reLative costs increased in nationaL currency terms by
nearLy 7 Z between 1960 and 1973, and were reinforced by an effective
apprec'iation of the yen of 20 %. However in contrast uith the Comm.rnity,
the major part of the increase in relative costs has resuLted from the
exchange rate appreciation rather than a rise in domestic costs. Since
1974, Japanese reLative Labour costs in nationaL currency terms have
improved massiveLy, and more than conpensated for the increase in the
effective yen rate on corpetitiveness rrith the resuLt that the jndex in
198? at 114 was weLL beLow the 136 tigure of 1974.
hf ithin the Commr.rnity in the peri od 1974-82 aLt countries, except
the FederaL RepubLic of Germany and the NetherLands, experienced depre-
ciations in their effective exchange ratese principaLty concentrated in
1976 and 1981.
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These countries negistered substantiaI reLative reductions in domestic
Labour costs which enabled them to improve conpetitiveness even whiLe
revatuing their currencies. In the remaining countries, it was onLy in
BeLgium and, to a considerabty Lesser extent, in Denmark, that domestic
Labour costs decLined. Etsewhere, increases in costs in nationaL currency
terms rtere onLy in Itaty corpensated for by exchange rate depreciations,
aLthough in France and IreLand the average annuaL changes in common
currency costs were minimaL. In the UK, substantiaL cost rises jn nationat
currency up to 1979 were only partty conupensated for by exchange rate move-
ments and were foLLowed up in 1979 and 1980 by a rapid exchange rate appre-
ciation. It uas thus onty in 1981 and 1982 yhen the competitiveness index
in common currency terms declined from the high point of 139 (Base 197O =
100) recorded in 1980 to 134 and 126 respectiveLy.
The outLook for 1983 on the basis of current[y expected exchange
rates suggests that common currency retative unit Labour costs in manufac-
turing wiLL grow by 1r4 % in the Community, as against a decline of 2 I in
the US and a marginat increase of Or2 I in Japan. llithin the Community,
faLLs in reLative costs are expected in BeLgium/Luxembourg (6 112 %>,
Federal Republic of Germany (Or4 %, and Denmark (OrZ Z) with aLL other
countries experiencing increases ranging from Or3 % in the United Kingdom
to 3r7 % in France.
'ib
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Itlajor developments in prices and incomes poLicy
9eLgium. In conjunction with the devaLuation of the Belgian franc a temp-
orary modification of the system Linking wages and saLaries to the consumerprice index was adopted on 20 February. Except for the statutory minimum,
wage indexation ulas suspended unti L the end of May. From 1 June to
3'1 December 1982 there wiLL be a flat rate increase of BFR 536 each time the
increase in the index exceeds the trigger point of 2%. These arrangements
appLy to both public sector and private sector workers. Action was atso
taken to infLuence various categories of non wage incomes, notabLy by freez-
ing directorsr fees at their 1981 Level, by limiting the extent to which
doctorst and other medicaL fees may be increased and by introducing a soIid-
arity Levy on the self employed. In March the Government decided to cut min-isteriat saLaries by 1O%.
As a further accompanying measure to the exchange rate adjustment a price
freeze was introduced maintaining prices at their LeveL on 15 February up to
31 ttlay with possibi tities for certain seLective exemptions f rom 1 Apri L. At
the end of May the Government decided to prolong the seLective price freeze
untiI the end of 1982, widen the scope of the special system under which
smatt and medium-sized firms cou[d appLy for exemption from the freeze, and
Limit profit margins in absoLute vaLue to their previous IeveL. Controts on
rents were extended in December 1981 for another year, the authorised in-
crease for 1982 being maintained at 6%.
Denmark. No direct government intervention in the wage determination process
occurrea in the year under review. In 1982 flat rate increases in wages areprovided for by the bienniaL agreement between the sociaL partners as weLt a
certain cost of Iiving adjustmentr. The expiry of the wage drift freeze at th
end of 1981 has not Led to any major increase in this component of wages.
Negot'iations between the sociaL partners for a neh, tLro-year agreement wiIL
begin on 15 November 1982.
In January the Government announced its intention to reinforce the law onprice controL (the ftlonopoLies Act of 195il with a view to extending theperiod required for prior notification of price increases and modifying the
composition of the board of appeal. In June it bras decided to index exciseduties on beverages, tobacco and electricity untiL the end of 1983.
FederaL Republic of Germany. !'lage settLements continue to be negotiated
directl-y by unions and employers. After intensive negotiation a wage settLe-
ment emerged'in the metal industries in March which provided for a growth'in
earnings somewhat beLow the expected infLation rate. Other settLements, inparticular in the chemicaLs industry, have been infLuenced to a considerable
degree by the concern of trade unions for job security and empLoyment. The
wage settlement in ApriL with the public service unions provided for wage
increases approximatety 1% beLow settLements in the private sector.
Greece. Automatic indexation of pubLic (and indirectLy private) sector wages
-fTntroduced to appLy f rom 1 January 1982 and adjustments wi tL take pLace
after the end of each period of four months. Indexation is complete onLy for
t,agesurotsDRA5500Cpermonth; fortheamcuntbet!',eenDRA3590Oand55UCOthein-
creaseuiILequaIhaLf theinfLaii,onrateandforthatbet,neen 55000andEc000it
wi [L equal one quarter of the rnf Lation rate. There wi LL r,re no rndexation i
creases above that LeveL. The index is provisionaLLy that of the consumerprice index and applies to sa[aries as they are on 1 January 198?, i.e. afte
the first increase (between 4 and ?5%\ wh'tch was granted to cover infLationin 1981 and to favour the Lower paid. At the end of May LegisLation provided
that automatic indexation granted by the Government to the pubLic sector
pubLic and private sector (except for the statutory minimum wage) during theperiod 1 June to 31 0ctober 1982. Contro,ts were aLso introduced on distri-
buted prof its, fees and commiss'i on. 'It is proposed to int'roduce on
1 November 1982 a system of artticipated rises in saLarjes in acccrdance
with the offi.ciaI price object'ive in thri putiLic sector and tfris has been
,recomrnended aLso to the.sociaI partners in the private sector.
0n 5 October 1981 the piices of ,"rui.", and ihe retai L pri"eis of certain'im-
1l
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on[y apply to the private sector where it was provided for in coLlective
agreement s.
The Government decided in October'1981 to tighten up the price controI
system by adopting more strict controI on industriaL production costs of
both consumer and intermediate products, the maintenance of price fixing on
basic products, quatity controt of a[[ products but especiatLy foods and
medicines as we[[ as controts on pubtic'ity. Measures imptementing this
decision in February 1982 fixed ceiLings on the increases in certain cat-
egories of industriaL goods. In cases where increases in costs necessitate
an increase in prices exceeding 1O7. for 1982 a speciaI authorisation uitI
be required both for nationat and imported products.
France. In Novenber'1981 a contractuat systemfor thedevetopment of wages and
sataries, in order to break the price wage spiraL, t,las proposed. This suggest
ion envisaged that jn the pubLic sector a catendar of quarterLy rises in
accordance with the Government price object'ive hrouLd be proposed and that
rises at the beginning of the period rlou[d anticipate the devetopment ofprices. No overall consensus uas found on thjs proposal.0n 23 June the
Government suspended prov'isionaLLy the law of February 1950 on the freedom
of negotiations and adopted a draft law to bLock a[[ wage increases in the
portant food products were frozen for sjx and three months respectiveLy. I.n
addition importersr margins were pegged in absotute vatue for three months.
Rent increases were limited for six months to 80% of the rise in the INSEE
construction cost index and a ptedge was given that the increase in public
sector charges uoutd be timited to betveen 8 and 1O"l in 1982. The prices of
industrjaL products h,ere not controU.ed but a recommendation was issued to
firms and whotesaters that the annuat rise jn prjces of products should be
timited to 82. In January1982 food prices were Li'beraLised and price controls
on services h,ere Lifted in Apri[. In June 1982 rents were frozen untit
31 October 1982 at their teveL of 11 June 1982. Fo[towing the EMS real'ign-
ment of 12 June measures were taken to freeze producers and distributorsprices unti[ 31 October. Importerb margins were atso frozen as we[[ aspric
of services. In addjtion aLL variation and revision clauses were suspended
the public and private sector and margins on various food products werefixe
The onty categories excLuded from the freeze were oi[, steet and coaL, prict
governed by internationat agreement.aird pubLic authority ch.arges. 0n.25 August different measures were adopted to ensune a sftooth fiirisition from
the price freeze with an objective of an 8 % rise in prices in 1983. These
incLude Limits on increases in pubtic sector charqes and a reouest to firms
not to exceed the 8 % LeveL.
rref.and. rn December 1981, after the breakdovn in negotiations for a
nffit pay agreement, the Government granted pubLic servjce workers in-
creases over 15 months of between 13 112 and 21"A (for t'he lower paid). The
average jncrease for the year 1982 is approximatety 122. This agreement has
tended to be adopted as a headline for settlements in other sectors.
Ita[y, The Confederation of ltaLian industries announced on 1 June that it
intended to canceI the agreement o'f 25 January 1975 concerning automaticindexation. This wiL[ not have a direct effect on wages untjL the end of
January '1983.
A new method was introduced at the beginning of the year by which the
rnterministeriaI committee on prices fixes the prices of oiI products.
1b
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Luxembourg. The Government temporari[y suspended the price/wage indexation
me?F-il-ism up to the end of 1982 on 9 March. The measures taken limit wage
and salary increases to two tranches of 2r5% (on 1 September and 1 December)
independentLy fror the price LeveL. Indexation was . maintained for the
minimum wage, a 5% solidarity contribution bJas levied on the net income of
the professions and Ministersr saLaries were cut by 10%.
0n ?2 February the Government decided, with immediate effectrto freeze pri
at the LeveL of 19 February.0n 9l'larch it was decided to extend the se[ec-
tive price freeze up to the end of 1982. In addition it lras decided to post-
pone for three months the planned rise in VAT on Liquid energy products.
NetherLands. In December 1981, when the two sides of industry were unabte to
rea;F'an agreement on wage increases in 1982, the Government took measures
under the wage Law to proLong the 1 12% cut in the hotiday bonus and to timit
automatic wage indexation to earnings under HFL 60 000 per annum. These
measures which wiLL appLy untiL the end of 1982 aim to timit the rise in
wages and salaries in 1982 to 6%. If this increase is exceeded the Govern-
ment maintains the right to intervene'
The Government Lifted price controLs from 1 January on six industriat
sectors (paper, texti[es, cLothing, wood, furniture and basic meta[s) and in
three commenciaL sectors (househoLd, audio and photographic appLiances). In
other branches of industry and commerce the maximum increases were set at up
to 5 1l?%. fhe maximum increase for public utiLity charges Lras fixed at 47..
With effect from 1 Juty 1982 rents can be increased by between 4 and 67(.
United Kingdom. The principLe of free coLtective bargaining was maintained
EFe past year in the UK. Action on the incomes side has concentrated
on measures which have been taken to reduce tabour market rigidities and
to cut non-wage Labour costs. In May the authorities agreed to pay increases
of around 6% for civiL servants, doctors, dentists and the armed forces. Thi
outcome was about 2% above the original target.
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Tabl-e 4.2
0rigin of price increases (finaI expenditure), EC 10
$3gt5tit'Eiototg rt?g^it'tiBgtai t,l8l
Import s Unit labourcosts (1 )
Indi rect
taxes (1 )
Other factors(residua[)(1) Tota t (2)
1972
't973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1 980
1 981
1982 (3)
1983 (4)
Q11
215
7r?
1r1
215
1r8
o12
211
3r2
313:
2r1
1r7 
'
313
413
711
8r0
319
412
3r6
319
511
5r0
411
3o5
Q13
014
o.6
0r8
1r2
1rO
0r8
1'1
1,?
Or9
1r1
lro
?,Q
211
215
219
313
215
?,2
2r4
212
2r3
3r0
213
516
9r2
'17 13
12,8
11 rO
915
6r7
9r4
1117
11, i
10r3
815
(1)Per unit of output.(Z)Totat 
= deftator of
( 3)Est i mate .(4)Forecast.
Sources: Eurostat and
Indirect taxes are net of subsidies.
finaL expenditure.
Commi ssion servi ces.
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TabLe 4.5
Normal i sed Labour income rat io (1 )
1960 1970 1979 1 980 1981 198? 1983
B
DK
D
GR
F
IRL
I
L
NL
UK
EC 10
77 19
78r?
77 ra
109 rO
82rz
9313
89 19
77 rz
7116
79,5
8216
77,4
8419
8111
94 15
79.5
98rz
8615
7615
8019
84 15
8218
8617
86r2
8216
9615
85,2
9319
9212
9114
82rg
86,4
8612
8811
8613
8316
9317
87 r1
100,6
90,8
94 rz
83r8
89,2
87,2
89,1
85 rz
83r8
98r4
8812
1o?19
94,2
99,4
81 rB
8819
88r1
88ro 86,5
8314 8215
8212 8112
1o3r7 10312
8618 85 19
gSrg 97,4
g4,4 96 11
99,1 9611
79 17 
.7813gg16 6g11
87,3 87,O
(1) Labour income, incLuding an imputed income
empLoyed as a % of net domestic product at
from Labour of se[f
factor cost.
Source : Commission services.
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Graph 4.12
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Graph4.2:Origin of prjce increases by country (1)
71 72 T3 74 7s 76 77 7E 79"80 El' 82 E3 71 72 73
(1) Contributjon of import prices and wage costs per unit of
defLaton of totaL finaL exoenditure.
Sorircc: Commission services.
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5.1
5. Monetary poLicy and the European Monetary System
The tendency noted since 1979 for monetary growth to sLow down
in the Commun'ity continued in 1981. This success in regaining controL
over the monetary aggregates has prevented a price expLos'ion in the wake
of the second oiL shock and of the rise of the doLLar and has aLready
permitted a degree of success in the fight aga'inst infLation. The scope
for the monetary authorities to switch to less restrictive poLicies depends
on a return to externaL equiLibrium and on an easing of internaLLy generated
infLat'ionary strains. In those countries in which infLationary pressures
are stiLL great t dfry reLaxation of the pressures exerted by monetary poLicy
wouLd raise expectations both of infLation and of currency adjustment and
wouLd not premit a Lasting reduction of reaL interest rates, save at the
cost of reLaunching the spiraL of deva[uation and infLation. The monetary
authorities of the countries which have secured an appreciabLe 'improvement
in their externaL pos'ition shouLd continue to make fulL use of their room for
for manoeuvre and reduce further the LeveL of the'ir interest rates to en-
courage a renewaL of econom'ic growth. A more substant'iaL and Lasting reduc-
t'ion in interest rates in those countries cannot, however, go further than
is consistent with the need to maintain the external vaLue of their cur-
rencies and to consoLidate the progress made in adjusting budgets and reaL
wages and saLaries.
The rise of the doLLar has added to the 'infLationary pressure of
domestic orig'in in Community countries, and reinforced the need for mone-
ta.ry stabiLity. The reaction of the European authorities in the face of
voLatiLe US interest rates has been baLanced : they have managed to keep
the path of money market interest rates smooth, whiLe attempting to Limit
the extend of fLuctuations in the doLlar exchange rate by interven'ing on
the exchange markets. Since the autumn of 1981 the European Monetary System
has been passing through a hazardous phase. WhiLe the adjustments to the
central rates in 0ctober 1981 and June'1982 were a partiaL refLection of
divergences in nat'ionaL costs and prices, the devaLuation of the BeLgian
franc in February 1982 arose from the need to stabiLize the BeLgian economy.
Success of the reaLignments and restoration of greater stabiLity w'ithin
the EMS can be achieved onIy through continued apptication and reinforce-
ment of domestic stabi Lization measures in the weak-currency countries.
5.1, Conduct of monetary policies in 1981 and 1982
169 groadly defined money stock rose 10.5 7, in 1981 (December on
December) on average over the Community as a whole, as against 11.3 % in 1980;
a simi Lar catcuLation covering the countries part'icipating in the exchange
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System shows a growth rate virtuaLLy
unchanged between 1980 and 1981 at 9.2 %. FoLLowing the'upsurge during the
1970s and the appreciabLe sLowdown in 1979 and 1980, money suppLy growth
has thus returned to the average rate recorded during the 1960s (see
Graph 5,1 ) .
s1
5.2
The evidence so far and Commission forecasts suggest that the stabiLization
of the growth of the money suppLy in the Community between 10 and 11% shouLd,
with sLight differences fr.om one country to anothenrcontinue in 1982 and 1983 (seb
TabLe 5.1),This success in regain'ing controL over money suppLy growth is the fruit
of the poLic'ies Launched at the end of the Last decade. It has prevented
the second oiL shock and the appreciation of the doLLar from causing a
sharp rise in infLation rates in the Community, as happened in 1974 and
1975 (see Graph 5.1); it has aLso contributed to the process of disinfLa-
tion noted since the end of 1981.
A major eLernent of the discipL'ine imposed by monetary poLicies
in most Community countries has been the fixing of targets for the growth
of the money supply or of credit which - in 1981 - involved at the very
[east the continuation if not a faLL in the growth rate for the target
var.iabLe compared with the 1980 outturn (see TabLe 5.2). Besides such
quantitative object'ives, the Commun'ity monetary authorities must, in exe-
cuting their poLic'ies, take account of externaL factorsz P?rticuLarLy
movements in the exchange rates of the'ir currencies. This is a consequence
of the high degree of openness of the European economies.
In the Federal Republic of Germany and more recentLy in the
United Kingdom, for exampLe, the monetary authorities have been using the
margin Left them by the fixing of a range for the target variabLe to adjust
the supply of money not onLy in the Light of domest'ic pol'icy but also on
the basis of their currenciesr pos'ition on the foreign exchang rnarket. Such
action does not put in questionthe need to controL the growth of monetary
aggregates if there is to be Lasting success in the struggLe against in-
fLation - qu'ite the reverse.
In the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, the measures taken in Fabruary
1981 by the Bundesbank to restrict the creat'ion of bank Liqu'idity and raise
its cost were motivated mainLy by signs that the German mark was weakening
Qnl"
5.3
on foreign exchange markets, both in reLation to the doLLar and within the
El{S. Th'is renewed demonstration by the Bundesbank of its commitment to
stabiLity, together with the'improvement in the baLance of payments on
current account and the reduction of inflationrsubsequentLy reinforced
confidence in the German mark. ExternaL infLationary factors are currentLy
being held in check by the appreciatjon of the German mark against Euro-
pean currencies and thus atso by the reLative stabiLity of the mark jn
reLation to the doLLar; th'is has meant that the Bundesbank has been abLe
graduaLLy to ease domesti c monetary cond'itions since the autumn of 1981
and so aLtow a more rapid expansion of the broadty defined money stock
(M3). The rate of growth of the target variabLe (MZ) was at the upper
timit of its range during the first haLf of 1982. In the United Kingdom
the authorities wished to be ab[e to present a flexibLe response to un-
usuaL shifts in the demand for money and therefore fixed targets for three
monetary aggregates (M1, sterLing Mg and private sector Liquidity - PSLZ)
wh'i[e aLso taking account of other indicators such as rates of interest
and the exchange rate. Without in any way fix'ing an exchange rate objec-
tive, they consider it desirabIe to Limit fLuctuations in the effective
exchange rate. Thus, in mid-September 1981 the Bank of EngLand reacted
to sjgns of weakness in the pound sterling by tightening money market
condit'ions and aLLowing a Large rise in interest rates. The baLance of
payments surplus and progress on internaL adjustment subsequent[y made
it easier to maintain the external vaLue of sterLing and aLLowed a graduaL
faLL in'interest rates. However, the fixing of quantitative objectives
remains the key instrument of anti-infLationary poLicy, notabLy because
it heLps to stabiLize expectations concerning the'internaL and externaL
vatue of sterLing.
In the other countries, the exchange-rate d'iscipLine imposed by
the European Monetary System has had the effect of reguLating the money
supply. In France,19Sl and the earLy months of 1982 saw an upsurge in the
domesti c creation of Liquid'ity, IargeLy to meet the'Treasuryrs increased
borrow'ing requi rement, but the destruction of Liquidity via the externaL
deficit made it possibLe to curb the growth rate of the money
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suppLy durjng this period; this rate was 11.4'/, over the twe[ve months to
December'1981, as against an initiaL target of 10 %, and current[y stands
at between 12 and 13 % (i.e. within the range of 12.5 % - 13.5 y, fixed for
1982>. Ita[y, IreLand and Greece fix quantjtative objectives for Lending.
In ItaLy and lre[and, which are members o'f the EMS, obeservance of the
targets is compLementary to the exchange rate objective. The same appLies
to Denmark, where the controLs on Lending resuLting from agreements bet-
ween the banking sector and the nationaL authorities are more stringent
than the officiaL assumption for the growth of the money stock. Enforce-
ment of the lendjng targets andrmore generaLty, controL of domestic L'iqui-
dity creation are means of exerting direct pressure on domest'ic demand
and thus of speeding up the externaL adjustment process. They may aLso
etiminate the risk that monetary poL'icy wiLL exert its stabiLizing infLu-
ence mainLy through the exchange rate, to the detriment of sectors exposed
to externaL competition. BeLg'ium and, since 198?, the NetherLands do not
fix quantitative objectives. These two countries pursue primari Ly
an exchange-rate poticy within the framework of the EMS. In the Nethertands,
the exten'sion of an objective fon domestic Liquid'ity creation 'into 1981 became
'inappropriate because of the appearance of a balance of payments surpLus
in the non-banking sector.
In the countries with an externaL deficit, the choice between
direct action on domestic Liquidity and intervention on the forejgn ex-
change market need not be resoLved by referring only to the [evel of
reserves or the avaiLabiLity of credit under EMS arrangements. The autho-
rities can in fact ease the monetary constraint imposed by the EMS by
borrowing abroad, either directty or indirectLy. The proceeds from this
borrowing can be used to repLanish foreign exchange reserves and to support
the currency on internationaI markets where necessary. Such a poL'icy of
financing externaL deficits has been pursued increasingLy in recent years
by aLL the European countries, with the exception of the NetherLands and
the United Kingdom. Figures pubLished by the centraL banks and by the Bank
for InternationaL SettLements (1) show that onLy Greece and ItaIy were
(1) See the annuaL report of the Bank for InternationaL SettLements 1982'p. 108 (EngL'ish text).
Onl-L
5.5
abte to finance part of their curnent account deficit in 1981 through
private sector imports of capitaL. In aLL the other countries, the figures
show net exports of pri vate capi ta L, wh'i ch, com'ing on top of current ac-
count deficjts, have Lead either to an increase in externaL pubIic sector
indebtedness or to a faLI in the offic'iaL reserves. The FederaL RepubLic
of Germany is in a spec'iaL position, however. Foreign borrow'ing by the
FedenaL Government is aLL denominated in German marks and is therefore
competing with private capitaL imports. It is therefore reasonabLe to
assume that, with monetary poLicy unchanged, pubLic capitaL imports part-
'iaLLy repLace rather than suppIement private capitaL imports. In the
United Kingdom, the poLicy of repaying the externaL pubLic sector debt
has been continued.
By providing support for the exchange rate and hence the terms
of trade and by relieving pressure on the domestic credit market, the
externaL borrowing poLicies pursued by the pubLic authorities have heLped
to stabiIize reaL demand for goods in Community countries fotLowing the
second oi L shock. t.lhi le this stabi Lisation has had vaLuabLe short-term
effects, it is nevertheLess cLear that, when used systematicaLLy, such
poLi c'ies are not wi thout danger. They deLay necessary domest'ic adjustments,
both in the budgetary fieLd and in reaL incomes, and postpone the reduction
of externa L def i ci ts.
5.2. The internaL constraints on monetary poLi cy
The monetary authorities have onLy L'imited scope for encouraging
the desparateLy needed upturn jn investment white steadiLy reducing ex-
ternaL deficits and restraining infLationary pressures. Monetary poLicy
is vulnerable to the repercussions of budgetary poLicies and the effects
of the growth of nominal incomes. The cost to the private sector of exces-
sive budget deficits when a strict policy of price stabiLization is pursued
is particuLarLy cLear in BeLgium and Denmark. In these two countries, the
size of the public sector borrowing requirement is such that the fLow of
bank Lending to the private sectoris apprec'iabLy Less than the fLow of
Lending to the public sector (see Table 5.3). The measures to controL the
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money suppLy, trhich bear only on the private sector, have thus a particu-
LarLy restrictive effect. In rtaLy, because of the growth in the budget
deficit, the 198'l target set t.las exceeded by more than 2 percentage pojnts,
whereas the expansion of credit to the private sector was within the norm
La'id down. In IreIand, where domestic Liquid'ity creation (1) is extremeLy
high, the rate of investment has stabiLized or has even increased, but
this has been achieved at the price of an externaL deficit and a rate of
inflation which are much hfgher than the community average. rn France,
the growth in domestic Ljquidity creatjon in recent months has been due
mainly to monetary financing 6f the budget deficit, whereas the expansion
of Lending to the rest of the economy has faL[en slightLy. These examp[es
show that the very credibiLity of monetary poLicy may be caILed into
question if the LeveL of the budget deficit is not contained; the pressures
which are aLready being exerted on interest rates because a growing pro-
portion of savings must be invested - directLy or through the banking
system - in pubLic debt'instruments wouLd then be aggravated by the in-
ftationary expectations which feed on such a [oss of credibiLity.
Whi Le pubLic sector borrowing requi rements LargeLy determ'ine
the degree of restrictiveness of monetary poLicy, there is another fieLd
where events interact strongLy with the stabi Lisation poLicies pursued by
the monetary authorities, nameLy the groulth of incomes. A rise in the in-
vestment ratio - and hence growth on a sound and tasting basis - requires
not onty the avai Labi L'ity of sav'ings for private sector investment, but
aIso an adequate return on capitaL empLoyed. Thus if monetary poL'icy aims
at stabiIity and reduces the amount by which prices can rise, then a faiLure
of income from employment to adjust adequateLy or in due time wiLL add to
the cost of the process of eLiminating'infLation.
Given the constraints, it is cLear that Laxity on the part of
monetary poIicy wouLd jeopardize the initiaL success which has been achieved
in reducing infLation and couLd not Lead to a sustained rise in the growth
(1) In TabLe 5.5, this incLudes externaL pubLic sector borrow'ing.
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rate. Expectatjons of rising prices and currency depreciation wouLd be
rapjdLy reflected in both jnterest rates and the growth of jncome from em-
ptoyment. This wouLd contribute nothing to the reduction of reaL desequi-
Libria and there wouLd be a risk of a cumuLative infLationary process.
This is why in countries such as France, Italy, IreLand and Greece, which
have infLation rates whjch are stiLL high in reLatjon to the Community
average and/on in which onLy Limited progress has been made in reducing
infLation, cont inued efforts to controL domesti c tiquidity creation are
necessary. The same is true in BeLgium and Denmark, where monetary poticy
wiLt have to continue to hoLd the rate of infLation beLow the Community
average. However, the better the baLance achieved in the budgetary and
incomes poL'icy fieLdsrthe Less restrictive wiLL be the effects of such a
rfbnetary poLicy on overalL demand. This is aLso essentiaL for a better
aLLocation of savings to productive investment and a steady reduction of
externaL deficits. The economic situation in the Community suggestsr.
however, that the three countries which run a surpLus on their current ac-
counts and wh'ich have made progress on domestic adjustment - the FederaL
Repubtic of Germany, the NetherLands and the United Kingdom - shouLd make
fuLL use of the room for manoeuvre avaiLabLe to them in the monetary field
to promote the upturn in growth expected in 1985. In these three countries
there are nevertheLess cLear Limits to the scope for a reLaxation of mo-
netary poLicy. First, the externaL vaLue of their currencies must be main-
tained sufficientLy to restrain externat infLat'ionary factors and, secondLy,
sustained efforts are required to consoLidate the internaL adjustment which
has been ach'ieved. A renewed tightening of monetary conditions might other-
wise become necessary.
5.3. Nominat and reaL interest rates in the Community
Owing to the highLy'integrated nature of internationat financiaL
markets, nominaL interest rates for the european currencies Here LargeLy
influenced in 1981 and the early months of 1982 by the LeveL of interest
rates in the United States, but their movements. in retation to each other
were determined mainLy by the economic performances of the various countries,
particuLarLy in the areas of infLation and the baLance of payments on cur-
rent account (see Graphs 5.2). In the FederaL RepubLic of Germany and the
Nethertands, for exampte, short-term rates - after reaching a record IeveL
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in 1981 (an average for the year of 1?.4 % and 11.8 i4 respectjveLy) -
have returned to roughLy their average 1980 Level (9.5 % and 10.6 % res-
pectivety) or even Lower. In the United Kingdom, short-term interest rates
have aLso faLten after reaching a maximum of 16.9 "A in September 1981;
'in Juner1982, they had returned to the LeveL obtain'ing during the f i rst
few months of 1981.
In the other countries, where infLationary pressures remain
strong and the current account outLook unfavourabLe, a simiLar faLL in
intenest rates has not been recorded. In ItaLy and IreLand, the monetary
authorities have not reLaxed money market conditions and interest rates
have risen appreciabLy since 1981, at Least in reLation to the. average
IeveL for the EMS area. The maintenance of reLativeLy high interest rates
is necessary in these two countries owing to their infLation rates. In
France, and to a Lesser extent in Betgium, money market rates have moved
more vioLentLy. In France, they have refLected partLy the monetary autho-
ritiest wish to reduce interest rates for domestic reasons and partLy the
need to respect the constraints of the European Monetary System. Between
the october 1981 reaLignment and that in Febnuary 1982, the one-month money
market rate thus feLL from 18.6 y. to around 15 %. It then rose again bet-
ween March and June 1982 to aproximateLy 16.5 % before again beginning to
faLL foILowing the June reaL'ignment. The BeLgian monetary authorities have,
for domestic economic reasons, hetd their interest rates at as Low a Level
as poss'ible, wh'iLe at the same time accepting a weaker position for the
BeLg'ian franc within its ?nargin of fLuctuation. In Denmark, the monetary
authorjties pursued, from the autumn of 1980 to Septemberl98lt ? goLicy of
uncoupling the cost of domestic credit from the cost of credit on inter-
nat'ionaL markets. This poIicy Led economic agents to swjtch whereever pos-
sibIe from foreign borrowing to the Danish banking system. The resuLt was a
net outfLow of private sector capitaL which in due course forced higher
intervention by the NationaL Bank on the foreign exchange market. It was
this which Led the NationaL Bankto aLLow the interest rate differentiaL in
(7f
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favour of the Danish krone to widen as from the autumn of 1981. This ex-
perience shows the Limited extent to which domestic and externat interest
rates can be disconnected in countries having a high externaL borrowing
requ'irement if private operators engage in currency arbitrage both when
borrowing and when investing. GeneraLLy speaking, the weight of funda-
mentaL factors in the determination of nominal interest rates has probabty
been accentuated by the more frequent adjustment of centrat rates within
the EMS: these make it more risky for financiat operators to invest short-
term funds pureLy on the basis of nominaL interest-rate differentiaIs. The
tendency for the EMS to equaLize nominaI interest rates has thus weakened
appreciabLy jn recent months.
As a community average, the reaL [ong-term interest rate was
2-9 % in 1981 compared with 0.7 % in 1980. FolLowing its appreciab[e fatL
during the 19705, it has thus returned to i ts average LeveL of the 1960s (see
TabLe 5"4). Thi s ri se 'in reaL interest rates has been evident in pract.i-
ca[[y alL the Commun'ity countries, the exceptions being IreLand and Greece.
WhjLe reaL interest rates have returned to their [eve[ of the 196Os, their
roLe in economic development has quite cLearLy changed: whereas at that
time they served to attract the savings needed to finance the accumutation
of product'ive capitaI they now refLect rather more a conscious decision on
the part of nationaI authorities to renounce monetary poLicies characteristic
of the [ast decade which permitted budget deficits and adapted to externaL
shocks. ParaILet with this, the growth'in output, which generates the surpLus
necessary to ensure an adequate return on capitaL, has sLackened sharpLy.
Since 1980' the rate of growth of reaL GDP has been appreciabLy Lower than
the reaL rate of jnterest in an ever increasing number of Commun.ity coun-
tries (see TabLe 5.4). If it continues, this pattern may pose increasing
probLems for sectors which are reguLarLy in deficit, particuLarLy the
pubLic sector.
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Tab[e 5.4 reveaLs with the help of a number of examples,
the interactions between monetary poLicy, budgetary poLicy and the growth
of incomes. Thus in BeLg'ium and Denmark reaL interest rates have reached
a panticuLarLy high level owing to the combination of a strict monetary
poLicy, which has kept infLat'ion beLow the Community averagerand budget
deficits of around 10 % of GDP. In lreland, on the other hand, where
monetary poL'icy has exerted Less pressure on domestic demand' reaL in-
terest rates have remained negative at the cost of a rate of infLation
which has been rjsing consistentLy s'ince 1978 (consumer price index :
+ 7.5 l{ in 1978 and + 20.5'/. in 1981) and of an external deficit exceed-
ing 10 % of GDP. In ItaLy and the United Kingdom, where prices atso ex-
pLoded after 1978 and where the reduction of infLation is not.l.- in dif-
fering degrees - under way, reaL interest rates, Led by the monetary
authorit'ies, are aga'in cLearLy pos'itive, and cLose to the Community
average. In France, thegrowth ofbudget deficits in 1981 and 1982 has been
accompanied by a rise in reaL Long-term interest rates- By aLLo-
wing the price of capital to find its true LeveL again,
stabi L'ization poLic'ies make it possibLe for investment deci-
sions to be taken on a more rational basis, Indeedr'i t 'i s
onLy when aLL those invoLved in the economic process, and more particu-
LarLy the budgetary authorities, take account of the reaL cost of internaL
or externa L savi ngs 'in the'i r deci si ons that the use of such resources wi L L
ensure a Lasting improvement in the economic situation of the Commun'ity.
5.4. The externaL constraints on monetary poLi cy
In 1981 and the earLy months of 1982 the economic policy of the
United States added to the internaLLy generated infLationary pressures
on the European economies. The spectacuLar upsurge in the doLLar between
JuLy 1980 and August, 1981, when it appreciated by 43 % against the ECU,
which has aggravated the effects of the second oiL schock (1) on the
European economies did not continue at the same rate, but the fLuctuations
(1) For exampLe, the average c'if price in ECU of
into the Community increased between 1980 and
dolLar price increased by onLy 10.6 %.
a barreL of oiL jmported
1981 by 40 %, whiLe its
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of the dol[ar (see Graph 5.3) since August 1981, did finaLLy resuLt jn
an apprec'iation agajnst the ECU of 10.5 % (average for the first seven
months of 1982 compared with the 1981 average). The sustained strength
of the doLLar over the Last two years'is LargeLy expLained by the impLe-
mentation in the United States of a resoLuteLy anti-infLationary economic
- and especiaL[y monetary - poLicy. The associated increase in interest
rates hasrhowever, been aggravated by the difficuLties encountered by
the United States authorities in controLling the budget deficit. Further-
more, the techniques of monetary management - based on strict very
short-term controL of monetary aggregates, practicaLLy independentLy
of any exchange-rate or interest-rate considerations - have so far been
accompanied by highLy volat'iIe money market rates. In
order to curb the rise in the dolLar and thus contajn its inf[ationary
effects on their economies, they acted in 1981 to adapt money market
conditions here to the LeveI of corresponding interest rates in the
United States. This upward movement in European rates was triggered
particuLarLy by the measures taken by the Bundesbank in February 1981. The
The European centraL banks have subsequentLy, though with sLight differ-
ences from one country to another, aLLowed money market rates
to deveLop smoothLy; the fLuctuations in United Statesinterest rates
have thus - where necessary - been refLected in exchange-rate fLuctua-
tions. In a bid to reduce the fLuctuations caused by conditions on the
United States money market, European monetary authorities aLso inter-
vened significant[y against the doLLar on the foreign exchange market.
Net sales of US dot[ars by the central banks of the EMS countries amounted
in 1981 to USD 25 800 miLtion or 87 % of their combined current account
baLance and, during the first six months of 1982 to USD 14 900 miLLjon.
However, it is probabLe that the refusaL of the United States monetary
authorities to interl,ene to any significant extent on the foreign exchange
markets - officiaLLy confirmed in Play 1981 - diminishes the psychoLogicat
effect of this intervention and hence its effectiveness.
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The monetary instabiIity of recent months may Lessen once the
financiaL markets have adapted to the latest indicators of the stance
of economic policy in the United States and the first signs of success
there in combat'ing'infLation. Improved cooperation between the major
monetary powers might however enabLe better account to be taken of
short-term factors LiabLe to cause instabi tity on jnternationaL finan-
ciaL markets, thereby heLping to make the internationaL monetary system
more stabLe.
5.5. Community currencies and the European Monetary System
Since September 1981, the pound sterLingrs exchange rate against
the ECU has been steady with a sLight upward trend (see graph 5.3).
SterLing has thus folLowed - though in a somewhat Less
marked fashion - the fLuctuations of the EMS currenc'ies against the
doL Lar. Between Novemben 1979 and JuLy 1982, ster t{ng
neventheLess showed on the basis of monthLy averages an appre-
ciation of 22.4 % against EMS currencies, a rise which
reinforced the restrictive effects of a tioht monetary
poLicy. SterLingrs reat exchange rate (1) aga'inst its main pattner
currencies, caLcuLated on the basis of unit wage costs, thus increased
by more than 40 % between 1978 and 1981. The progress made in bringing
down infLation and the reLative stabiLity of ster['ing on foreign exchange
markets shouLd moderate the trend of this indicator. Between Juty {981 and
JuLy 1982, the drachma deprec'iated by 7.5 % against the ECU, whereas the
inf[ation differentjaL between Greece and the Community stands at around
10 y.. The dnachmats reLative stabiLity is a refLection of officiaI policy;
it was part'icularly marked up.to Apri L 1982, which made it possibLe to
Limit externaL inf Iationary pressure.
(1) The reaI
rate for
lation to
exchange rate adusts the movement in the effect'ive exchange
the movement in a countryrs reLative costs or prices in re-its trad'ing partners.
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The EMS has been going through a hazardous phase for a number
of months now. Since it was introduced on 13 March 1979, there have been
six reaLignments of centraL rates (see TabLe 5.7). The first two reaLign-
ments, which took place in the autumn of 1979, met a need for adjustment
reveaLed by the initiaL phase. However, within the space of nine months,
from 5 0ctober 1981 to 14 June'198?, there were three reatignments of
centraL rates, which Led to substantiaL changes in bi LateraL rates.
For exarnple, between 4 October 1981 and 15 June 1982, the officiaL bi-
[ateraL exchange rate between the German mark and the French franc
changed by 2O.3 %, whi Le that between the mark and the Li ra changed by
16.6 7. and that between the mark and the BeLgian franc by 2O.2 %. A
marked divergence jn the movement of nominaL exchange rates was the re-
suLt (see Graph 5.2). A number of factors have contributed to the in-
stabiLity of the EMS in recent months. In particular, the reversaL of
the current account position in the FederaL Republic of Germany and
the new direct'ion given to economic poLicy'in France generated contrary
expectations of the movements of the German mark and the French franc.
However, such factors shouLd not necessariLy be an obstacLe to the main-
tainance of exchange rates within the EMS. For proLonged periods a tight
monetary poti cy wh'i ch emphasizes the determination of the authorities
in weak-currency countries to continue thei r stabi Ijzation efforts
danpens the effect on expectations of economic performance wh'i Le it is
sti LL unsat'isfactory and avo'ids provok'ing specuIative cap'itaL movements
which Limit the room for manoeuvre in deciding on the appropriate date
for a reaLignment.
The variations in reaL exchange rates against EMS partners (on
the basis of unit wage costs) between 1978 and 1981 nay appear high for
countries such as France, ItaLy or IreLand (see TabLe 5.5). However,
this impression shouLd be quatified in two ways. First, the ef-
fects on the totaL externaI trade of these countries have been partiaL[y
offset by the advantages fLowing from the appreci.ation of the dottar
and the pound sterLing. Second[y, in 1978 reaL exchange rates in these
countries were reLativeLy tow compared with their LeveL at the beginning
of the 1970s (see TabLe 5.6), partLy bacause of the monetary instabiL'ity
of the past. These countries therefore appeared to have some "room for
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manoeuvre" in this regard when the EMS was introduced. However that
may be, the reatignments in October 1981 and June 1982 have appreciabLy
curbed the increase jn the reaL exchange rates of the French franc and
the Lira in retation to the other EMS currencies. In the medium tern'
a markedLy divergent trend of reaL exchange rates is not des'irabLe
because of the distortions which it causes in trade fLows. Th'is is
why a partiaI and retrospective adjustment of nominaL exchange rates
in response to divergent cost and price may somet'imes prove necessary.
NevertheLess, exchange-rate poLicy, which heLps to contain externaLLy
generated infLation, remains an important eLement in the pursujt of
stabi Lity. Its credibi Lity and its restri ctive effect on the economy
depend mainLy on how qu'ickLy the domestic adjustments are made during
the stabiLization perjod. The chances of a baLanced upturn in economic
growth and a future reduction in externaL deficits hinge on the extent
of these adjustments. For the same reasons and in order to ensure that
the devaLuations of weak currencies are successfuL when reaLignments
are made, such reaLignments shouLd be accompanied in the countries con-
cenned by measures to restore domestic equiLibria and to prevent do-
mestic prices from being affected by a deterioration in the terms of
trade. It was with this in mind that the French Government decided, on
the occasion of the June reaLignment, to introduce a price and wage
freeze for a period of four months, to be followed by an active incomes
poLicy. hlithin the strategy adopted, the budget deficit shouLd not in
future exceed 3 % of GDP. SimiLarLy, ItaLy, whiLe part'iaLLy adjusting
to the wide disparity between its infLation rate and those of its EMS
partners through the use of the Lirars wider margin of fLuctuat'ion and
changes in centraL rates (see TabLe 5.5 and Graph 5,4)' continues its
efforts in the fieLd of domestic stabiLization. Thus, the measures taken
in 1981, wh'ich shoutd make it possible to Limit the monetary financing of
the pubLi c defi cit in ltaLy, and the reduction in the degree of
wage 'indexation currently being negotiated could heLp, in the context
of a tight monetary poLicy, to reCuce infLat'ionary strains.
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When the EMS was introduced, the re[ative LeveL of un'it wage
costs in BeLgium was extremeLy h'igh compared with the earLy 1970s. This
refLected the uncontroLLed upsurge of reaL wages and saLaries in Be[gium
particuLarly between 1974 and 1978. Up untiL Februaryr1982, the time
when the BeLgian franc was devalued, the efforts to stabilize domestic
costs and prices had helped to Feverse this trend (see TabLe 5.5).
However, the structuraL disequ'i libria of the Be[gian economy, the size
of the budget deficit and the extremety high wage ratio (see TabLe 5.4),
meant that these efforts were'insuffic'ient to reduce the externaL deficit.
Yet a devaLuation of the BeLgian franc to acce[erate the adjustment of
reaL exchange rates and, eventuaLLy, of the externaL deficit couLd be
effective onty if it formedpart of a cohesive economic reform programme
for the BeLg'ian economy. In particutar, the rigid wage'indexat'ion prac-
tised until its partiaL suspension in February 1982 would have had the
effect of fulLy passjng on the effects of a devaLuation to prices and
wage costs and wouLd have prevented any further progress in reducing the
reaL disequi Librium; at the same t'ime, 'it woutd have fueLLed inf [ation.
This is why the success of the devaLuation of the Belg'ian franc on ?2
February 1982 depends on the continued appLication and, where necessary,
reinforcement of the measures accompany'ing it, in both the budgetary
and incomes fieLds. The exampLes given show how ctoseLy exchange-rate
pol'icy and domest'ic policy, both in the monetary fieLd and in the incomes
and budgetary spheres, shouLd compLement each other. Reaffirmation of the
objective of stabi Lity through the continued apptication in weak-currency
countries of concrete stabjt'izing measures wouLd enabLe the European
Monetary System to regain the stabiLity it enjoyed until" the autumn of
1981.
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Tabl.e 5.1
Growth of'money stock
(Annuat percentage change, end of year comparisons)
Country-Definition ,t959. 1970- 1979- i98C- 1981-$ f82.9
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(1)
Commission staff forecasts of September/0ctober 1982.
B : Up to 1964: monetary ctajms on the majn monetary institutions. IRL : revised
series as from 1971. I: up to 1975 z ttlz. Linkage on the basis of growth rates.
NL:1976, 1977, 1978 z break in series. DK : up to 1975: t\2.
(2) Rate of growth of the geometriciaL average, r.leighted by GDP at 1975 prices and
purchasing power parit'ies, of the money stock indices of the countries concerned(975 = 100). The lreight of Luxembourg has been added to the weight of Belgium.
EMS = EC 10 m'i nus UK and Greece.
Source : Up to 1981, centraL banks.
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Tab[e 5.2
Intermediate objectives and outturns
C'ount ry Key
variabLe
(3)
1980
Obj ect ive Outturn
19gr
Objective Outturn
1982
Objective Outturn in
the 12 months
R (1)DK' ', t"12H
D T4Z
GR (4) PscE
F 142(2\IRL. , PSCE
I TDCE
NL DM2(3\UK' ' AM1
:
5-6
15ro
lrro
1],0
L7 r5
? ,5-8 rO
7-l-r
:
10' 1
4-Z
23tO
L2tr-Ltr5
14, O
1q q
'/, /
:
8-rz
12,6 July
4r? June
27 r2 Aori L
12rO . .Juhe
14,r JuLy
18,F May
10.r3 JuLy
!
Rrvt4
LO
.l /
2014
9*8
2019
18, J
?,6
2Ot O
:
"tJ
4-7
'lo ?
-/l/
10, O
15r o
16rO
et/
6-10
:
o1/r-
/t /
Toro
11r 4
1516
18,7
1t (
1517
TDCE : totaI cred jt expansion of domestic origin; lrl2H : harmon j zed ltrZ;ilZ: centraL bank money; PSCE: domestic credit extended to the private sector;
Dltl2 : money creation f rom domest'i c sources; lltrl3 : sterL'i ng M3. For further detai Is,
see methodoLogicaL annex.
(1) Non-binding objective.
(2) Financiat year from February to February.
(3) At an annual rate for the period from February of the current year to ApriL
of the fo[towing year. Targets have aLso been fixed fon M1 and pSL2 (orivate
sector Iiqu'i dity),
(4) The Greek monetary authorities aLso fix a target for the rate of growth of
the note cincuIation.
Source: centraI banks
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TabLe 5.4
ReaL interestfrates in retation to sel'ected macroeconom'ilc vari ab [es
ReaL Long-term interest rates(1) Rate of growth of real GDp
.E
DK
D
6R
F
IRL
I
NI
UK
CE
B
DK
D
GR
F
IRL
I
NL
UK
CE
6t-zo t9z5 :-gSo :98t tgSz
7r2 -1t4 5t5 5,7 4r82r1 Lr7 617 7,1 gr1
4, o 2r5 1rQ 41 4 3,5
- -5r9 -5r3 -5rO -5,3
-1r4 or8 2,6 3r2
-1'1 -1'? 
-1,e -0,8
-5r2 -2'6 1,1 3',0
-or 6 4rz 5,o 4,3
-5r2 -116 lr8 3r4
2r9 -1r8 Or7 2r9
GeneraI government borrow.ing
reguirements as Z of GDp
3r4
sL-zo L9?j r98o 19Bl 1982
'1314 J2,8
- 
7.,1 - e,5
- 
4tU 
- 3r9
-1Or1 -g,2
- 
1,5 :,3r0
-16 ,9 -1 5 ,2
-11,9 J1?6
-4r5 - 5 17
-?, 1 - or9
-4,8 '5r0
19.:1-7C 1q70-75- 197s-8n 1oB1 1cR^ 
_4,8 ,r, 2r8 -1,7 
-or54r9 2ro 216 -o,z z,o
4r7 2r2 7r5 0,1 -0,5
? 16 5rO 4r4 '0,7 0,7
5 r5 7r4 7r2 0,3 Itl4,2 4,2 4;o 1,1 2,0
5J 2r4 ,r9 -0,2 o'85r2 7r2 716 -1,1 '0,5
212
2r6
rr9
218 2r8 2rr 116 -1,9
41 8 2,8 3rr -0,4
115r6 122,4
111, I 101 ,4l_10,5 147 ,6
lo7,I 1C8,9
to8r2 113,C
117 r 8 113,t*
rL',' 115,7
11-6r4 '110,2
tt2r5 110,1
016
013
122,0 118,7
99 ,3 93,010:,s .10s,3
111,9 110,3
111,5 102,9
113,7 119,0113,4 11J,2
103,0 105,4
110,9 108,2
Reat wage position; indices (2):
.-
19?5 1980 1981 1982
-Lr) -4r 4 -9.4
+1r4 
-1r9 -519
+or5 
-5r8 -'rj
-216 -5rL -514
-or 4 -2r2 or5
-7r5 -L2r8 -rzr8
-2t2 -LLJ - 7r8
-or9 -2r2 -7r4
-or7 -5,O -tr5
-or 4 -516 -t,5
(1) Yiel'd of publ'ic sector bonds. Real rates caLcuLated usjng a 25-month moving
,^. it"r"tfftf""".ttrtoirt'flff"frice indicesrexcept in 1982, tor wni-ctr tt'" 
"u"i.ge of the first(z,, rndex of conpensation of empLoyees per 
-employee, deftated by consumer price indjcesand adjusted for changes in the terms of trader-divided by Labour productivity.
Source : Eurostat and commission departments (982 z forecast of .september/october 1gg2.
roJ
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TabLe 5.5
Effective exchange rates and reLative unit labour costs (1) vis-i-vis EMS
, 
parthers
Ef f ee,t i v-e ,-exchange
rate (2)
- 
L\-\dt
Z change p.a.
197n- 1978- 1982
1973 1981
Unit tabour costs
p)
\ o,l
Re La.t i ve change i.n
tiondt,currencies
% p.a. .
(c) = (a) x (b)
na-,.ReLative change jn com-
'mon currency :
% p.a.
1970- 1978- 1982 "'1978 1981
1970- 1978- ' 1982
1978 1981
B o'9
DK -Or8
D 4r4
F 
-1t5IRL -7,L
rRL()) -2,8
I -8,8NL Lr7
uK( r) -6,2
-o12
-7tL
2'5
-or7
-o13
-4'5
-4r 5
o15
7'7
-8'5
-4 
'710, O
-6 r4
-ot9 '
or7
-5rg
or)
-ot 1
1r2 
-1r8
1rI 
-o17
-4,4 -4,9
or 6 4r2
4,4 81 1
2rO 7r7
7ro 9,2
o17 
-2rO
3ro 612
-2r2
2t4
-5, o
6ro
4r8
qq/)/
8r8
-1' 9
1q.
2rr 
-2, O -1O,5
or7 
-7r4 -2r4
-or 1 -2r5 7r4
-1,o trg -0,8
-lrt 7 18 5r7
-or9 -1r1 612
-zr4 4r2 2r5
rr5 -Lr5 4r5
-trt 14 17 -L 15
(p) Forecasts of MaylJune 1982.
(1) Compensation of empLoyees per empLoyee divided by productiv'ity per person
emp Loyed.(2) Export h,eighting, variabte from year to year untit 1979;1982 exchange rates
consistent t.lith centraL rates in force on 15 June 1982.(3) Vis-6-vis Communjty partners as a whoLe.Source: Eurostat and Commission departments.
Table 5.6
LdveL of reLative unit
4978 and 1982
Labour cbstr i-n common currency vis-d-vis EMS partners
1978
tsASE JUU :
leToaii#ffo fyti_%m-LOTJ 1O4r8 LOzt7gg,1' 105r4 10,fO
92,6 81,1 89 ,t??,9 ?4,8 82,2 ,9?,t 1O1r4 lOOr582J 8t,4 80,z
rr2r9 rzLt7 11lr 5
?6,t 69,8 ?7 ,7
Base 1CO :
92rt 9Or'
102,0 g8,8goe 99,)
gg ro 106,2
roo, o g6 16g4,2 g,,8
r2rrt 111,2
1O2,5 114,2
1932 (c)
B
DK
D
r
IRL
IRL: (2)
I
NL
UK( 2)
99'O
90r3
94 
'6r0]ro
10J, O
96 ro
9, |7
112,5
117, 8
(p) Forecasts of May/June 1982.(1) Compensations of emptoyees divideo by productivity per ernptoyed person. Thepartnersr index and the effective exchange rate are caIcuLated on the basis
of expoert weight variabLe from year to year untiL 1979;1982 exchange rates
are compatib[e with centraL rates in force on 15th June '1982.(2) Vis-d-vis Community partners as a whole.
Source : Eurostat and Commission departments.
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Tab[e 5.7
Changes in EMS excha rate s
ReaLi"gnment of centraL rates (7.> in relation to the
group of currencies whose bi IateraL-parit'ies irere not
changed
BFR/rFR
DKR
DM
FF
IRL
LIT
HFL
24.9.79
o
- 2'9
+2
o
o
o
Date s
.LL. />
+5
n
+5
1)
+5
a)
- 
8r5
-1
o
o
o
o
o
o
+ 4125
- ,r75
o
- 
217,
+ 4r2J
of reaLiqnments22.3.8r 5.10.81 22.2.82 14. 5 .82
o
o
o
o
o
-6
o
o
/t/
7
o
?
./t-/
20
1 \q.
10
I
I+ ,,--^\
-i- ./ \+ ,f \,^.I 1 zrd\-.'+\ Money stoc+ \-.-. .r\ / '" '\.:l \*=--="\ 1 i '-'---._.-.t'- \
-L -\r ,../ \__
.L
t, oQ
s.22
Graph 5.1
BroadLy defined money stock (1), reaL GDp and GDp deftator.
Avenage EC 10 - 1960-82 (annual percentaee changes)
For definitions, see Table 5.1.
averages of money stocks.
Th'i s graph is based on annuaI
sounce: Eurostat and commission departments - For 1982: forecasts of
Septemben/October 1982,
-5 t-$t;-*l---rS-J--{-+-t-F+-'-LJ=-+-'-+--*+--l-* L"-r4-{-,*F+1-{-t-1 +
(1)
Graoh 5,2 :
Ito
NominaL sho.rt-term
(-) and in the
interest rates in the
United States ('..)
e5
20
t5
l0
5
25
20
15
1D
o
'a.. usA 0
Comtnun i t Y
5,?3
"\""..usA
L
198?
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e0
15
10
5
BeLgium
19 81
Denmar k
1981
1981
D
0
tg
1937
DK
USA
25
2A
L5
10
5
25
2B
D
ID
1982 1981
e5
e0
l5
l0
q
19E1 198? 1981 1982
1) B: Four-month Fonds des Rentes certificates; three-month interbank deposit rates
for D, NL, UK, IRL; sight rates for It DKt EL, F : rate for one-month sa[e and
repurchase of private securjties; EC : average weighted by 1975 GDP at 1975'prices and purchasing power parities; USA: yie[d on three-month Treasury bil.Ls.
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Graph 5.3 : Movement of UK pound, drachme
'-- March 197{ = 100
and doLLar against the Ectl -
- Month[y averaqes
1979-82
150
1,{0
130
L?O
t10
100
90
ts0
?0
110
105
100
95
98
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Graoh.5"4 : Movement of EMS currency exchange rates against the EillS(i.e. ECU w'i thout sterLing component)
March 1979 = 100 - Month[y averaqes
r*-.2/--\--*__-__d-__-___-*aa_*-- 
-_-DR 
A
(r,
1979 1 980 1981
Graph 5.5 :
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BILATERAL SPREADS OF CURRENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
a) Positions of the strongest and the weakest currency in the
EMS band
1)
{\
b) Posjtion bf each currency in"the EMS band
19?9 1980 1981 1982
1 ,1?5
-1 .125
1.125
-1 .125
1 .125
-1.125
1.125
-1 .125
1,125
-1.125
6 2)
2)
-6
1 .125
-1 .1?5
R€alignment f-,--;:.,-l-,##-+-# l*:--
(excLudinq the lta[ian Lira) tion to the weakest or the2) Maximum spread aLLowed for the ItaLian Lira in reLat
strongest currency in the EMS
1)
1979 1 980 1981 1982
The difference between the two curves nepresents the maximum spread on the basis
of weekLy averages between the strongest and tne weakest currency in the EMs
rr3
6. Budgetary policy
Budget deficits as a proportion of GDp increased sharpty in
the Comnunity in 1981 and rose somewhat further in1982. Tax pressure rose
sLightLy, nainty as a resutt of an increase in direct taxes and in social
security contributions, and most of the l4ember States endeavoured to
controL the gror.lth of expenditure, partikcutar[y transferts and pubtic con-
sumption. t.|ith the trend of activity once again tending to engender a
spontaneous increase in deficjts, the generaL stance of budgetary poLicy in
the Community continued to be restrictive overatt. However, the steadygrowth of generaL government resources and expenditure reLative to GDP, the
size of budget deficits, the growth of pubLic indebtedness and the rising
burden of debt servicing arq becoming more and more worrying, particuLartyin certain [tlembre states. fn countries where it persists, infLation,
though reducing the weight of the pubtic debt in reaL terms, nonetheless
weakens the effectiveness of budgetary poticy and increases financjat
strains. In a commlniation on budget discipLine and economic convergence
which it presented to the CounciL in Juty 1982, the Commission stated that,in many ltlember States, the management of pubLic sector finances was not
making a sufficient contribution to the efforts being made to achieve eco-
nomic stabiLization and to put the economy on a sound footing. It catledfor better controL of the budgetary aggregates, apLication of strict budge-
tary procedures and strict principles of budget management, and greater
severity in the criteria appLied in financing publ.ic deficits, In 1983,
the modest revivat in activity wiLt be too weak to support efforts to
reduce the net borrouing of generaL government as a percentage of GDP in
the Community.
6.1 Recent budgetary deve[opments
In 1981, the net borrowing of generat government as a proportion of
GDP increased in aLL the Member States except the United Kingdom. The Com-
munity average in 1981, at 4r8% of GDP, represented the heaviest budgetary
disequiLibrium since 1975. The figune is, however, two tenths of point tower
than that estimated in March and, in particuLar, resuLts from sLightty
Lower-than-expected defjcits in Denmark, the FederaL RepubLic of Germany,
France, Luxembourg and the NetherLands. Budgetary devetopments in the Com
munity L,ere cLearLy out of baLance: a 15151 rise jn totaL expenditure con-
trasting with an increase of 1217% in current revenue, uhich was directty
affected by the decLine in activity (see Tabte 6.1). The actuat increase in
totaI expenditure in 1981 Has nearLy one-and-a-hatf points higher and reve-
nue more than a point higher than the forecasts made a year ago in the
1981-82 Annuat Economic Review. ttthereas in 1980 onLy one Member State
\\+
6.2
had a generaL government net borrowing requirement in excess of 101 of GDP,
f our trlember States (ee Lgium, Greece, IreLand and Itaty) f ound themseLves in
that position Last year.
The most marked infLuence on budget outturns in 1981 came from the
grouth of current expenditure. Current transfer payments increased by more
than 18I on average in the Comnunity, and "other current expenditure"
(uhich, to a Large extent, consists of interest payments) rose by more than
262 (see TabLe 6.2). By contrast, gross capitaL formation jncreased by onLy
3rlt. The difference betneen this Latter f igure lnd the previous tt{o
figures indjcates that, in determining the structure of budget expenditure
last year, efforts yere made to achieve some degree of buitt-in stabitiza-
tion in budgetary poLicy pending the reversaL of the economic cycte.
The estimates for 1982 suggest that the Comm.rnityrs net borrowing
requirement as a proportion of GDP wiLL increase sLightLy (52 as against
4r8Z [ast year). There is expected to be a significant reduction in the ra-
te of increase in totat expenditure (up 12t5t as against 15r5'Ar, whi[e the
growth of current revenue is expected to be haLf a percentage point tower
than in 1981 62r?Z against 12177,). Tax pressure, particuLarly that of jn-
direct taxes andrabove aLt, sociaL security contributions, has increased,
with the resuLt that the sum of taxes and sociaL security contributions in
1982 wiLL probabLy be equivalent to 427" of Comm,.rnity GDP as against 4113%
last year (TabLe 6.2>. However, the shift in budgetary poticy in 1982 is
evident mainLy on the expenditure side, with sLower growth in current
transfers, other current expenditure and pubLic consumption. However, in-
fLation is sLouling down onLy graduaL[y, and the degree of rigidity dis-
pLayed by these expenditure components remains high. The 1.6 percentage
point reduction in the rate of increase in current transfer payments (most
of which go to househoLds) and the 3.6 percentage point reductjon in the
rate of increase in pubLic consumption refLect the efforts being made by
the authorities to contain the growth of budgetary expendjture. However,
the persistent disequiLibrium between the growth rate of expenditure and
that of revenue has the effect of maintaining the momentum of dissaving
tt5
6.3
(29 100 miLtion ECU in 1982 as against 17 600 miLLion ECU in 1981), so that
despite a continued squeeze on capitaL expenditure (gross capitaI forma-
tion up 416Z 1n 198D, the net borrowing of generaL government in the
Community as a percentage of GDP has risen. At the same time, budgetary
capitaL expenditure as a proportion of GDP is decLining.
In 198?, the majority of Member States shoutd see a reduction in
their net borroling as a proportion of GDP. However, in Denmark, France,
Luxembourg and the Nethertands, the increase in the pubtic deficit rriLt be
greater than the increase in nominaL GDP. In Denmark, the reLative teveL of
current expenditure, particu[arLy transfer payments, is rising steadiLy
(this is true of unerptoyment benefits in particuLar), whi[e the sloy
growth of reaL incomes is affecting budgetary resources, particutarLy the
yieLd of indirect taxes. In June, a programme to support employment was in-
troduced and financed by an increase in excise duties, which yere already
very high, but the increase in revenue does not futLy cover the increase in
expenditure. The cost of debt service is aLso becoming an increasing burden
for Denmark. CaLcuLating net borrowing after deduction of net interest pay-
ments (see TabLe 6.1), the adjusted batance witL probabty increase by onLy
six-tenths of a point as a proportion of GDP as against an increase of 2.4
points for the unadjusted baLance. In France, where in 1981 generaL govern-
nent net borrowing as a percentage of GDP was Low, the increase in 1982 yas
aLso due to the fact that the rise jn current expenditure outstripped that
in current revenue, despite the increase in indirect taxation (changes were
made in VAT rates). The baLance adjusted for net interest payments aLso in-
creased. In Luxembourg, the high teveL of capitat transfers expLains why
there is a net borrouing requirement, a[thouglt gross saving is substantiat
and the scaLe of interest payments received by generat government expLains
the size of the borrowing requirement net of interest payments. In the
Netherlands, 1982 has seen only a very modest increase in receipts from di-
rect and indirect taxes white current expenditures, particuLarLy transfers,
have increased substantiatty. In the other l4ember States, adjustment ef-
forts are in the form of tighter controL over the growth of expenditure,
often combined with an increase in revenue. In Betgium, an attefipt has been
made to cut back on current expenditure, which should make it possibLe to
Limit the current deficit in the centraL government budget to BFR 252 000
miLLion and to eLiminate the deficit in the sociaI security budget in 1982.
l'\ b6.4
In the Federat Repubtic of Germany, the 1982 budget atso inctuded a series
of measures to curb expenditure on heaLth, housing and support for
enptoyment. IreLand raised sociaL security contributions and significantty
increased VAT rates and excise duties. These two types of taxes were aLso
adjusted upwards at the end of JuLy 1982 in ltaty, where a law granting a
tax amnesty together with an increase in direct taxes payabte shouLd atso
boost budget revenue. In the Nethertands, a terporary increase in tax on
rages and other personaL incomes was introduced with effect from 1 JuLy
1982.
6.2
ln 1982, nearLy att the l4ember States were confronted uith a
number of common difficutties in budgetary management, though the acuteness
of the probtems varied from one country to another. Finance laws were pre-
pared in the summer of 1981, except in IreLand and the United Kingdom,
where the procedure appties to the financiaI year. There were detays in
adopting the budget in severaL ftlember States. This was the case in Belgium,
xhere the budgetary procedure spiLLed over L,etL into 1982, in Denmark and
Greece, where the budgets hrere adopted in February and Apri L respectivety,
and in Itaty, trhich had to appLy the provisionaI twetfths procedure untiL
Aprit. The growth rates of activity assumed in the draft finance taws gene-
raLty proved to be higher than the rates actuaLLy achieved. ConsequentLy,
budget revenues increased tess than anticipated. This effect was combined
with a swetting of transfer expenditure, mainty as a resuLt of the conti-
nuing sharp rise in unemLoyment. In pursuing their poticies the authori-
ties rere therefore obLiged to try and avoid or Limit, as far as possibte,
any straying off course. This phenomenon yas sufficientLy generaL to affect
not onLy those countries with targe budget deficjts but aLso those with mo-
re moderate deficits. Table 6.3 gives the corponents of changes in budget
deficits, distinguishing between the effect of changes in activity, the ef-
fect of changes in net interest payments and the residua[ change, which re-
presents the discretionary corponent of budgetary poLicy. t'lhiLe the figures
must be interpreted with caution, they do none the tess indicate that the
change in activity, though contributing Less to the change in the Community
t\l
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deficit in 1982 than in 1981, continued to make for an increase in that de-
ficit as the grouth rate ulas generaLLy Lower than the potentiaI growth
rate. (The potentiaL growth rate for the Comm.rnity uas estimated at 216I.
The methodoLogy used js set out in the methodoLogicaL annex).
Accordingtyr the discretionary component (net of interest payments)
continued to have a restrictive impact $1r4t of GDP in 1982 as against
+Or8A in 1981). Another, much more summary, indication of the stance of
budgetary poLicy is provided by the figure for net borrowing after deduc-
tion of net jnterest payments (TabLe 6.1). In so far as net interest
payments [argeLy refLect the present cost of past budget management, the
net positions after deduction of interest payments give a truer reftection
of the current thrust of budgetary poticies. The Community average of the
deficits can thus be seen to decLine by four tenths of a point betueen 1981
and 1982, whereas the average inctusive of interest payments faLts by onty
two tenths of a point. The question rrhich therefore arises is rhether the
budgetary poLicies pursued have been adapted to the present economic
situation in the Commrnity. UntiI very recentLy the main problem was to
decide to what extent the buitt-in stabi[izers shouLd be aLtowed to
operate. As the recession in evidence since the second haLf of 1980 had
been expected to give way to an adequate recovery in 1982, it might have
seemed a reasonable option to aLLow some rote to economic stabitizers,
aLbeit in differing degrees given the specific situation of each ftlember
St at e.
Since the recovery has not taken pLace, however, the budgetary and
financiat situations of the ltlember States have in generaI deteriorated. In
a period of two years, severaL ttlember States saw their public debts
increase considerabty as a proportion of GDP: between 1979 and 1981, the
totaL pubLic debt in Betgium rose from around 72% to atmost 89Z, of GDP,
centraL government debt in Iretand rose from 90162 to 99t12; generat
government net debt in Denmark rose from 1 18 I to 16.13 7. of GDP. The finan-
cia[ constraints on these ftlember States have been aggravated by two fac-
tors, name[y the rise in interest rates, uhich adds further to the
r\g
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cost of debt servicing, and the
repayments of externaL debt. It
these economies in the economic
budgetary policy stance, as the
them.
rise in the dotLar, which increases
is therefore not so much the position of
cycte which now LargeLy determines their
scaLe of the financiaL probLems facing
A brief examination of the budgetary situations of the ttlember Sta-
tes might suggest that, in contrast to those in which the budgetary
sjtuation is the most imbalanced, the countries which are better placed in
terms of pubLic finance shouLd continue to frane their budgetary policy
mainty in the Light of their position in the economic cycLe, thereby making
sure that the counter-cycticaL effects of the buiLt-in stabiIizers are not
offset. Yet this argument faiLs to appreciate that a combination of factors
is restricting the room for manoeuvre for budgetary poLicy to support acti-
vity. The first factor, which is now becoming particuLarLy significant, is
the steady rise in generaL government revenue as a proportion of GDP. This
is a generat phenomenon affecting aLL the ftlember States and one yhich has
been gaining momentum since the first oiL shock and the stowdown in growth.
The increase in the proportion of nationaL resources appropriated and
redistributed by government was less directty perceptibLe by economic
agents during periods of strong groh,th. The stowdown in activity has had
the effect of speeding up the process and making it tess controttabte. Ini-
tiatty, it was possibte to consider that the sociat function of government
in the areas of redistribution and sociaI transfers (particuLar[y
unempLoyment benefits) remained the budgetary priority in the eyes of atL
economic agents. However, there is reason to wonder whether, in some cases,
the tevet of redistribution by government has not norl gone beyond what is
ittpticitty accepted. GeneraL government current revenue in Luxembourg, the
Nethertands and Denmark js now equivaLent to more than 502 of GDP and is
above 40"/. in aLL the other filember States except Greece, where it is around
302. During a period when the growth of their nominat incones is sLowing
down and, in some cases, their reaL incomes are actuaLty faLting, private
househotds tend to be Less ready to accept the burden inposed by government
levies. In such circumstances, cuts in budgetary expenditure become the key
priority. At the same time, the re[uctance of economic agents to accept the
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burden of the "oit tax" has certainLy in a number of countries been an
important factor of confrontation in the distribution of nationaL income
among enterprises, househoLds, governments and the rest of the worLd. This
attjtude has, in inportant degree, Led to the maintenance of excessive
absorption and thus to externaL deficit and inftation. In these cir-
cumstances budgetary poLicy evidentLy cannot seek a recovery of activity in
the Community through demand support.
For the reasons set out above, it appears that the use of budgetary
poticy for short-term reguLation of the economic cycLe is an extremeLy
deLicate openation. The United Kingdom and the FederaL Republic of Germany
are certainLy, from the point of vieu of infLation and externaL trade, the
tvlemben States in the most favourabLe position. But in Germany too,
recurrent budget deficits and the resuLting increase in pubLic debt
increasingLy restrict the scope for action.
In France, on the other hand, it is not the scale of budget defi-
cits or the pubLic debt, but the LeveL of inftation and size of the trade
deficit r,lhich have induced the authorities to restrict the growth of the
budget deficit.
The medium-term trend of the major budgetary aggregates, tike that
of the budget batances, is not particuLarLy reassuring. Graph 6.2 shows the
share of pubtic expenditure in the ltlember States over a period of a Littte
more than 2O years, and the upward trend seems inexorable, In its com-
munfcation to the CounciI dated 1 Juty 1982, entitled "Budget disciptine
and economic convergence", reproduced as an annex to this Review, the Com-
mjssion stated that, in many Menber States, the management of pubtic sector
finances rllas not making a sufficient contribution to the efforts to achieve
economic stabiLization and put the economy on a sound footing. Action had
to be concentrated in the area of pubtic expenditure, whose growth wouLd
have to be strictLy Limited and whose structure wouLd have to be improved.
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The Commission therefore requested the CounciL to accept four main guideLi-
nes which shouLd be impLemented in each Member State white of course taking
into account individuaL situations: controL of the budgetary aggregates,
apptication of strict budgetary procedures, appLication of strict prin-
cipLes of budget management and more severe financing criteria. The Com-
mission beLieves that achievement of a sounder budget situation must be the
objective throughout the Comm.rnity,
The budget forecasts drawn up by the Commission departments for
next year form an integraL part of the economic forecasting exercjse. An
improvement in activity and sLowdown in infLation are expected to be accom-
panied by a reduction in generaL government net borrowing expressed as a
percentage of GDp $r8'A in 1983 as aga'inst 5r0Z in 1982). After deduction
of interest payments, there shouLd be an irprovement of four tenths of a
point in the net borrowing requirement. TabLe 6.3 shows that the change in
activity wiLL have the effect of increasing the budget deficit by nearty
one point, and the discretionary conponent of the change in the deficit
riLL be strongly positive (r2 points of GDP), refLecting a further
tightening of the budgetary poLicy stance in 1983. Achieving these fore-
casts requires an increase (eight tenths of a point) in generaL government
current revenue as a percentage of Communjty GDP, that is, a continuation
of the upward trend in that percentage despite the efforts made to end it.
More and more budgetary authorities are setting themsetves short-term or
medium-term targets to controL the growth of budget deficits. This is par-
ticutarLy the case jn BeLgium, which is seeking to reduce the centrat
government net borrowing requirement as a proportion of GDP by 1 - lrSZ
over a period of two or three yearsi in France, which hopes to Limit the
central governrnent net borrowing requr'rement to 37, of GDP; and in the
United K'ingdom, which, as part of the medjum-term financiaL strategy, has
set budgetary targets for as far ahead as the financiaL year 1984-85. Most
of the other Hember States atso set themseLves technicaL objectives for
Limiting expenditune and/or deficits in preparing their 1985 budgets.
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6.3 Pub!ir--de@
Since 1973, pubtic-sector debt as a percentage of GDP has risen -
though to varying degrees - in att the f{ember States except the United
Kingdom, where it had fatten to 58r1t of GDP in 1981 tron7115?t, in1973
(Graph,6.2 and TabLe 6.4>. The division into countries with a Large pubtic
debt and countries with a more moderate pubtjc debt did not change fun-
damentatl.y during that period. t'fhi[e differences of definition make it dif-
ficuLt to compare the fignrres for pubLic debt as a proportion of GDP, it is
possibte to assess the various rates of increase jn the leveL of pubLic-
sector debt within the economies of the Member States. This LeveL has
doubled in Greece, aLmost doubl.ed in lreland and in the FederaL Republic of
Germany and has increased by about 5Ot or a Ljttte Less in the NetherLands,
Itaty and Betgium; it has remained virtuaLLy stable in France, Luxembourg
and the Nethertands. In Denmark, net pubLic debt Has negative in 1973 and
substantiatLy positive in 1981. The increase in the public debt as a pro-
portion of GDP Lras fairty steady during the period in the FederaL RepubLic
of Germany, lreLand and ItaLy; it acceLerated distinctty from 1978 onwards
in BeLgium, Denmark and Greece. The rise in the externaL cornponent of the
pubLic debt hras generatly sharper than that of the debt as a whote. In
eight years, the externaL debt rose fronO167' of GDP to 1Or9% in BeLgium
and f ron 4r7i1 to 35r?% in lreLand; there h,as atso a signif icant increase in
the FederaL Repubtic of Germany (0147. in19731 4t3% in 1981) and a somewhat
smaLLer one in Greece (from 5r1X to7.8t>. If the debt is divided into
short-term and [ong-term jnstruments, it can be seen that there }Jas a very
marked shift towards short-term indebtedness in BeLgium and in Itaty.
Economic anaLysis of the pubtic debt situation is inevitabty
comptex. This is because it is difficutt to determine when the size of the
debt and its comosition become too costLy for the economy. Horeover,
attempts to achieve a substantiaL reduction in pubLic debt as a percentage
of GDp are inevitabLy a tong-term exercise. A number of anaLyticat criteria
must be appl,ied to obtain a cLearer picture of the various situations.
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FirstLy, it should be remembered that in some countries the sum of
monetary and financiaL assets in the economy has consistentty tended to
increase more rapidLy than GDP in nominaL terms. Thus, between 1972 and
1979, i.e. within the very short space of seven years, the ratio of mone-
tary and financial assets to GDP rose from 3.6 to 4.4 in BeLgium and from
2.7 to 3.5 in the FederaL Republic of Germany. This means that, assumjng no
change in the distribution of assets and Iiabi Lities as between institu-
tionaI sectors, the generat government debt in these economies increased as
a proportion of GDP yithout entai Ling any distortion in the financiaI
structure of the country. In the FederaL Republic of Germany for exarpLe,
the gross indebtedness of general government as a proportion of totaL
indebtedness in the economy rose fron 6r$t to gr7X. This increase is much
Lower than the virtuat doubLing of indebtedness as a percentage of GDP over
the same period.
Another criterion which is also somewhat ambiguous is the externat
conponent of the debt. It is not possibLe to corpare the trend of the debt
in the Unjted Kingdom or the FederaL RepubLic of Germany acquired by non-
rgsidents with the external- debt jn BeLgium, Denmark or IreLand, virtuatLy
aLL of which is financed by banks. In the first two countries, it ref[ects
spontaneous acquisitjon of securities denominated in currencies that have
something Like a reserve currency statusi jn the other three countries, the
debt is the resutt of borrowings initiated by the authorities jn order to
f inance budget deficits and/or baLance-of-payments defjcits.
Last[y, a breakdown of indebtedness into short-term and long-term
instruments gives us some idea of the degree of acceptabitity of pubLic
debt securities in financiat markets. The shortening of the maturity of
securities issued indicates erosion of the credjbitity of the issuing
authority. Thjs tendency rras very cLear in BeLgium between 1973 and 1981
and in ltaLy where, in 1981, the short-term debt accounted for a LittLe
over tHo thirds of the totat debt as against a LittLe over haLf in 1973.
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This indicator may be set atongside that obtained by breaking down
the financing of the budget deficit into the proportion financed by the
banking system and the proportjon absorbed by the financiat markets (see
Tabte 6.5). In BeLgium, monetary financing of the budget deficit in 1981
amounted to 1411% of GDP as against the amount equjvaLent to 1r?% of GDP
absorbed by the financiaL markets. In Greece, the reLevant figures were
respectivety 14r3'A and 0 % of GDP and in Iretand 18,2i( and 3%.
However, the rise in pubLic expenditure is financed not only by the
current (and visibLe) revenue of generat government budgets, but atso, to
varying degrees, by the effect of jnftation on the reat vaLue of the
exi sting pubLi c debt. In some lvlemben States, notabty ItaLy, the ef f ect of
inftation sjnce the first oiL crisis has been such that the growth of the
pubLic debt as a proportion of GDP has remained retativeLy modest despite a
very high apparent budget deficit. In Gernany, by contrast, the apparent
LeveL of budget deficits has been appreciabLy betow that in ItaLy, but the
growth of the pubLic debt has been practicaLLy of the same order: because
of the [ow inftation rate and the re[ativeLy modest leveL of the pubLic
debt initiaL[y, the effect of inftation on the reaL vatue of the pubtic
debt in Germany has remained negLigibte (see TabLe 6.6).
A rapid increase in pubtic debt as a proportion of GDP may be
accompanied by signs of strain on the financiaI markets, particuLarty if
the LeveL of financiat assets in the form of bonds is aLready high. ttlarket
operators see the risk that infLatjon may subsequentLy reduce the reaL
vaLue of their assets and they demand a gnoh,ing premium.
Given the conptexity of the financiaL markets and the irportance of
market confidence, it is hardLy possibte to estabtish any simpLe Link bet-
ween the grob,th of the pubtic debt (measured by the budget deficit,
adjusted for the effect of inftation on the teveL of the existing pubLic
debt) and the reat interest rate. As shoun by Graph 6.1, there is, however,
a distinct tendency for a high Levet of budget deficit adjusted for infta-
tion to go hand in hand Hith a high tevet of interest rates. The exceptions
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to this ruLe might partLy be attributabLe to institutionaI differences or
to other specific factors: the deductibitity of interest payments in tax
returns might expLain the retativeLy high LeveL of interest rates in
Denmark; a certain degree of isoLation of financiat markets in lreLand and
ItaLy might be the reason for the exceptionaLLy Low teveL of interest rates
there; the exceptionaL monetary restrictions in the United Kingdom in 1981
wouLd seem to be the reason for the reaL interest rate being out of aLL
proportion to the reaL pubLic sector borrowing requirementl and the retati-
veLy Low level of the real interest rate in Germany (in reLation to the
size of the budget deficit adjusted for inftation) might be due to inter-
nationaL confidence in the German mark and an extension of its inter-
nationaL monetary roLe.
Thus, study of the trend of the pubLic debt (and of budget deficits
adjusted for infLation) provides additionat information that is essentiat
in anatysing budgetary deveLopents and in establjshing a framework for the
preparation of a medium-term financiaL strategy aimed at putting the
budgets in orderl the basic principLes for this process have been outtined
in the Commissionrs communication on budget discipLine.
dI
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llain bg9ggtary_ pgljcy measures in ttlember States af f ecting the f inanciaL
years 1982 and 1983
In BeLgium, the government presented the 1982 provisionaI draft centrat
government budget in August 1981. rt decided at the time to Ljmit the
centraL government current deficjt to BFR 201 000 miLLion and the net
borrowing requirement to 8FR 354 000 miLtion, equivatent to 9z of GDp.
The net borrowing requirement for the pubLic sector as a whoLe tras
pLanned not to exceed 12i4 of GDP. The resignation of the government
meant that the budget couLd neither be tabLed nor adopted according to
scheduLe and, foLLowing the generaL eLection, the SociaL Christian
Party and the LiberaL Party agreed in December on a government pact
aimed at reformjng pubLic finances. The pLanned current deficit for the
1982 budget tras maintained at BFR 200 000 mi Ltion and was to be
achi'eved soLeLy through expenditure economies (BFR 120 000 miLLion).
Under the speciaL powers granted to it earLy 1n 1982, the government
introduced in February a number of measures incLuding, in particutar, a
reduction in the VAT rate on construction work from 17% to 62.
FoLLowing the devatuation of the Betgian franc on 21 February, the
system of Linking wages and saLaries to the consumer price index was
modified and a price freeze, subsequentty extended untiL the end of the
year, was inposed. In March, the Government decided to trim centraL
government current expenditure in 198? from BFR 1 469 800 miLtion to
BFR 1 393 000 miLtion, to Limit the current deficit to BFR 252 000
miLLion and to reduce the sociat security deficit to BFR 42 500
miLLion. The draft budget for 1982 was tabled on 1 ApriL. In ApriL, a
RoyaL Decree intro-duced substantiaL tax cuts for firms deciding to
invest (between 5/, and 25i( of the amount of investment coutd be
deducted from taxabLe income, depending on the kind of investment).0n
Commission estimates, the centraL government net borrowing requirement
coutd amount to more than 13 % of GDP in 1982, as against 13t5t in
1981. At the beginn'ing of August, the Government presented its provi-
sionaL 1983 draft budget. Totat revenue was projected to be BFR I 277
000 mi LLion and totaL expenditure BFR 'l 702 000 mi L[ion, representing
increases of 9r5i6 and 7r5?( respectiveLy over the figures in the 1982
centraL government budget. The net borrowing requirement is expected to
be BFR 445 000 miLLion, equivaLent to 1Or5% of GDP. The draft budget,
which, apart from a few detaiLs, is in accord with the intentions
cited, was tabLed on 8 October.
In Denmark, the government pLaced its 1982 draft budget before
Par[iament in August 1981; the draft provided for a centraL government
cash deficit of DKR 39 900 mil"Lion. However, the government Lost the
support of ParLiament in November. It rlas decided to ho[d a generaL
eLection on 8 December and ParLiament granted the government temporary
pohrers to raise taxes and to meet current expenditure in 198? untiL the
budget bras passed by the new ParLiament. In Februa?y, ParLiament passed
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the 1982 budget, thereby cancetLing the provisionaL budget adopted in
November 1981. Conpared with the 1981 budgetr pLanned revenue vas 1rZy,
higher and pLanned expenditure 2O'A higher, raising the pLanned centraL
government net borrowing requirement to DKR 47 600 miL[ion. In June,
Partiament adopted the finaL part of the government programme designed
in particu[ar to irprove the enptoyment situation and to support
investment. The totaL cost of the programme, put at some
DK 7 500 miLLion, Has to be financed by an increase in indirect taxa-
tion, by a tax on interest receipts and by an increase in certain
excise duties. In its report on the 1982 budget, pubLished in May, the
Finance trlinistry acknowLedged that the centraL government deficit might
turn out higher than ptanned. 0n 16 August, the government Laid before
ParLiament its 1983 draft budget. The totaL defjcit (current account,
capitaL account and Lending) was first put at DKR 73 700 miLLion, then
in September at DKR 80 200 miLlion, or DKR 227O0 miLLion higher than
the most recent estimate of DKR 57 500 miLlion (122 of GDP) for the
1982 deficit. The new government, in office since 6 September, pre-
sented its new economic poLicy programme on 5 October. It envisages,
as we[L as a hrage freeze and the suspension of indexation of incomes, a
reduction in certain sociat transfers subsidies.
In the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, the 1982 draft budget approved by
the gov rovided for a substantiaL reduction
in the FederaL government bonrowing requirement, which was estimated at
DM 26 500 mi ltion, or around Df,l 7 000 mi [[ion tes than the outturn
expected for 1981. The package of measures proposed was designed to
reduce the Federat budget deficit by DM 12 500 miLtion, as compared
ulith the initiaL estimate, through spending cuts totaLting
DtY| 10 000 miLLion and revenue increases amounting to Dl4 2 500 miLtion.
The main features of the measures as adopted by ParLiament in December
were a reduction in current expenditure (notabLy on heatth services,
erpLoyment promotion and housing), cuts in sociaL security benefits,
increases in a number of excise duties and reductions in certain tax
retiefs. At the same tine, an increase in capitaL aLlowances was
adopted. The objective was to hotd the FederaL government deficit to
Dtvl 26 800 mi LLion. The authorities decided at the beginning of February,
when the annuaL economic report utas published, to introduce a range of
additionat measures, to boost investment in 1982, which wene to have
thei r main budgetary impact in 1985. In ltlay Par[iament approved the
governmentrs proposal for the introduction of a 101 investment grant.
The target for the FederaI government deficit was subsequentLy revised
upwards. In June, the government approved a suppLementary budget
invoLving expenditure of Dfll 7 100 miLtion and raising the projected
FederaL government deficit to DFI 35 900 miLlion. GeneraL government net
borrowing coutd be equivalent to 47. of GDP in1982, as against 4r5Z in
1981.0n 30 June the Federat government adopted the generaL guideLines
for the preparation of the 1985 budget. The FederaL government
borrowing requirement tras to be he[d to Dl4 28 500 miLtion. At the end
of September the new coaLition government formed by the CDU/CSU and the
FDP presented a serie of proposats for the 1983 budget which includes,
in particuLar, the principle of a on-point increase in the rate of VAT
from 1 JuLy 1985 and the inposition of a compulsory Lan from high-
income househoLds to the government. Taking account of these propo-
saLs, the FederaL government deficit for 1983 was estimated at
DI'l 37 000 mi Ltion.
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In Greece, the centraL government budget deficit incLuding government
trading accounts uas virtualLy stabLe up to 1981, at around 5'6% of
GDP. In 1981, an expenditure explosion produced a tlro-fold increase in
the deficit, taking it to 127l of GDP. The new government formed after
the 0ctober 1981 generat election prepared the 1982 budget with the aim
of reducing the deficit to 9% of GDP. The budget, rhich rtas adopted by
ParLiament in earty ApriL, provjded for a substantiaL increase in revenue$8r5"n notabty f rom indirect taxation (new taxes and increases in ex-
isting taxes) and direct taxation (new taxes and a drive against tax
evasion) and from the European AgricuLturaI Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
The increase in expenditure was put at 35%. As a resuLt, the generaL
government borrowing requirement shouLd, on Commjssion estimates, be
equivaLent to 9r?/. of GDP in 1982, as against 10.17. in 1981.
In France, the 1982 draft budget t.las passed by Parliament at the end of
1981. Tha pLanned centraL government cash deficit tras fixed at FF 95 400
miLLion, or around 2r6X of GDP, and the tax burden was increased a LittLe.
Expenditure, geared primari Ly to boosting empLoyment and investment, t{as
pLanned to rise by 2716% and revenue by 18r9'A. The higher LeveL of spend-
ing involved among other things the creation of 61 000 civiL service jobs,
direct empLoyment subsidies costing FF 18 600 miLLion and a substantiat
increase in the minimum oLd-ale benefit. Personal income tax bands vere
widened by 13151( and a tax on .targe fortunes tlas introduced. Taxes and
sociaL security contributions for both empLoyers and empLoyees llere raised
significantty in November as part of a ptan for financing the sociaL sec-
urity deficit. In May, the Government agreed on a supplementary budget
that was subsequentLy adopted by Partiament. This supptementary budget,
under which new expenditure and new revenue were in baLance at 11 900
miLLion, t.las designed to finance assistance to private firms (reduction
in the business tax) and to the neuly nationatized undertakings, notably
through an adjustment of VAT ratesr the standard rate being raised from
1716"1 to 1816% and the rate for basic foodstuffs torered tron 77 to 5r5il.
According to Comnission estimatesr the centraL government cash deficit
wi[t probably be around FF 105 000 mittion in 1982, equivatent to 37" of
GDP, compared with FF 81 000 miLLion or ?167 of GDP in 1981. In JuLy, a
plan for pruning sociaL security spending by FF 10 000 miLLion was adopt-
ed by the Cabinet.0n 1 September the government adopted its 1983 draft
budget, which provides for much sLover rates of increase in centraL gov-
ernment expenditure and revenue than in 198? <11r8t and 102 respectivety).
The centraL government budget deficit was put at FF 117 000 mitlion (this
inc[udes 20 000 mittion set aside as a contingency reserve). The burden
of taxation witL probably be unchanged from the previous year.
In lreLand, a draft budget for 1982 uas Laid before Partiament in January
and rejected. ParLiament was then dissoLved and a generat election bras
held in February. The neu governmentts budget tlas presented to ParLiament
on 25 filay and subseguentty adopted. Its main thrust vas simi tar to that
of the draft budget presented in Januaryl however, as promised during
the etection campaign, a number of measures such as the charging of VAT
on cLothing and footwear and the abotition of certain food subsidies
were dropped. The objective in the Finance Act hras to restrict the current
(e)
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budget deficit and the Exchequer borrowing requirenent to 6l and 141
of GDP respectively, compared yith the figures of around 8l and 1Tt
recorded in 1981. The main tax measures in the 1982 budget uere some
smaIt direct tax concessions for those on tou incomes and substantiaL
increases in vAT rates and excise duties. rt yas atso decided to raise
sociaI security contributions. rn ApriL, the government decided to makefurther income tax concessions (at a cost of rRL 45 miLLion) to com-pensate Hage earners for the increase in sociat security contributions.
rn August, the authorities put foruard a ptan for cutting government ex-penditure by TRL,120 miLlicn by the end of the year. The Conmission depart-
ments estlmated in OctobeF, that the Exchequer borrowing,requirement couLdbe equivatent to {5,?% of 6DF i.n 1ggz, i.e. stightLy 'tower than the figureof 15r8X recorded in 1981.
rn rta[y, the government, uhen presenting its estimates for 19E2 on30 september 1981, had announced that it uoutd make every effort to
restrict net borroring by the entarged publ.ic sector to Lrr 50 000 000
mittion. The 1982 Finance Law vas passed by parl.iament on 26 Aprit lggz;this.uas tater than scheduted, so that the provisionaI tweLfths (ormonthly suppty vote) proceduie had to be appt.ied unti r. then. At thebeginning of t4av, a press retease from the'i;";;";t ilinistry put the
same aggregate at Lrr 65 000 000 mit[ion, the overrun being'made up ofan amount of Lrr 7 500 000 miLLion to atlow for a downward revision ofrevenue estimates, an amount of Lrr 5 ooo 000 miLtion to cover higher-than-expec'ted interest charges and an amount of Lrr z 5oo 000 miLlion tofinance extra spending. The estimate for net borroying by ttre enrargeapublic sector vas raised to Lrr 6g 000 0oo miLtion in .rune. on 31 JuLy,the.government approved a package of measures for bringing the mountingpubtic deficit under controt. rhe main measures to be imptemented immediatety were increases in pubtic service charges and indir".i t"i"r-ivai, 
"*-cise duties and the setttement of income t.r oirprles through payment oftax on. an assessed amount increased by a flat 3uo. The authorities hopedthat this woutd enabte the deficit of th" *f""ged-publ.ic sector to behetd to around Lrr 60 000 000 mi[[ion in 19g2.6n sb september the-gov-ernment presented its provisionaI economic report to parIiament. The sec-ond part of the report set out the draft budget for lgE3. gecause of shortfalts in tax receipts and a revision of expenditure and revenues, thedeficit of the enLarged pubr.ic sector could be around Lrr 14 ooo o0omiItion in 1982' For 19E3' pretim'inary estimates by commission departmentsput this deficit at around LIT 90 0OO OOO miil.ion.'
rn luxgmbourg, the draft centraI government budget for 19gz ras present-
9d by the government on 31 Juty tigt ana adoptej-by partiament on16 December- The Finance taw provided for expenditlre totattingLFR 55 900 mittion, a 614z increase over the adjusied 19g1 budiet, Hhir.etotaI revenue (inctuding LtR 2 000 mitLion in b6rror.ing)ras estimated atLFR 54 600 miItion, a 7r5l increase. The totat deficit-*", 
"ip".t"i-ioamount to LFR 1 300 mi[[ion, but a surptus of around LFR 4 00b mitiionwas anticipated for the current account a[one. As in Belgium, the govern-ment decided, fottouing the February deva[uation of the Luxembourg franc,to impose a se[ective price freeze untiL the end of the y;";;-i; ]r"penafor a time the system of rage indexation and to impose a rent freeze. Asa percentage of GDp, generar. governnent net bonrou!1s 11t probabtybe sr.ighttyhigher in 1982 than.-in 19^?!-(;gz,."is against 1,gz). rn August, theGovernment dreu up its 19gs draft budget proviiing for increases inexpenditure and revenue of 6r4t ana arzz,"rp".tiJ"iy. rn 1gg3, totaIexpenditure is thus expected to be LFh 59 700 miItion, rith revenueamounting to LFR 59 300 mittion. This voutd Leave -net borrowing ofLFR 400 mitIion.
\c-\
6.17
In the Nether[ands, the government presented its 1982 draft budget on
1ssept65ffi'ThebudgetdeficitwasputatHFL158o0mi[[ion,
equivaLent to 4 3l4Z of net national income <67, in 1981). The generat
government borrowing requirement was fixed at 6157 of net nationaL
income Q 314% in 1981). The government resigned on 15 0ctober and the
neu governnent decided in November to prepare an empLoyment programme
aimed at creating between 25 000 and 35 000 jobs and at restraining
the growth in incomes.0n the budget front, the target of a total pubtic
finance deficit equivalent to 615% of net nationaL income uas maintained
but significant amendments uere made to the draft budget (increases in
expenditure and revenuernotabLy through an increase in indirect taxes).
The empLoyment programme, the cost of which was put at some HFL 3 000
mi LLion, h,as adopted by the government in ftlarch 1982. In Apri L, it was
decided to raise temporarity, trith effect from 1 JuLy, the wage and per-
sonat income tax. 0n 12 l4ay, the Sociatist ministers resigned frorn the
government because of disagreement tdith their Christian Democrat and
Progressive LiberaL partners over budgetary poticy in 1982 and 1983. It
was decided to hoLd fresh elections. A minority government took office
and set the date of the general election for 8 September. 0n 21 September
the outgoing government presented a draft budget for 1983. It was charact-
erized by onty modest growth in revenues as a resuLt of retrenchment(amounting to HFL 12 100 miLLion) in the sociaI security and centraL gov-
ernment budgets. The pressure of taxes and sociaI security contributions
was estimated to increase by 1r1Z of net nationaL income. The cash deficit
of generaL government for 1983 was put at 1lr8i( of net nationat income (as
against 1Or2% in 1982).
In the United Kingdom, the Chanceltor of the Exchequer announced at the
beginni;6-6TlEmm 196t revised pubtic expenditure ptans for 1982183.
with expenditure UKL 5 000 miLLion higher (atUKL 115 000 miLtion) than
ptanned in the previous tfhite Paper published in, ttlarch 1981. Some of the
measures announced concerned revenue (increases in sociaL security con-
tributions, Nationat HeaLth Service charges and higher counci L house
rents). rn March 1982, the Government presented its 1982183 budget and
pubLished a revised ltledium-Term FinanciaL Strategy. The pubtic sector
borrowi ng requi rement (PSBR) was forecast to be UKL 9 500 mi L Lion (equi va Lent
to 3157. of GDP), stightLy above the iLLustrative figure given in the
previous yearrs Medium-Term Financiat Strategy. Income tax threshoLds
were increased by 141, and increases vere announced in certain excise
duties and indirect taxes. A[t in aL[, the budget reflected a sLight
easing of budgetary poLicy as compared with the targets set a year
earLier, but the first priority nas stiLL to bring down infLation.
Even so, the target of UKL 9 500 mittion remained beLor the figure of
UKL 10 500 miLLion fixed for the financia[ year 198118?. The actual
outturn for the PSBR in',981182 uas at UKL 8 800 miLlion tower than the
target of UKL 10 500 miLLion. As the Latest deveLopments on the monetary
front permitted a more plagmatic appro'ach, the new Medium-Term Financiat
Strategy at the same time set a target range of 8-1?i( for monetary grotth
in 1982183, compared with the range of 5"-9Z,envisaged in March 1981 for
the same period. 0n thebasis of a number of indicators, it appeared in
0ctober that the target of UKL 9 500 miLlion for the PSBR in'1982183 would
be met.
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Graph 6.1: ReaL Long-term interest rates and budget deficits adjusted
for the effects of inf[ation on pubtic debt as Z of GDP.
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(1) Annuat average yieLd of government bonds minus the annuaI changein the impLicit price deftator for private consumption.
.(2) Net lendinq (+) or borrowing (-) of genera[ government minus the
toss ln real vatue of pubLic debt holdings as % of GDP.
Sources: Commission services.
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6.26 Graph 6.3: Trend of pubtic debt as Z of GDP since 1973 (1)
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7. Labour filarkets
Labour market trends in 1981 and 1982 continued to be characterisedby high and rising unenployment due to Low rates of enp[oyment growth andhigh rates of Labour force growth. The Comnr.rnityts record in cieating jobs
over the Last ten years has faLten far short of that achieved by UnitedStates and Japan, particuLarLy when tabour force trends are taken into
account. Instead, the Comm.rnity has achieved a faster growth of producti-
vity than the United States, particuLarty in manufacturing industry, which
has been shedding labour continuousLy since 1973. Emptoyment growth has
been occurring in the services sector, but on a far tess scaLe than in theUnited States, and atso at a rate insufficient to conpensate for the conti-
nuing decLine of enployment in agricutture and manufacturing. Increasinginterest has been focussed on the rote of rea[ wages in the recent upsurge
of unenployment, and various measures have been used to determine the
strength of the reLationship between reaL wages and enptoyment.
7.1 Tl11Comryq4ity rs employment performance
ln 1982, the Conm.rnityts labour markets, in common with those of
the other principat industriatized countries, were stiLL experiencing a
continuation of the trends of the last two years : the stump in GDP and
enptoyment grorth jn 1981 and 1982 nas equat to that experienced in the
1974-75 recession. In the Comrrunity, unerptoyment averaged 8r1 76 in 1981
for the year as a whoLe and is estimated at some 9r2 % tor 1982. In the
United States, despite a short-Lived recovery in the first three quarters
of 198O, unempLoyment is expected to reach 9r5 I in 1982. Even in Japan,
atthough unempLoyment remains at the reLative[y tow rate of 2r? %, it has
stiLL nearLy doubLed from its average rate of the 1960rs (Graph.7.1).
The steep rise in the tevel of unerpLoyment in the Community over
the tast tro years is principatty due to the faiLure of empLoyment growth
to corpensate for the unusuaLl.y high pressures arising from adverse demo-
graphic movements. Over the period 1980-82, the average rate of enptoyment
grorth in the Comrrunity was - Or9 Z, with a particutarly Large fatL in 1981
G113 Z). At the same time, there tras a rapid expansion in the working-age
popuLation (at around 1 % a year in the period 1980-83)r comrprising mainty
young schoot-Leavers arriving on the labour market for the first time.
Given the retative stabiLity of the activity rate, which has ftuctuated by
no more than 0r3 Z points since 1971, this has resulted in abnorma[ty targe
rises in the tabour force in the tast 3 years. This combination of events
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is unique to the Community at the present time, uhen overa[[ world activity
is Least conducive to a rapid recovery of erployment gro]rth, but the
situation currentty facing the Community in terms of tabour force growth
and demographic pressure is exactLy the same as that experienced by the
United States from the middte sixties untiL the end of the seventies. The
post war baby-boom there, which tasted from 1946'1962, reached its peak in
1955, and by 1970, this "buLge" was iust arriving on the labour market.
During the rest of that decade, the American economy had to cope Hith a
25 % increase in its tabour force whi Le at the same tjme the rate of output
grouth was being nearLy hatved by the effects of the 1973 oil shock. In the
period 1973 to 1981, reat economic growth in the United States averaged
just over 2X a year and enptoyment rose by more than 2 Z annuatty. In the
Community, in the same period, reaL output rose by tess than 2 Z a year and
employment decLined by Or2 %. Tf the Commlnity had achieved onLy haLf the
empLoyment grouth of the United States, this wou[d have been sufficient to
ease the unemtoyment probtem: annual enptoyment growth of 1% a year from
1973-81 would have meant I 1 12 ni tLion extra jobs; in the same period the
number of jobtess rose by 7 112 ni LLion.
The difference in the performance of the two economies can be seen
in Graph 7.2. This shows the trends in the activity rate, which is the
proportion of the working-age poputation in the labour force (employed and
unempLoyed), and the erpLoyment-population ratio, uhich is the proportion
of the working-age popuLation who are emtoyed, for the Community and the
United States in the period 1960-1981. If the activjty rate is taken as an
expression of the proportion of the poputation who wish to uork, and the
erptoyment-popu[ation ratio as indicating the abitity of the economy to
provide them with work, then the difference between them shows how succes-
fut these two economies have been.
In the United States, yith the exception of 1975. erpLoyment growth
h,as sustained at a very high rate throughout the period 1971'79t and it is
onty in1982 that the growth rate faLts betow that of the Community, Thus,
despite a progressive rise in the activity rate, from 58 Z in the earty
1960rs to 63 Z in 1981, the abitity of the US economy to provide enpLoyment
for a grouing proportion of its population did not deterjorate untiI after
1979. In the Comrunity, by contrAst, a steady dectine in the activity rate
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has been matched by an even sharper decLine in the proportion of the
working-age popuLation which is erpLoyed : by 19g1 the empLoyment-
popuLation ratio was down from over 67 % in 1960 to tess than 63 x and by
1983 it is forecast to fatt to nearly 61 16. The marked differences in the
apparent abiLity of economies to create enptoyment - between 1973 and 19g1,
15 mi ttion jobs in the united states, J mi LLion in Japan, and stagnation
in the community - are of course, refLected in the trend of productivity
growth. The arithmetic reLationship between output, emptoyment and produc-
tivity necessariLy means that a fatL in output growth may be absorbed in
one of t,,o Hays: by a faLL in productivity growth or by a far.r. in
erployment grotrth (or a combination of the two). The devetopments in the
comrunity and the united states over the tast twenty years and particuLarty
since 1973 are ctear examtes of the two extremes of this dichotomy : in
the community the stowdown in the rate of growth of output has cLearLy been
borne by the faLt in ernpLoyment, whiLe in the United states, a simiLar faLLin the rate of output grouth has been absorbed by a Large faLt in produc-
tivity growth, |Jhich stowed atmost to zero on average for the period (TabLe
7.2> .
7-2 structurat and SectoraL Trlqnds in EmpLoyment
sectoraL erpLoyment trends in both the Comrnrnity and the United
States in recent years have been characterised by three main features : the
continuing decIine of agricutture as a provider of emptoyment, the dectine
in the share of industry, and particu[arty manufacturing, and the marked
rise in the service sector to the position of targest empLoyer. The scaLe
of these deveLopments between the two economies however, has been qu;te
different. (TabLe 7.3)
The vast majority of the 15 million net{ jobs created in the united
states in the period 1973-81 are in the services and government sectors. By
198Ot 66 7( of atl enptoyment was in this sector compared with 63 y. in 1913.
By contrast, the enptoyment share in both agricuLture and industry had de-
cLined over the same period. An anaLysis carried out by the US Bureau of
Labour Statistics suggests that the reLativeLy successfuL enrpLoyment
\4D-
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performance of the American economy in the face of the recent recessions
may be expLained by a shift in the mix of enptoyment towards tess cycticat-
Ly sensitive industries especiaLLy service-producing industries, uhich have
inproved their enpLoyment performance in a[[ recent recessions. The reLa-
tive buoyancy of services erpLoyment is very unevenLy distributed across
industry categories. The principat sectors which posted strong gains in
recent years Here government enpLoyment and the services industry : Legat,
heatth and business services, hoteLs and motets, auto repair, anusement and
recreation. These are the sectors which generatty exhibit tow productivity
growth, Less technotogicat advancement and a high ratio of djrect Labour to
machines, hence enpLoyment gror,rth is not surprising, even during an econo-
mi c cont ract i on.
It has also been suggested that the jobs boom in the United States
since the Second t'forLd hlar is a form of indirect government empLoyment.
In the 1950rs this occurred through the expansion of education, in the
1960rs (and up to the mid-70rs) in the increase in sociat services, and
since 1975, the growth of heatth care. It has been estimated that since
1975 sociaL and heaLth services funded by ttledicare and ttledicaid have been
generating 800.000 new jobs a year.
The other striking structurat phenomenon about the US economy is
its capacity to absorb women into the workforce. Between 1960 and 1981,
the share of females in the Labour force rose from one-third to nearty one-
haLf. In the same period the femate participation rate rose from 43 Z to
60 %, and the vast majority of these jobs for h,omen are to be found in the
services sector and in heatth, education and tretfare: exact[y those sec-
tors which have registered the strongest erpLoyment gains in the tast
8 years.
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In the Comrunity, by contrast, the expansion of the femaLe tabour
force was much stower, rising from around 34 7, of the totat Labour force in
1970 to 37 X 1n 1981. SimitarLy, the fenale activity rate atso rose much
slower than in the United States, from an estimated 447. in 1960 to 50 Z in
1981t although the expansion stowed down after 1979 as the growth in the
rorking age poputation acceterated.
OveratL enp[oyment trends bethreen the three main sectors, however,
have not been dissimi [ar in the Comrrunity f rom those in the United States :
the drift from agricutture continued, but at a much stoner pace as the
scope for adjustment in agricutture became much smatter after the Large mo-
vements off the Land in the targe agricutturat emtoying countries fn the
earLy sixties. Even so, the decLine uas atmost entirely due to a drop in
the number of seLf-enptoyed and unpaid famity workers uho make up the majo-
rity of agriculturat uorkers in the Comm.rnity as a yhoLe.
The dec[ine in emtoyment in industry in the Community, from nearLy
40 1 of totaL enptoyment in 1973 to less than 37 % in 1981, was targeLy due
to the contraction in manufacturing. In some of the Community countries
the pace of "de-indr.rstriatisation" has been staggering (TabLe 7.4) z in the
United Kingdom between 1970-81 the share of manufacturing felt 8 t points,
in the BeLgium by 716 Z points and in the Nethertands 5rZ Z points. The
very sharp rise in unerpLoyment in Betgium and the United Kingdom, (which
have the tro highest rates of unerptoyment in the Community), nay be cto-
seLy connected to this phenomenont over the period since 1973, and par-
ticutarty in the Last two years, these two countries have demonstrated high
rates of productivity grouth. These are the resutt, principaL[y, of the
decLine in enployment in traditionaI hearrry industries - steet, coaL, and
heaqy engineering - nhich results in an immediate irprovement in overaLt
prodlctivity and profitabi tity in the average for manufacturing industry,
but uhich has no positive effect on enptoyment prospects; it is sinpty a
resuLt of the redlction in numbers emLoyed. Services sector emptoyment
expanded in a[[ ttlember States, the sharpest increases being in Itaty,
France and Betgium.
(10)
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A detaiLed anaLysis of erpLoyment in services for those Community
countries for which sufficientLy corparabte data exist indicates some stri-
king differences, both between Community countries and between the Communi-
ty and the United States. (Tab[e 7.5>.
In the whotesaLe and retaiL trade, (incLuding repair servjces), and
in transport, enpLoyment dectined in the FederaL Repubtic of Germany white
in aLL other countries except ItaLy it remained fairLy stabLe. In hoteLs
and catering, aLL countries except ItaLy and BeLgium showed [ow rates of
increase. In banking and insurance and communjcation there were strong
growth rates everywhere except in the FederaL RepubLic of Germany and in
the United Kingdom in communications. ALL countries showed sharp increases
in empLoyment in "other market services" and there has been a disproportio-
nateLy rapid grourth in the government sector, which together with domestic
services and services provided by private non-profit making institutions
account for some 16'21 i[ of emptoyment in non-manket services.
The three sectors which increased most rapidty in the Un'ited Sta-
tes, LegaL services, business services and heatth care, probabLy aLso
showed the targest gains in the Comrrunity, since they fatt into the two
sectors which aLso grew substant'iatLy : "other market services" and
"non-market services". It must be recognized, however, that the system of
heatth care varies considerabLy on the two sides of the AtLantic and aLso
between Community countries, so that a direct conparison in this sector is
coropticated by questions of definition. 0n the other hand, two sectors
which did weLL in the US performed badLy in the Community, nameLy hotets
and catering, and the distributive trades (incLuding repair services). The
most notabte feature, however, is the extent to which devetopments in one
Community country, ltaLy, ctoseLy match those in the United States. It is
the onLy Community country in which the share of totaL emptoyment in manu-
facturing did not dec[ine over the decade as a whote aLthough it peaked in
1974 and decLined stowLy thereafter. At the same time, however, Ita[y atso
registered the fastest growth in services empLoyment in the Community,
(with average groulth of nearty 2 112 % a yean between 1973 and 1980).
Among the various service sectors it posted strong grohrth in whotesa[e and
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catering, banking and fjnance and "other market
trend of unenptoyment since 1973 has also been
the United States, rising tron 4r9 Z in 197j to
In the economy as a whoLe, productivity growth in the Community
has faLLen about hatf since 1973, whiLe totaL enpLoyment has actuaLLy
declined. rn 1982, with a fatt in erptoyment of some 1 A, the stight
grouth in activity wiIt resu[t in a modest rise in productivity growth,
rather than in any imrnediate effects on unerptoyment: after more than two
years of recession in output and demand, it is to be expected that there is
some spare capacity in the economy, both in terms of capitat stock and
short-time working. Emptoyers are tikeLy to react initiaIty to any upturn
}Jith caution by taking up the stack in these two areas before recruiting
new labour. This trend is expected to continue in 1983: with only modest
groulth in activity a further faLt in erptoyment is forecast, with a simitar
rise in prodr,rctivity growth. An area of uncertainty here is the extent to
which spare capacity of the capitaL stock reaLLy exists, or whether the
decLine in profitabi Iity has induced acceLerated scrapping (see
section 7.3>.
In manufacturing indust ry t ? simi Lar pattern can be observed. trlanu-
facturing output gronth sLowed everywhere after 1973, and usuaLty more
sharpty than overatL grouth. In contrast to the reaction in the United
states, Japan and particuLar[y the Community countries have not responded
to this slowdown in output growth with a Large falL in productivity growth:
in the period after 1973, the rate of growth of productivity per head and
per hour has faLLen by tess than haLf (Tabte ?.6).
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tlhiLe in aLL countries the decline in the rate of growth of produc-
tivity per head and per hour has been rough[y paral.tet, some differences in
the magnitude of the reaction do exist. rn the united states, average
ueekly hours have decLined in the period since 1973, nhiLe emptoyment has
increased significantLy. As a resuLt, the rate of hour[y productivity-
grouth has s[owed much [ess than the rate of growth of per capita produc-
tivity: the response of American industry to the sLoydown in demand and
output appears to have been to erpLoy more workers for fewer hours. In the
Community the the decLine in average ueekty hours continued at much the
sane pace, atthough there are d'ivergences among the llember States, rlith
much faster decLines in Germany, and to a Lesser extent the United Kingdom
and France, than in Itaty and Dennark. Totat hours uorked in the Community
as a whole decLined m.rch faster during the second period, but this is
aLmost certain[y due to the reduction in emLoyment rather than in hours.
These trends acce[erated in 1981, uhen both manufacturing output and
enptoyment fetI sharpty, and productivity per hour rose because emptoyee
hours dectined more than output.
The resutt of this "choice" rthich countries appear to have made in
responding to the adjustment probLem inposed by the various shocks of the
197gts is the subsequent rise in unerptoyment. Over the 1970rs, the rise
in unenployment has been much greater (reLative to its 1960rs average) in
the Commlnity than in either the United states or Japan, and in the Last 3
years has worsened further (Graphs 7.1 and 7.j). Since the beginning of
1980, the rate of unerptoyment in the commrnity as a whote has risen
steepty to reach 9t9 Z by August 19E2 (seasonaLty adjusted). Despite some
tentative signs of a stowdown in the rate of increase during the first haLf
of 1982' unemtoyment is not expected to faLI before the end of 1983; the
snatL rise in output grorth in the Community in 1983 witt sti[L be insuf-
ficient to offset a further marginaL faU. in erployment, rhite the high
rate of tabour force gronth nitt continue.
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7.3 Emptoyment and the Adjustment of ReaI Uages
It is apparent that the recent increases in unempLoyment in the
Comm.rnity are due to a ride range of contributing factors : the upsurge in
infLation, weak reat demand, structuraL probtems arising from the rise in
the re[ative price of oiL, a generat tack of business confidence, Labour
force and prodlctivity trends, It has atso been suggested that the sharp
increases in reat wages uhich have occurred in recent years but 11hich were
not justified by prod,rctivity increases, have further increased
unenptoyment Levets through the acconpanying faLts in prof itabi Lity.
A combination of these factors may indeed be the most reLevant
explanation of the present European situation. If a sharp faLl. in productj-
vity is associated vith a fatt in demand from a terms of trade toss and
reat wages do not adjust sufficientty quickty, then there can be a tack of
demand and at the same time real wages can be too high for tong-run futL
empLoyment. In these circumstances, too high reat wages and the correspon-
dingLy Lor profitabitity reduces the incentive to invest in new machinery
and the investment that does take p[ace wiLt be highLy capital intensive.
As a result there riLt be an increasing mismatch between the labour suppLy
and the erptoyment necessary to fuLty util.ise the capitaL stock.
The measurement and ana[ysis of the reaL wage probLen is fraught
t{ith difficuLties. No sinpte straight-forward measure exists and the
potentiat probtem must be examined in the tight of severat indicators. Two
of the more frequent[y used measures are factor income shares and the reat
hrage gap.
If wages are at their appropriate teveL then the share of profits
shoutd be such as to encourage firms to fuLty utiLise the present capitaL
stock and encourage further investment. Therefore the wage share and any
change in it shouLd provide a vaLuabLe indicator of any Hage probtem. But
the figures are affected by the assumptions made about seLf-empLoyment
income. NationaI accounts do not distinguish between that portion of
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seLf-erptoyment income which is profits and that portion yhich is an
inpLied wage payment. If it is assumed that att seLf-employment income is
profit, then the tabour income ratios wiLL be biased downwards, the probLem
being particuLarLy acute for those countries with a targe setf-empLoyed
popu Lat i on.
PartLy to overcome some of the probLems with the tabour income
share and partLy to anaLyse the reasons for any changes in factor shares,
the concept of the reaL wage gap has been developed. It shows the dif-
ference between the actuat growth in reaL wages (defined as wages divided
by consumer prices) and that grourth rate in reaL wages which wouLd maintain
constant factor shares (the so-catted warranted growth in reat wages).
This latter depends mainLy on the rate of growth of productivity and
changes in the terms of trade.
Graph 7.3 shouls the reat wage gap for the Conmunity,, the USA and
Japan over the period 1960 to 1982, and corpares it with enpLoyment growth.
For the Communityt it shous ctearty the different trends before and after
the oiL price shock. During the 1960rs there was retative stabitity in the
share of wages but between 1972 and 1975 the reat wage gap increased by
over 4 % partLy because of a stump in productivity growth and partLy be-
cause of a deterioration in the terms of trade. 0ver the subsequent four
years the reat wage gap narrowed as productivity growth recovered and the
terms of trade inproved. However, during the 1980-81 oiL induced reces-
sion the reaL wage gap widened again reaching about the same [eveL as the
previous peak in 1975. (The absotute size of the real wage gap is somewhat
arbitrary since it depends on the base year).
For the United States the picture is somewhat different. In the
earLy 1960s, there Has a significant shift in income shares in favour of
profits which tras fuLLy reversed between 1967 and 1970. Since then factor
shares have remained more or less constant atthough there are some indica-
tions that 1982 may tead to the devetopment of a significant reaL rage gap.
\41
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In Japan, up to 1969 there tras a sharp ilmrovement in the share of
profits, mainLy because of a very high rate of productivity growth. Bet-
reen 1969 and 1975' there Has a reverse movement of the reaL uage gap due
to a massive deterioration in the terms of trade and a stowdoyn in produc-
tivity growth. The high reaL wage gap reached in 19?5 has been naintained
through-out the rest of the 1970s and has widened somewhat more in the
1980-81 recession.
The graphs for the USA and the EC provide some evidence of a nega-
tive correLation between the reat wage gap and enptoyment but Japan does
not seem to fit into this pattern. However, atthough neaI wages in Japan
rose faster than warranted in the 197Os, the share of wages and sataries in
manufacturing vatue added
remajned considerabLy lower than in the EC or the USA. This may be part of
the explanation of Japanrs continuing high rates of investment and Low te-
vets of unernptoyment corpared hrith both the uS and the community.
Graph 7.4 shows changes in the reaL wage gap and emp[oyment in the
individuaL Comm.rnity countries except for Greece and Luxembourg. Among the
countries shown, those with the highest reaL wage gap in 1981 were Betgium
(118) and France (110). In both cases, reat nage increases of more than
three per cent per annum since 1973 were not warranted despite rel.ativety
high productivity growth (2r4 7, per annum in France and zr3 Z in BeLgium).
For 1982, the real wage gap is forecast to dectine in aLt ilenber States
except rtaLy, where it b,iLt remain roughty stable: this is Largety due to
the continuing rise in productivity consequent upon the contractjon in em-
ptoyment discussed in sectian 7.1.
Taking the period 1970-82 as a whoLe, certain characteristics stand
out : whiLe the irpact of the 1973 oiL price shock and the subsequent wage
explosion can be ctearLy seen, devetopments in the real wage gap and
emp[oyment have varied widety from one Member State to another. To take onLy
the two extremes, the retative performance of Itaty and Betgium show the
effects of differing poticies foLLowing the fatt in productivity growth and
terms of trade Loss in1973. rn Betgium, a strong exchange rate poLicy
constrained output prices so that firms had to rely on above average pro-
ductivity gains to reduce reat unit Labour costs (particuLarLy given the
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rigid tabour market and wage indexation system). Despite sharp increases
in productivity over the period, a substantia[ (and rising) reat wage gap
has been acconpanied by a stead dectine in enployment. In ltaly, on the
other hand, the reaL wage gap widened in 1974-75 mainly because of negative
productivity grorth, Over the next three years, moderate reaL wage increa-
ses and reasonabLe productivity growth resutted in a substantiat iryrove-
ment in the reaL uage gap. However, a depreciating currency and
unconstrained output prices has meant that infLation has been a serious
probLem. Despite aLL this, there has been stead grorth in emtoyment
throughout the period, the onLy Comm.rnity country to have achieved such a
resu tt.
Despite the wide variations in the experiences of different
countries, a number of them seem to have had a sizeabLe and sustained reaL
wage gap during the tatter part of the 1970rs. In itseLf, this does not
prove that adverse trends in reat uages have significantty increased
unerpLoyment in the 197Ots, but the trends in output, productivity and reaL
Hage movements strongLy point to a roLe for the real wage in output deter-
mination and uneflpLoyment. The evidence from econometric simutations is
inconcLusive, probabLy because they tend to capture short-term effects
rather than longer term consequences. In the Longer run reat uages affect
enpLoyment because of their infLuence on profitabiLity and investment.
Such effects on the capitaL stock are inevitabLy stow.
0veratt, the timing of the emergence of a real wage gap (Graph 7.1,
suggests that it was associated with the major changes in the economies of
the advanced countrjes which took pLace in the Late 1960s and earty 1970s.
The rapid, and historicaLLy exceptionat, growth of the post uar period
ended. There Has a sharp increase in upward pressure on Hages. Shortages
of raw materiats, in particuLar oi[, emerged. These changes Here, for a
time, masked by the synchronous expansion of 1972-73 which cottapsed in the
wake of the first oiL price shock.
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Looking back, it is not difficu[t to see how faLLing productivity
grfith, terms of trade Losses and expectations that Living standards wouLd
continue to rise, produced an unhrarranted growth in reat wages. More
hrorrying is the way in which this "reaI wage gap" has persisted in Europe.
There has been less reaI wage ftexibitity than etsewhere. This seems to
have resuLted from deep-seated sociaI attitudes, with wage bargaining being
more expLicitty or irpLicitty Linked to price movements than eLsewhere. To
reduce the real wage gapr increases in reat wages must faLL short of
increases in productivity. The outLook for the immediate future suggests
that this witt indeed be the case. Unfortunate[y, the Large increases in
productivity grourth are mainLy the resuLt of taLts in emp[oyment.
7.4 ConcLusions an
The experience of the Last decade has shown a cLear distinction in
the response of various countries to the upheavats engendered by the oi I
price shocks. lJhi Le unempLoyment has everywhere risen sharpLy conpared to
the 1960rs, the Comnr"rnityrs performance in terms of ernpLoyment growth has
been arnong the Horst in the industriaL wortd. This is aLL the more wor-
rying when labour force trends are taken into account and it is reaLised
that in essence, the 1970r s Here a period of retative caLm on the demogra-
phic front : the major surge in the Labour force is to occur in the
earty 1980r s.
The evidence presented in this chapter so far has iLLustrated the
way in which the experience of the Comrunjty has been aLmost conpLeteLy op-
posite to that of the other major industriatized countries, and the United
States in particuLar. EmpLoyment growth, productivity growth Labour force
trends, activity rates, sectoral, erpLoyment patterns, reaL wage tnends :
aLL have been sharpty contrasted.
It has been suggested that the diametricatLy opposed trends in
enptoyment and productjvity in the two economies are the resuLt of a
"choice" of how to respond to the required adjustment probLem. But the
outcome of thjs choice is itseLf conditioned by the whoLe economic and
sociat environment of the two economies, which is refLected in differences
7.14 \b)-
in attitudes, and the resuLting behaviour. In this respect, it woutd appear
that a major faiLing in the Comrunity economy coryared to the United States
is a lack of ftexibiLity which creates rigidities in response to change and
the need to adapt. Nowhere is this more damaging in its impact than on the
tabour market : the more open attitude to risk-taking and change in the
United States has resuLted in a somewhat better performance in terms of
enpLoyment growth.
As onLy one exarp[e of the effects of excessive rigidities, the
evidence presented by the use of the real wage gap concept, white far from
concLusive, does suggest that the tack of reaI wage f[exibiLjty may have
ptayed some role in preventing a more positive erptoyment response.
The poLicy-issues raised by these considerations are far from
cLear-cut. It may be suggested that a fundamentat change in attitudes and
behaviour is required, but this wou[d itsetf require a change in objectives
and desires as perceived by society as a whote.
In these circumstances, poticymakers have been obtiged to con-
centrate their attention on atteviating rather than curing the
unempLoyment probtems by "targetting" action towards the most hard-hit
groups : young peop[e (especia[[y schooL-teavers), otder workers, and the
Long-term unenpLoyed. trlith regard to the probtem of youth unempLoyment, in
the foreword to the Fifth Medium-Term Economic PoLicy Programme the Com-
mission catted for Plember States to set up machinery and arrangements to
ensure that, on teaving schoot, att young peopte obtain either a paid job
or access to a vocationaL training course, or both together. By the middte
of the year three Member States had announced ptans for such schemes (see
Box), which wi LI come into force graduaLty over the next trJo years. l4ost
ftlember States atso stepped up the votume of resources devoted to more
\E3
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"conventionat'r [abour market measures such as direct job-creation in the
pubtic sector, enployment subsidies to the private sector, either in the
form of tax concessions or, in the case of young peopte, direct uage sub-
sidies. In others, the enphasis has been pLaced on stimrlating the private
sector to create jobs itsetf by channetLing avai[ab[e resources into
investment programmes, and particu[arLy investment in neul technologies,
energy saving and the environment, as weIL as regionaI subsidies, atthough
the scope for gtobaL stim.rlation measures has been severe[y restricted.
A new enphasis which has appeared this year has been the move to-
wards a redistribution of yorking-time as a means of sharing out avaitabte
vork among the unemLoyed. In tuo ilember States this has taken the form of
a reduction in the normat working-reek, in exchange for additionaL.
enployment. SeveraI have atso increased the number of annuaL paid hoLi-
days, and earty retirement schemes have become more firmLy established as a
means of red.rcing the number of peopte in the labour force. Itleasures to
encourage part-time work and short-time working have become more poputar,
and in one novet experiment, in the Nethertands, a subsidy is paid when one
futL-time job is converted into trro part-time jobs. A simiLar scheme is
nou being considered in the United Kingdom.
\y+7.16
Labour market poticies
Bef.gjum. Since the middLe of 1981, labour market poticy has been increas-ingty directed towards the tr"rin probtems of youth unemptoyment and tong-
term unemptoyment. rn August 1981, the existing schemes based on job-
creation in the pubtic sector were supptemented by the "de wutf trans-itionat ptan". The "speciaI temporary scheme" has been modified and len
ened in the publ.ic sector (2 schemes, of 2 years and 5 years) and now ex-
tended to the private sector (.if empLoyers can guarantee toprovide a job for5 years). The temporary emptoyment premiums paid under the t'tork Exferienc
Programme for young peopLe under 30 were aLso increased. rn February,further measures aimed at faciIitating part-time work and short-time trork
uere imptemented as wetL as'i ncentives to emptoyers who empl-oy young
peopLe. In the draft Budget presented on 2 August, the Government
announced ptans for specific measures to create empLoyment.
Denmark.0n 4 June ParLiament adopted the measures proposed in the
Goffi'nilbntrs Economic PoLicy Programme 1982 - 85, which aims at creating
50 000 jobs annuatty during this period (of which ?1 000 in the pubtic
sector), and provide a job or training possibiLities for atI young peop[e
with fuLI effect from 1984. This package of measures comprises various
incentives to encourage business investment as weIL as expansion of
aIready existing direct Iabour market measures such as vocationaI traini
and vocationat guidance, the job- offer scheme 6r the long-term unemptjob creat'ion by locat authorities and job creation subsidies jn the pri
sector for 18-25 year olds.
FederaI RepubLic of Germany. During 1981, no ne]l tabour market measures
Here announced, but addjt'ionaI funds trere aLLocated during the year to
existing measures, which emphasize vocationaI training and vocationaL
guidance for young peopte as t.lell as se[ective measures to improve the
econom'ic outLook in specific areas and create emptoyment through stimutatjng private investment. In February 1982, in the face of rapidLy increas-
ing unemployment, the Government announced a neu empLoyment creation
package, containing three main eIements: investment incentives to private
industry, inctud'ing a 1O% subsidy for investment which exceeds the aver[eve[ of the Last 3 years; additiona[ funds for investment in energy,
innovation and the environment; and Dltl 400 miLtion for the youth training
programme. In March, the Government aLso announced that it wou[d introduc
a bi Lt to aLLow early retirement (at 58 years).
Greece. In the past, the [ot.t officiaI rate of unemptoyment was often used
as an argument for not impLementing spec'ific emptoyment measures, but the
net.l government immediately announced a serjes of measures designed to im-prove the operation of the Labour Administration as t.leLI as the cottecti
of statistics. At the end of 1981 it introduced its first economjc poticy
package which included a reduction of the legal working week to 41 hours
and the introduction of 4 weeks paid holiday for everyone. rn May 1982 it
promuLgated the instrument entitl-ing prjvate-sector workers to 24 working
days hoLiday per year.
France. In December 1981, the Government adopted a "programme for young
peopte between 16 and 18 years of age", whereby organised actions on
vocationaI guidance, trdining and the transition to working Life woutd
be provided in public estabLishments. On 25 November '1981, the Government
passed the Law on SociaI Measures to be adopted by Order, which contained
the fotIowing principLes:
- changes and reduction in hours of work, with the target of 35 hours by
1 985.
\65
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- reduction of the optionaL retirement age to 60.
- Longer paid holidays for aLL workers.
The 0rders impIementing these principLes were introduced progressiveLy
over the earty months of the year: in January, there were 0rders reducing
the statutory work'ing neek to 39 hours in aLL branches, and imposing
Limits on overtime and shift-working; granting aLL workers the right to
2 112 days paid holiday per month of work; Limiting the recourse of em-
pLoyers to temporary or contract work, encouraging recruitment and restri
ing casua[ work; and permitting those over 55 years to work part-time. At
the same time they provided the legaL basisfor the "Sotidarity Contracts"
between firms, the governments 3ni LocaL groupg designed to step up effort
at job creation with particuLar emphasis on young people and the [ong-
term unemployed. In March a further 6 SociaL Orders were passed, includi
the provis'ion for earLy retirement at 60 from 1 ApriL 1983 onwards. In
ApriL the Government announced a set of measures to assist enterprises. I
addition to various fiscaL incentives it aIso provided for greater fLex-
ibi Lity in the reduction of working hours. In future these wou[d no Longe
be LegisLated by ParLiament but Left to the initiative of management and
uni ons.
IreLand. As part of its eLectoraI programme the new Government which took
;TTTce in February announced that it woutd impLement an IRL 200 miLLionjob creation plan which is now being examined in the context of an overal
medium-term strategy. At the same tifier plans are going ahead on the Yout
Emptoyment Agency, announced in JuLyi|981, which is funded by a 1% Levypublic sector incomes and which wiLL integrate and extend Youth empLoymen
schemes. The Government is aIso extending the scheme of training courses
to provide skiLLed manpower for industry with the implementation of the
programme to set up 6 neu centres.
ItaLy. No new Labour market measures were introduced by the government inffih?r 1981 or 1982. The draft law on the reform of the employment servic
which provides for the wide-ranging decentraLisation of some government
functions and more coordination between ptacement and training authoritie
introduced in August 1980 has passed the Chamber of Deputies and is now
before the Senate.
Luxembourg. The speciaL tabour market measures aimed at the specific
problems of iron and steel workers had aLready been strengthened in 1981,
but by earty 1982 the imbaLance in the labour market - too many workers i
the "anti-crisis unit" and too few in the net.l industries - t.las progress-
iveLy worsening. At the beginning of ftlarch, therefore, the government
announced a reinforcement of measures to encourage the mobi Lity of worker
and the setting-up of new firms, particutarly smalL and medium-sized entpri ses.
Nethertands. In addition to the existing schemes to stimuLate employment
vE-ilsidies to the private sector dating from the end of 1980, in
ttlarch 1982 the government adopted the EmpLoyment programme lg}z- 83,
whereby HFL 3000mi[[ion would be a[[ocated to measures aimed at reducing
youth unemployment and achieving a better distribution of avaiLabLe work.
rt is expected that 30 000 jobs wiLL be created in 1982 and 1983. The
government had previousty announced that under the programme a premium of
HFL 2 000woul-d be paid whenever a fuLL-time job t.las transformed into twopart-time jobs in 1982.
r%
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United Kingdom. In November 1981, in presenting its programme to
Partiament, the government promised that further empLoyment measures
to supplement the wide-range of existing schemes wouLd be introduced, wit
particuLar reference to unemptoyed young peopte. At the beginning of
December, the ChanceLLor of the Exchequer announced revised expenditure
plans for 1982183 which provided for an additionat UKL 800 mittion for
speciat emptoyment schemes.0n 15 December it announced plans for the
devetopment of industriaL training of young peopLe. Under these plans the
existing Youth Opportunities Scheme wouLd be repLaced by the Youth Train-
ing Scheme: from September 1983, atI minimum age school Leavers nouLd be
guaranteed one year of vocationaL training combined with further educatiIn June 1982 it t{as announced that pLans to withhotd sociat security
benefit from young peopLe refusing to join the scheme would be withdrawn
and that the aLtowance to be paid wouLd be raised from UKL 16 to UKL 25per week. In the ltlarch Budget, the ChanceLLor aLso announced pLans for
voLuntary "Community lrlork" for the Long-term unempLoyed. In JuLy, the
ChanceL[or aIso announced that from January 1983' subject to meeting
certain conditions, employers who "spLit" a fulL-time job into two haLf-
tjme jobs would quaLify for a subsidy.
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GRAPH 7.1 GDP AND E|IPLOYI{ENT GROWTH (1) AND UNEI'IPLOYNENT RATE
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GRAPH 7.2 ACTIVITY RATES AND EIIIPLOYI'IENT POPULATION RATIOS. EC AND USA 1960-81 Z
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GRAPH 7.3 The Rea[ Wage Gap and EmpLoyment. ECl Us and Japan 1960-8?
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8.1
8. CapitaL Markets
The original goal of EC member countries to buiLd a free and integrated
capitaL market within the EC has not been achieved so far. In return,
however, a wetL-organized, private Euro-currency market has come into
existence, as a part of gLobaL internationaL financiaL markets. This fact
has to be taken into account in any attempt to anaLyse the present state
of capitaI market affairs within the EC, ImpLications differ, however,
according to the point of view taken. Judged from a purely technicaL point
of view, private Euro-currency markets render the orig'inaL goaL of bui[d-
ing an integrated European capitaL market Less necessary. 0n the
other hand, an increased necessity to promote that originaL goaL and to con-
sider ways of controLLing private Euro-markets seems tobe the upshot from
the po'int of view of EC integration. To arrive at such a position, some
theoreticaL considerations on capitaL mobiLity in a wor[d of fixed and
fLoating exchange rates are utiIized in order to discuss the basic policy
mix question. It'is argued that nationaL monetary poLicy is inevitabLy
constrained by capital mobi Lity and efficientLy functioning Euro-markets,
irrespective of the exist'ing exchange rate regime. From this position,
generaL and specific observations on controLs are made, foLLowed by a short
discussion of options avaiLabLe towards a fresh start in European
capitaL markets poLicy. Two appendices give more descriptive and detai Led
information on the present situation of nationaL capitaL market controLs
and on the pnivate use of the European Currency Unit (ECU).
8.1 Introducti on
Twenty-five years ago, the representatives of the six founder states
of the European Community, in sign'ing the Treaty of Rome, aLso approved the
prjncipLe of LiberaIized capitaL markets: the obstacLes to freedom of move-
ment for capitaL in the Community were to be pnogressiveLy aboLi6hed (Ar-
ticles 3 and 67 of the EEC Treaty). This goal was connected, among other
th'ings, with efforts to proceed towards free trade and free movement of
persons and services.
The [atter aims have by and Large been reaLised, But after the initiaL
successes in LiberaLization in the earty 1960s, the construction of a free,
'integrated European capitat market has become increasingty bogged down. It
is true that some countries such as the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, the
United K'ingdom andrto a lesser degree, the Nethertands have, in the meantime,
aLmost compLeted the LiberaLization of their nationaL capitaL markets. The
same hotds true for Be[gium and Luxembourg; both countries have, however,
sp Li t their foreign exchange markets, thereby exposing payments trans-
actions for internationaL capitaL movements to a Larger risk of exchange rate
fLuctuations.0ther Community countries such as Denmark, France, IreIand and
ItaLy have, in recent years/ introduced new restrictions on capitaL movements,
or have reintroduced oLd controls which had been dropped as earLy as the
1960s (for a detaited account of the current state of affairs, see box 1).
ttr8
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Today, there is no integrated EC capitaI market;
institutionaILy unconnected nationaL capitaL markets are existing side by
side and reguLated with varying strictness. The question of whether the
"absoLute" degree of ['iberaLjzation existing in the Community as a whoLe
today is essentiaLLy different from the situation achieved in 1960 and 1962
after two LiberaLization directives is one which is difficuIt to answer;
apant from measurement problems, the greater number of member countries aLso
causes difficuLties of comparison. However, one th'ing can probably be estab-
Lished: the differences in the degnee of LiberaLization between capitaL
markets of member countries are more marked today than in the mid-1960s. To
that extent, the originaL aim of buiLding a European capital market has, if
anything, actua L Ly suffered a setback.
A rationaL analysis of this situation, on the basis of Community prin-
cipLes, must resist the temptat'ion to apportion blame and to demand that
exist'ing treaty obL'igat'ions be fuLf i I Led without any genuine attempt at
understanding. But/ on the other hand, it must atso avoid using primari[y
nationaL arguments to defend the exist'ing situation as virtuaLLy unavoid-
able or even as the onLy one possible, without tak'ing account of the Logic of
the LiberaLization principLe. It must rather concentrate on Learning, with
as IittLe prejudice as poss'ibLe, from the reasons why the construction of a Euro-
pean cap'itaL market has foundered: this shoutd stimuLate considerations for a
fresh start to a Community-wide poLicy for European capital movements.
An attempt at anaLys'is of this kind must answer a number of basic
questions: for instancer given the marked change in internationaL financiaL
markets in the meantime, has perhaps the origina[, officiaL goat of a free
European capitaL market Long been overtaken? 0r is there still the need, on
the capitaL markets of the Community countries, for coordinated LiberaIization
measures, which are thwarted by persistent - or even growing - preferences
for as tight as poss'ibLe nationaL controts of domestic financiaI markets? The
present contrast between a stagnat'ing rudimentary officiaL EC capitaL market
and fuLty integrated, rap'idLy expanding private Euro-currency markets is
striking; it stimuIates further questions: shouLd perhaps the principLe of the
free movements of capitaL be reformuLated, to exclude short-term fIows of
cap'itaL via internationaL financiaL markets, which have in past years at times
been huge, and which today, on the whoLe, represent a centraL problem for the
international monetary system? 0r shouLd the principIe of Liberatization be
compLeteLy rejected toCay because there is, given free trade, a basic anaLytical
t b'l
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inconsistency between fixed but adjustabLe exchange rates (EMS), capitaI mobi-
Lity and nationaI Ly independent ("autonomous") monetary poLicy?
The attempt to answer these points Ieads to a macro-economic anaLysis
of open economies and to basic questions of monetary poLicy cooperation in
the Community in generaL. BeLow, these questions wiLL be oriefLy toucnecj
upon to indicate their interreLationship with the subject matter. We stant
with some observations on Euro-currency markets, and then go on to discuss
theoretical and poLiticaL aspects.
8.2 Euro-currency market:
Size and institutionaI features
In the course of the tast 5 years, the gross size of the Eura-currency
market has more than doubLed from I 374 bi[Lion in 1977 to I 840 biLtion in
1981 (for these and the fotLowing figures, see Table 8.1). From 1977 to 1981,
the average yearty expansion surpassed the 6 100 bilLion bench-
ma rk. Even if the considerabLe doubLe-counting due to redepos'iting among
participating Euro-banks in the order of magnitude of 40 % (gross figures) is
subtracted, the estimated net size of the Euro-currency narket $ 479 bj L tion at
the end of 1981) is stitL impressive. Behind the strong market growth during
the past years were ampLe suppLies of new LoanabLe funds by OPEC countries
and ([ateIy again) by major western industriaL countries. At the same time,
demand for syndicated Euro-credits in its various forms and Eurobond-
issues by private and publ-ic borrowers in Europe and overseas cont'inued to
be high.
To put the Euro-currency market size in perspective, it may be compared
with worLd-wide internationaL financiaI markets ("Xeno-markets"); to assess
its dimension from an EC point of viet, the share of EC countries in the Euro-
currency market may be examined separateLy. The figures for the Last 5 years
reveaL that the Euro-currency market continues to encompass more than one
haLf of atL internationaL financiaI markets (i.e. totaL externaI cLaims and
internationaI bond issues of banks in the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the off-
shore centres); the Euro-currency market share has remained at an average of
55 % Qross f igur'es, see Tabte 8.1). 0n the other hand, the share of EC
countries in this market is predominant. In 1981, externaL assets of
banks in EC countries (without Greece) in foreign currency accounted for
more than 90 % of the Euro-market totaL (8 786 bilLion as compared
rJ0
8.4
t.rith g 840 biLLion, gross figures; net figures yieLd the same order of
magnitude for the percentage figures).One reason for this situation Iies
in the institutionaL fact that the major Euro-market centres in London and
Luxembourg are situated within the EC area, with London tradit'ionaLly
pLaying the dominant r6Le. Taken together, it seems safe to concLude that
banks in EC countries compri se nearLy a L L of the Euno-currency market and
roughLy one haLf of totaL internationaL financiaL markets.
Having said this, it may be questioned whetherrfrom a financiaL point
of view, the above-mentioned goaL of LiberaLized national capitaL markets
in the EEC makes sense any more. Is it true that nationaL financiaL markets
have progressiveLy Lost importance/ in a simpLe quantitative sense/ reLative
to the Euro-currency market? To answer the quest'ion, the reIative size of
nationaL and internationaL (Euro-) markets should be compared. This is,
howeverr. a statisticaLLy difficu[t task, as no comp[ete matriced of
baIance-of-payments capitaL fLows between EC countries are avai LabLe. There
are severaL ways of approximation, aLL carry'ing a certain degree of arb'itrary-
ness.
one method of comparison might be to focus on national volumes of domestic
bank loans and securities to domestic borrowers vis-l-vis the totaI stock of
Euro-currency bank credits and Loans. The resuLt'ing picture would, however,
be distorted by traditional institutionaL differences of the various natio-
nal credit and capitaL markets, aggravated by the fact that national credit
aggregates are a major inter"mediary tanget of domestic monetary stabi Liza-
tion poLicies.
Therefone, another method of comparison has been used belour. It is based
on the hypothesis that the quantitative'importance of Euro-markets reIative
to individuaL nationaL financiaL markets can be roughLy approximated by the
voLume of bankrs externaL assets in foreign currency reIative to externaL
assets in domestic currency. Hence, the share of foreign and nationaL cur-
rencies in extennal assets of European bahks is taken as the criterion in
assessing the retative magnitude of Euro-markets. In effect, denomination
in foreign currency has been taken as the defining feature of the figures
on Euro-markets mentioned above"
TabLes 8.1 and 8.2 show the overaLl figures corresponding to the approach
just outlined; they comprise short- and Long-term funds as weLL as pubL'ic and
private ones. In TabLe 8.3, the same method has been appLied to bond
rll
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markets onty. AtI in att, the evidence tends to confirm the view of strong
and increasing importance of Euro-markets retative to nationaI financiaL
markets in the Community. The totats in Tab[es 8.1 and 8.2 indicate that
the Euro-market considerabIy outwe'ighs its counterpart in domestic currency.
In 1981, the (gross) reLation was USD 786 biLtion Euro-market size in the
EC (TabLe 8.1) to USD 114 biLLion in domestic currency externaL markets
(Table 8.2); this is a reLation of nearty 7 z 1, as compared to roughty
5 :1 in 1977. Obviousty the reLative weight of the Euro-currency market
has increased. Secondty, we may [ook at bond markets separateLy, i.e. at
a smaLL tong-term part of overa[[ financiaI markets (the "capitaL market"
in its most narrow sense, if syndicated Euro-credits are neglected). The
comparison between (gross) Euro-bond issues and (gross) "cIass'ica[" foreign
issues in Tabl.e 8.3 corroborates the evidence assembted so far, i.e. the
reLative dominance of the Euro-market within the EC area. The figures re-
veaL, however, a tess pronounced quantitative discrepancy: in 1981, the
gross amount of Euro-bond issues (USD 5.4 bittion) was just doubLe that of
cLassicaL foreign bond issues (USD 2.6 bitLion). The ratio has not in-
creased, as compared to 1977 (USD 4.4 biLtion aga'inst USD 1.9 biLLion).
The Large voLume and continu'ing growth of Euro-currency markets refLect
some basic fnstitutionaL features as weLI as specific recent devetopments.
The former consist, for exampLe, in an absence of nationaL controts, which
'impLies a generaL cost advantage for Euro-banks in countries with non-
interest-bearing minimum reserve requirementsi there is no obLigation for
Euro-banks to deposit IegaLIy requ'ired reserves for Euro-market LiabiIities
at zero interest rates with any centraL bank. The latterinctude, for
exampLe, the recyc Ling of petro-dot Iars; there i s a continu'ing necessity
for internationaL banking to create ['iquidity for financing worLd trade,
and to channeL (recycLe) funds between highLy industriatized nations, Less
deveLoped countries and oi t-export'ing countries.
There are reasons to expect internationat Lending on Euro-markets to
be associated with increasing risk. As there are no controts, there is a
higher country risk today; some countries have serious difficutty in dealing
simuItaneousty with a deteriorat'ing baIance-of-payments situation and con-
tinuing pubLic sector deficjts on a Iarge sca[e. Contjnued recession 'in
severaI countries, and recent failures of [arge firms and banks have aug-
mented the uncertainties. TechnicaLIy speaking, intermediatjon via debt
rescheduting tends to be associated with a higher risk component. In
addit'ion, and connected with country risk, is the present tendency of
shorter Lending terms and maturities.
l-1>
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International f inanc'iaI capitaL is extremeLy mobi te. tlith the estab-
tishment, de facto, of complete convertibiLity among major currencies,
Euro-currency institutions are important intermediaries for currency
conversions. Therefore, they are potentiaILy ab[e to orig'inate and trans-
mit financiat disturbances on a Iarge scate. To put 'it differentty,
today the Euro-currency market is a highl.y efficient means of imptementing
capitaI mobiLity in the very short run. Low transaction costs, quick
co:munications and nearty instantaneous price adjustments of financiaI
instruments around the gtobe characterize this efficiency. TechnicaLLy
speaking, we are witnessing today the successfuI marriage between computer
and teLecommunications technotogies; Iarge internationaI banks are rapidIy
becoming financiaL information corporations on a g[obal scate.
8.3 Euro-markets and EC poLicy
Taken together, the facts are conducive indeed to raise doubts on the
continued desi rabi L'ity of the 25 year otd goaL of European cap'itaI market
'integrat'ion. SpecificaLty, the orig'inaL economic and financiaI ideas for
bui Lding an 'integrated European capitaI market t"lithin the Community (see
above) are practicaIty futfi Lled today by the existence of efficientty
funct'ioning, private Euro-markets. It shoutd be acknowLedged that the
emergence of private Euro-markets benefited from the absence of a Euro-
pean capitaL market. ALthough geographicaLLy within the Community, these
Euro-markets are not subject to officiaL reguLations or poLicy.
However, the argument so far has been pursued in terms of economic and
financiaI reasoning onty. This is insufficient, as it negLects the economic
poticy aspects which are vitat and decisive in the discussion of capitaI
market LiberaIization. Indeed, from the point of view of monetary pot'icies -
in singte member countries as we[t as on a Community [eve[ - the original
goaI of buiLding an integrated European capitaL market is stiLL a vaLid aim.
It is a major prerequisite not onLy for the optimat, inter-Community a[[o-
cation of reaI resources, but, most importantLy, for the impLementation
of any major step towards the finaI monetary goaI of the Community, i.e.
towards monetary union. As long as this basic aim is not abandoned,
capitat market L'iberaIization and integration remains essentiat.
,-T 3
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To arrive at this proposit'ion, it has to be taken into account,
first[y, that a basic consistency is needed between the European Monetary
System (EMS) and the present state of nationaL capitaL markets in the EC.
SecondLy, it shoutd be acknowtedged that there is hardLy any t.ray to avo'id externaL
constraints on nationaL monetary poIicies with fuL Ly LiberaIized capitaI
flows (capitaI mobiLity). Both points are deveLoped in the foILow.ing
section 8.4
Before going into detaiL, it shouLd be kept in mind that absence of
contro[s on Euro-markets means that nationat monetary poticy actions can
be circumvented in princip[e, and in various ways, via internationat Lend'ing
and borrow'ing activities. To this extent, the very existence of Euro-
markets constitutes a basic threat to the'independence of nationat monetary
poticies. For exampIe, Euro-markets may significantLy add to the magnitude
of destabitizing short-term capitaI flows, thus interfering with dbmestic
stabi Iization efforts. Moreover, free avai Labi Lity of internationaL
Liquidity via Euro-markets may seduce a country with severe baLance-of-
payments probLems to ignore the drain on their reserves, and to conduct
poticies which may not be directed towards stabiLity in the Longer run.
These potentiaL dangers underLine the importance to be attached to the
question of controLting Euro-markets, e.g. by means of appropriate nationaL
and/or EC actions. The topic clearty surpasses the scope of this chapter;
it constitutes, however, a "memorandum item" not to be forgotten.
8.4 CapitaL mobiLity and interdependence of domestic monetary po'Licies
Since March 1979, most EC countries have joined the currency area of
the European lilonetary System (EMS). Hence, member countries f ace a mi xture
of fixed and fLexibLe exchange rate regimes in their externaL monetary
reLations with other countries. Obviousty there is some contrast between
the EMS, which provides free convertibiL'ity of European currencies at fixed
exchange rate marg'ins, and the continued existence of nationaLLy reguLated
European cap'itaL markets. 0n the one hand, the EMS contributes to a cLoser
inter-reLationship of nationaL money via an increased roLe for interest rate
differentiaIs and interest rate effects on financiaL capitaI transactions
and exchange rate movements (within the given margins). 0n the other hand,
it is exactty these short-term capitat transactions which are subject to
the most rigid nationaI controts. This situation may give rise to a harmful
inconsistency.
i1+
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ReLated to the EMS is the fact that most nationaL governments, in the
Community as weLL as outside, reLy heaviLy on monetary action in order to
achieve domestic stabiLisation goaLs - much more so than 20 years ago. Hence,
there is a strong desire to controL nationaL monetary aggregates; many
countries have offic'iaL Ly announced targets for monetary growth. Therefore,
massive fLows of short-term financiaL capitaL, forcing centraL banks to inter-
vene and (thereby) to create additionaL internaL bank Liquidity, may inter-
fere with money stock controL. This js, of course, not necessariLy so, as
many EC countries try to 'incorporate possibLe exchange-rate devetopments in
thein decision about monetary targets. SmaLLer countn'ies, in particuLar,
conduct their monetary policies within the coi-rstraints imposed by foreign
exchange markets; they obv'iously try to cope w jth the basic fact that the'ir
economies are "open" and that internationaL capitaL fLows rea ct sens i -
tively to internationaL interest rate differentiaLs and exchange rate expecta-
tions, This suggests tak'ing a cLoser look at the theoreticaL and practicaL
16Le of capitaL mobility, w'ith specific reference to the exchange rate regime.
RecentLy, the conventionaL theory of "insuLar" economies and the corres-
ponding analysis of externaL constraints on the policy m'ix (at given capitaI
mob'iL'ity) has been modif ied in an important way. In reaction to theoneticaL
deveLopments t^ras weLL as factuaL experience, it is heLd that fulL insuLation
from extennaL infLuences is impossibLe, even with fLoating exchange rates.
It is maintained that nationat authorities, in a worLd of cap'itaL mobiLity
and fLexiUte eXchange rates, are not much nore independent in
policy-making than in a worLd of capitaL mobiLity and fixed exchange rates.
There are thnee basic ooints:
- Some main determinants of exchange rates, Like interest rates,
baLance of payments, and infLation rates, operate consistentLy'in
the Long nun onLy. In the short run, exchange rates may be pushed
in different direct'ions, away trom their fundamentaL equiIibrium
LeveL, by changing expectations of exchange rates itseLf, as weL I
as of the "fundamentaLs" just mentioned.
- Short-run changes in exchange rates are brought about by massive
fLows of short-run financ'iaL cap'itaL, gene.rated in and transmitted
via efficient internationaL financiaL markets (Euro-markets, as
described above).
rl5
8.9
- The divergence of exchange rates from their "normal" [eve[, i.e.
their over- or under-shooting, has important "reat" effects on
domestic economic act'ivity - on domestic industries, export and
import-compet ing sectors.
From these three points, it fo[[ows direct[y that nationaL authorities
cannot afford a rben'ign negLectr as regards exchange rate ftuctuations.
Hence, the [eveL and ftuctuations of exchange rates continue to be a matter
of concern to nationaI monetary authorities; in practice, there are good
reasons for stabiLizing exchange rates. This is preciseIy so because
capitaL mobi L'ity provides an ef fective t'inkage for the internationaI trans-
mission of macroeconomic inftuences, even in a regime of ftoating exchange
rates. As this proposition hoLds anyway in the case of fixed exchange
rates, financiaL and "rea[" inter-retationships between nationaI economies
obviousLy exist irrespective of the exchange rate regime actual.Ly adopted.
With capitaI mobiLity as'it is existing nowadays, monetary poLicy is in-
evitabLy constrained by internationaI capitaL fLows. Hence, the abiLity
of centraI banks and governments to pursue independent monetary poticies
appropriate to their internat economies is aLways restricted. The con-
etraint is feLt more severeLy, and accepted more readity (see above), by
the smaLter countries in the Community. But it appLies, in princip[e, to
the "big" member countries as weLL.
FinaILy, the new environment of Euro-markets ensures that internationaI
capitat mobitity must to a [arge extent be taken for granted - at teast,
as long as capitat ftows between nationaI and Euro-markets continue to
remain uncontroLLed. UntiL now, governments seem to consider those capitaL
f[ows advantageous from a purety nationaI point of view (see the remarks
in section 8.3 above). It may sound somewhat paradox'icat, but the Low
degree of overaIL LiberaLization within the EC simpLy accentuates the con-
trast with an ongoing process of more and more gtobaI cap'itat mobiLity.
Hence, there seems to be no t.lay of avo'iding the mutuaI interdependence
of nat'ionaI monetary poLic'ies just described, but as a last resort seLec-
tive direct controLs on capitaI fLows and/or on the accompanying'inter-
nationaL payments may be considered as a means to preserve autonomy'in
nationaI monetary poticies. In countries Like France, for exampLe, there
is a tong-standing tradit'ion in using such controts act'ivety as an instru-
ment of exchange poticy. 0ther countries [ike Germany have at their dis-
posaL the power to introduce controLs (see Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz). Some
tioughts on contro[s therefore seem to be warranted.
(t2)
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8.5 0n ControLs
Restrjctions on capitaL movements Here, according to Art' 67 of the
Treaty of Rome, to be progress'iveLy removed in order to faciLitate the workings
of the common market. The Treaty of Rome itself (99 73r 108 and 109) and the
tiberaLization directives specify circumstances when controLs are to be con-
sidered a tegitimate toot to deaL with certain dangers'in financiaL markets'
Houever, controLs shou|.d be the except.ion, not the ruLe, and their appLication
shouLd be Limited in time.
These Community ruLes are obviousLy in confLict with nationaL insti-
tutionatsettingswhichinctudecontrotsasanormaItooIofmonetary
management , even though there was
generaL accePtance of Liberatization directives in the earLy sixties
(see above). Rather, it shouLd be acknowledged as a matter of fact that nationaL
traditions tend to dominate, if confLict arjses. Moreover, purety financia[,
short-term specuLat'ive flows of "hot money" are often considered detlimentaL
if they are unrestricted.
The matter is controversiaL' It foLLows, nevertheless' that there is some
reason to reopen the basic discussion on the objectivest functions and conse-
quences of capitaI market contr-oIs in 'a non-dogrna'tic: iray-' 1n the:'tbL"t'o{ling
paf€grabh?, three'.fundarnentat propositions:are'put fo?werd-gs-'a st:imULus for
discussion. They ari, of course, not exhaustive'
-WhenitseemsimpossibLetoconductpoLic.iesbasedontheusuaLreLation-
ship between instruments and targets within the existing framework of mar-
kets and institutions, governments are tempted to bypass this reLationship'
using adm'inistrative power to directLy impose the desired state of affairs'
This is the generaL essence of controLs in terms of economic poL'icy' It
could mean that probLems are of such a dimension that conventionaL measures
are considered too weak to be effective in the desired way; it coutd' how-
ever, aLso mean that a traditionaL instrument is used, without indicating
any particuLar magnitude of the probLem'
- As a permanent feature of capital markets in the EC, direct controls are
in danger of becoming ineffective. FirstLy, whiLe strengthening the grasp
of governments on capitaL fLows in the short run, controLs may become
Less effective as they further encroach on the very same phenomena they
are designed to overcome. If this happens, governments do not get rid
of the probLem but onLy of its symptoms. The retief may be temporaryl
as controLs.turn into a permanent feature, they are LikeLy to be circum-
vented. Hence, new additionaL controLs may become necessary.
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- If restrictions on the free fLow of capital. and currency are used to
stick to unreaListic exchange rates in a situation of serious domes-
tic imbatances, there is a danger of a vicious circLe, from increased
controts to more divergence, more contro[s, and so on. This danger
arises, in other words, if national governments wrong[y accept t or
contribute to, an accumuIating externat imbatance. Given the recent
attempts to impIement stabiLization poIicies in EC countries, incLu-
ding poticy measures taken in paraLLeL with exchange rate reaLign-
ments within the Etl|S, this danger at the moment is more theoreticaL
than practicaL.
8.6 PossibLe poLicy approaches
Improvement of policy coordination is the way envisaged within the EC,
but it is obviousLy very d'ifficuLt to impLement. In the present institutionaI
framework the Community must, in order to have reaI effect, refer to other
undertakings such as the capitaL market LiberaIization, further progress of
the EMS and increased emphasis on the European Currency Unit.
To enforce capitaL market integration at a generaIty accepted, uniform
degree of Liberatization wouLd mean a Large step in the direction of turning
the EC into an optimum regulation area. Its impLementation might be attempted
by enacting further LiberaLization di rectives and revitaLising the IegaLLy
estabLished supervisory functions of the Commission and the Monetary Committee.
Coordination of the Member Statest poLicies on capitaL movements vis-d-vis
third countries- in compLiance with Art. 70 of the Treaty-woutd contribute
to the success. The step conforms c[osety to the cooperation 'inspiration
of the Community, and it carries the Logic of enforc'ing poticy coordination
in an indirect way via institutionaLisat'ion, or organization, of a European
CapitaL Market. There have been, however, Long decision Lags within the
Community on these matters, refLecting the poLiticaL unwiLLingness in moving
ahead unaninousLy towards an integrated capitaL market.
t-1B
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Moving touards monetary union by means of further development of the
EllS would mean progress in turning the Community into an optimum currency area.
This approach is definitety reLated to the above-mentioned direct approach
on capitaI market integration, as has been argued in section 8.4; and both
proposaLs seek to enforce poIicy coordination (and, hence, economic divergence).
As regards 'impIementation, the EMS/monetary union approach Looks more
attractive at first sight as a few important institutionaI decisions might
suffice to accompLish the framework for monetary union. PoLiticaLLy, the
road to monetary union is at teast as long as that to cap'itaL market integra-
tion atone. Indeed, the Latter aim is somewhat Less ambitious.
ThirdLy, attempts might be made to estabLish the European Currency Unit
(ECU) as a generaL[y accepted unit of account in a[[ inter-Community financiaL
transactions, officiaI and private (see box 2). This move cou[d bb combined
vith the ptanned further institutionaIisation of the EMS especiaLLy as the
prospect that ttlember States couLd use the ECU as a convenient means to gain
better access to the internationaI financiaL markets and ['iquidity provoked
considerabte criti ci sm.
In conctusion, a[[ approaches have their difficuIties. A soLution being
acceptabLe to aIL member countries in the Community might incLude attempts to
promote each of them in a stepwise fashion. But there can be no reatistic hope
untess the poLiticaL wiLIingness to move ahead has been revitaIised. Renewed
discussion on capitaI market poLicies in the Community might contribute to
such an revitaIization; the present study dnaws its Legitimation out of this
view. Analyticatty, it shou[d be kept in mind that capitaI mobiLity and poLicy
coordination, achieved directty or indirectLy, mean a Loss of nationaL autonomyjn economic (monetary) poticies. Therefore any new, or renewed, European capital
markets poticy has to be based inevitabLy on a basic agreement as to the prin-
cipIes of monetary stab'ilization poticies, incLuding priorities for the achieve-
ment of finaI economic goaIs such as price stability, futL emptoyment or externaL
(batance of payments) equi Librjum. Last not Ieast, the question of how to jnte-
grate Euro-markets into any new framework of European capitaI markets poIicy
remains to be tackted and soLved.
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lllll"l;tassets (:l) or European banks in roreisn currency(Euro-currency market)
Stocks at end of year in biLlions of US doLLars
1977 1978 1979 1 980 1 981
BeL gi um
Denmark
France
Germany
I reIand
ItaLy
Luxembourg
NetherLands
UK
23
?
62
17
?
15
44
27
159
32
3
81
21
2
22
58
37
203
40
4
100
22
?
28
79
45
270
52
4
119
22
2
30
87
51
334
59
4
1?O
24
?
36
87
53
401
EC-9 gross 351 459 590 701 786
=============== ==========!========================================= =========
Minus doubte-counting(2) $)
EC-9 net (5 )
For comparison :
Tota L Euro-currency
market (3) gross
135 185 ?s7
2'16 ?74 35s
374 502 640
27? 307
429 479
751 840
Minus : doubLe-counting
<2' (5 )
Tota L Euro-currency
market ( 3) net (5 )
144
230
202
300
257
383 460
328
512
291
AIL internationaI finan-
ciaI markets (4) -'gross 657
net 405
903
540
1.111
665
1.323
810
1.542
940
(1) ExternaL cLaims pLus internationaL bond issues.
Q) DoubLe-counting due to redepositing among reporting banks.
(3) Reporting banks in EEC (9) countries pLus Austria, Sweden, and SwitzerLand.
(4) 1.1ithout banks (except US reporting banks) in the offshore centres Bahamas,
Cayman IsLands, Panama, Hongkong, and Singapore.
(5) Estimates by the Commission services, based on the hypothesis that doubLe-
counting in European banks is identicaL with the total share of doubLe-
counting in globaL iriterh'ationaL markets, i.e. 37.82 in 1977, 40.214 in 1978
and 1979, 38.82 in 1980 and 392 in 1981.
Source: BIS (AnnuaI Reports) and Commission services
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Tabte 8.2
ExternaL assets European banks in domestic
Stocks at end of Year in
currency
biLLions of US doLLars
(1) 
of
1977 1978 1979 1 980 1 9E1
aetglum.
Denmark
France (2)
Germany
I retand
ItaLy
Luxembourg
Nether Lands
UK (3)
2
0
12
32
0
0
1
5
12
3
0
18
40
0
1
1
9
15
3
0
23
48
0
1
1
11
16
3
0
24
5?
0
1
1
11
?3
3
0
23
51
0
1
1
12
23
EC-9 8764 103 115 114
(1) ExternaI claims and foreign bond issues.
(2) Inc Luding buyer I s credi ts.
(3) Inc[uding, in addition to Loans, advances
biLLs and acceptances.
Source: BIS (AnnuaL RePorts)
and overdrafts, atI commerciat
l8l
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TabLe 8.3
InternationaL bond markets
in biLLions of US dolLars
I: Gross Euro-bond issues
1977 1978 1979 1 980 1 981
BeLgi um
Denmark
France
Germany
IreIand
Ita Ly
Luxembou rg
Nether Lands
llK
0.0
0.3
1.1
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.5
0.4
1,6
ol+
0.8
0.3
o]
0.3
0.2
0.8
0.3
0.2
1.3
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.5
1.0
0.2
0.3t:t
0.1
1.0
0.0
0.9
1.5
0.3
0.4
2.0
0.1
0.4
0.9
0.0
0.3
1.?
EEC (9) 4.4 2.9 4.1 5.8 5.4
western Europe 9.0 5.4 7.4 9.1 7.6
WorLd-wide totaL 19.5 1 5.9 17.4 20.1 26.5
II: "C Lassi ca l" foreign i ss
BeIgi um
Denmark
F rance
Germany
IreLand
ItaLy
Luxembou rg
Nether [ands
UK
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.1
a,2
0.2
0.7
0.5
o.7
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.9
0.7
o.?
o.?
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.9
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.5
0.2
EEC (9) 1.9 2.3 2.3 ?,4 2.6
Western Europe 5.1 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.5
Wor[d-wide totaL 16.6 ?1.4 20.0 18.0 21.3
Sources : BIS, tlor Ld Bank, OECD
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8.16 Box 1
Community obtigations and capitaI movements: Situation in llember States
Community provjsions
The CounciL Directives of 11 ilay 1960 and
mentation of ArtjcLe 67 of the Treaty Lay
ilember Statesr obIigations Hith regard to
movements.
18 December 1962 for the imple-
dovn the present framerork for
the LiberaIization of capitaL
The capitaL movements [iveratized trithin the Community are given jn Lists
A and B annexed to the First Directive. They incLude direct investments,
personaL capitaI movements, short-term and medium-term credits reLated to
commerciaL transactions or to suppIies of services in yhich residentsparticipate, transfers in performance of insurance contracts, and opera-
tions in securities deaLt in on a stock exchange. Under the ternrs of
that Directive, IiberaLization of these operations is unconditionaL and
cannot be suspended except by invoking the protective cLauses providedfor in ArticLes 73, '108 and 109 of the Treaty.
The capitaL movements specified in List C annexed to the First Directive(notably issues of securities of a domestic undertaking on a foreign cap-ital market and, converseLy, of those of a foreign undertaking on a dom-
estic capitat market, operations in securities not dea[t in on a stock
exchange, and financiaL credits) vere LiberaIized onLy on condition that
a ltlember State may maintain or reintroduce such restrictions on these
operations as Here operative on the date of entry into force of the Direc-
tive or on the date of accession where such free movement of capitaL might
form an obstac[e to attainment of that ttlember Staters economic po[icy
objectives.
For the other operations, invoLving for the most part short-term capitaL
movenents (securities deaLt in on the money market; opening and repLenish-
ment of current or deposit accounts, etc.), ttlember States remain free to
decide whether or not to impose restrictions.
Situation in ltlember States
The degree of effective tiberatization of capitaL movements varies appre-
ciabty between ftlember States. Exchange restrictions on aLL capitaL opera-
tions have been Lifted in Germany, the United Kingdom, BeLgium and
Luxembourg, aLthough the [atter two jojntty operate a two-tier exchange
market. The Nether[ands abides by its Community obligations and takes a
IiberaI viev of capitaL operatjons not subject to any tiberaIization
requi rements.
rB5
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France, Itaty, IreLand and Denmark continue to app[y controls over atL
capitat movements and have been authorized by the Commission to invoke
protective cLauses in order to pLace restrictions on certain capitaI
operations Iiberatized under the 1960 and 1962 Directives.
Bs!!nsUeng-r!!19dg ged-snges-pre!e9!ive-s,!eggeg
France: By Decision of 4 December 1968, the Commission authorized the
'imposition of restrictions on the fuLL range of capitaI movements. Franc
has since eased these restrictions, but, by way of derogation from the
retevant Community provisions, controLs continue to appLy to the foLtowing
operat i ons:
- Direct French investments in the Community are free from restrictions
vhere they do not entai L any transfer abroad by a resident; where a
transfer does take ptace, such investments over and above FF 1 miLtion
require authorization. The proceeds accruing from Liquidation of such
investments must be repatriated in fulL and surrendered on the foreign
exchange market;
- Acqu'isit'ion by residents of real property abroad is subject to a prior-
authori zation requi rementl
- Acquisition by residents of foreign securities deaLt in on a stock exchangeis caught by the "investment franc" system (see beLow).
Itaty: By Decision of 6 ttlay 1974, as amended by the Decision of 26 flay 1975'
Itaty is authorized by the Commission to require residents to [odge an
interest-free bank deposit equaL to 502 of the amount of investment trans-
actions carried out abroad. In practice, however, this requirement is not
appLied to direct investment in ttlember States. Insurance companies and the
acquisition of securities issued by Community institutions (up to an annuaI
ceiLing set at 45 mitLion ECU in 1962) and of units in investment trusts
authorized to do business in Ita[y are aLso exempt.
Irefand: By Decision of 3 ttlay 1980 amending the Decision of 22 December 1977,
the Commission authorized lreLand to maintain restrictions on the acquisi-
tion by residents of foreign securities deaLt in on a stock exchange except
where financed through the sa[e of other foreign securities. These restric-
tions do not appLy to the acquisition of securities issued by Community insti-
tutions or, under certain conditions, to insurance companies.
Denmark: Under arrangements broadLy simjLar to those appLicabLe to Iretand,
ffitions on the acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt
in on a stock exchange vere authorized by the Commission Decision of
22 December 1977. These restrictions do not appLy to the acquisition of
securities issued by Community institutions or by internationaI institutions
of rhich Dennark is a member. Furtherno?et on 5 February 1979, Dennark
invoked the protective cLause provided for in ArticLe 73(2) of the Treaty
to prohibit the saLe to non-residents of government bonds issued after 1975.
r8+8.18
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ltlore of ten than not, the requi rement that certain transf ers shouLd be
channeL[ed through a specific foreign exchange market invoLves additionat
costs that may hinder the corresponding capitaL outfLotrs. Subject to
certain conditions, inctuding the absence of any appreciabIe and Iasting
differences between the rates for capitaI transactions and those for
payments reLating to current transactions, the Community Oirectives permit
the introduction of a two-tier foreign exchange market for capitaL move-
ment s .
Since 1954, BeLgium and Luxembourg have operated a "free" exchange market
atongside the officiaL market. As a generaI ruIe, aLL capitaL transactions
take place on the "free" market. Under certain conditions, direct invest-
ments may be made and Liquidated on the official market.
In France since l4ay 1981, residents have been required to finance the
purchase of foreign securities out of foreign exchange accruing from the
saLe of other foreign securities ("investment franc" system). This cLosed
market, which is compuLsory onIy for residents, differs from the'"free"
market operated in BeLgium and Luxembourg, to which non-residents are a[so
admi tted.
| 85
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BOX 2
Private use of the ECU
Atthough it had atready been used for a number of years for current accounts
hetd for the most part in the name of the Community'inst'itutions, the European
unit of account (EUA) effectiveLy assumed the 16te of monetary instrument for
settL'ing private transactions onLy when it was introducedunderthe ECU tabeI in
centraL banksr balance sheets for recording transactions under the European Mone-
tany System. It is now possibLe, three years after this officiaL act of recogni-
tion, to make a survey of the private use of the ECU and to
ctarify its status with regard to the different sets of exchange regu[ations in
force in the Community.
Tybri's of oderaii'Ons- Tbe'ECU is used by the private sector above aLL for
recording and, in some cases, tor settIing financiaL and banking transactions; it
is LittLe used as yet for commercjaI transactions.
The banks treat the ECUas a currency in its own right and now offer a range of
E CU-denominated financiaI services simi tar to those avai tabte in any convertibte
currency. TheECU is used for the foLtowjng transactions:
- Qggg:ilg_glg_gyglggllg. In this area, the Community institutions, which hotd
substantiaL accounts in ECU, gave the [ead first to the banks, whose participa-
tion in EqJ-denominated issues Led them to open ECU accounts in their own name,
and then to business transactors, who, especiaLLy in ItaLy, make short term
borrowings in order to finance exports.0ver 200 banks now operate drawing ac-
counts denominated in ECU and over 100 business have overdrafts in ECU.
- Bank [oans : These loans, which have a maturity of between two and five years,
caFFy vaFiabLe rates. They are granted by a singLe credit institution where, as i
Denmark, they involve sma[[ amounts of around 20 000 ECU for smaLL businesses orprivate individuaLs. tJhere they invoLve Large amounts, they are handLed by a
banking syndicate and can take on a soph'isticated form, e.9. the 200 miLLion
ECU Loan granted in JuLy 1981 by the Cr6dit Lyonnais to the Cr6dit NationaL. An
amount of some 350 miLLion ECU was outstanding in respect to such transactions
at the end of JuLy 1982.
- tg!!ig-iggggg-99!gg!!e!gg-j!-gl-u : Since March 1981 when the first issue wasfloatedon behatf of an Itatian borrowerr l8 issues have been pLaced on the
market totaL Ling nearLy 'l ,200 mi L Lion ECU. l,l'ith the
exception of the 500 mitLion ECU Loan issued by the ItaLian Government in Februar
1982, which was p[aced for the most part on the domestic market, they have aLL
been floated on the Euromarket at fixed rates ranging between 131l and 14% and
with maturities of 6 to 10 years.
- !g!!!gqg!!_91-€llJ_!gg!glelg : UntiI now, ECU transfers between banking institu-tions posed probLems because, direct transfers being not possibLe, it was
necessary to transfer atI the currencies making up the ECU, causing a Large
handting charge that inhibited the deveLopment of the ECU market. A number
of part'icuLarty active banks have circumvented this difficuLty be steadi[y
introducing what are in effect simptified setttement arrangements invotving the
execution of transfer orders in ECU between the increasingly [arge number of
accounts opened in their books. These banks have now improved this process by
opening with one another reciprocaI accounts in ECU that are settLed in nationaL
currencies over and above a certain ceiLing. This purely pragmatic process makesit possibte to execute transfer orders in ECU not onLy between accounts opened
(8b
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in a bankrs own books but also between such accounts and those opened in the books
of aLL banks operating
neciprocaI accounts. This sett[ement system, which has the drawback of not treating
atL banks on an equaI footing, embraces only part of the banking system. The banks
are aware of the limitations of this system and are current[y examining ways and
means of institutionaLizing a system that wiLI ensure more efficient as wetI as
mofe extensive setttement arrangements.
- 99fy!S9_elJef99_!g_pt1yg!S_!le!g9g!9lg : t^lith the expansion of the bankine faciIi-ties operated in ECU and the reduction in costs, the minimum threshotd for transac-tions has been [owered to a leveL that brings ECU-denominated operations within
the reach of private transactors: reduction in the minimum amount for deposits(3 000 ECU in some countries) and for toans (20 000 ECU in Denmark); certificates
of a standard unit amount of'l 000 ECU for ECU-denominated issues. In Itaty, itis aIso possib[e to take out Life-assurance poLicies denominated in ECU.
Status of the ECU with regard to nationaI reguLations. Wider private use of the ECU
presupposed that this unit coutd be used in its own right, i.e. that it couLd betreated as a genuine currency and no longer as a basket of nine currencies each of
which had to be handIed separatety in banking transactions.Member States have approach
ed this problem in different ways. Reference to the ECU is stiLt prohibited'in
Germany whi[e Itaty has granted the ECU currency status, which the ItaIian Government
has confirmed by issuing a 500 miIL'ion ECU Loan in February 1982.0f the other MemberStates appIying exchange reguLations, France and BeLgium have recognized the ECU as
a currency by officiaL decision; IreLand, Denmark and Greece have not yet gone thisfar but do authorize their banks to receive ECU transferts from abroad. The United
Kingdom, which appLies no exchange controIs, and the Nether[ands, which appLies
fLexibte exchange reguIations, Leave it to the banks to decide whether or not to treat
the ECU as a currency.
r8l
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9. Energy
The situatjon on the energy market and its retationship trith the
economy as a uhoLe were so profoundty altered by the second oi L shock that
earLier trends hrere compLeteLy disrupted. The decLine in the consumption
of energy and particutar[y oiL as a resu[t of price rises, increased invest-
ment, contracting economic activity and other factors, such as administrative
measures, is in part'structuraI and to that extent here to stay. But it is
cLear that these factors, and particuLarty pricing and investment poticies,
are not yet sufficientLy coodinated to meet the continuing need for adjust-
ment. Net energy imports are stiLL making considerabLe inroads on the baLance
of payments which can be reduced onty if top priority is given to impLementation
of the Communityrs energy strategy.
9.1 The Communityrs energy baLance
Taken as a *hole, the main components of the Communityrs energy
bal.ance (energy consumptionrproduction and imports) have sustained quite
dramatic changes over the [ast three years (as they have in most industriat-
ized countries), the fuIt impLications of which are stiLL far from ctear.
l{hereas, fo[lowing the 1975 recession, economic grorth and the demand for
energy returned fairLy rapidLy to reIativeLy high IeveLs in most countries,
it has been a different story in the aftermath of the second oiI shock:
(i) the crisis is continuing in most of the OECD economies, uith an
average rate of grovth for the three years 198Or 1981 and 1982 of just
under 1t for the 0ECD area, cLose on 0.EZ for the ten Community
countries, and nil for the United States, whi[e growth is stiLL running
at over 37( in Japan;
(ii) demand for energy, especiaLty oit, has shown a very marked downturn
since 1980. (TabLes 9.1 and 9.D. This represents a compLete break
with previous trends which, aLthough it is too ear[y to distinguish
structuraL aspects from pure[y cycLicaL aspects uith any certainty, is
accompanied by a sharp reduction in energy consumption, especiaLty oit,
per unit of GDF. Thus gross inLand consumption of energy per unit of
GDP at 1975 prices and exchange rates (975 = 100) has faLLen from
99.9 in 1979 to 90.2 in 1981 and 88.7 in 1982, yhiLe over the same
period oiI consumption per unit of cDP feLL from 96.1 in 1979 to 79
in 1981 and 75.8 in 1982 (TabLe 9.2>. Changes such as these obvious[y
inc[ude a considerabLe etement of structuraI change and cast doubts on
the reLiabiLity of most of the medium- and Long-term forecasts made
eartier.
9.2 ,sl
To be more precise, whiLe Community GDP increased by 2.5% between
1979 and 19E2, gross inLand consumption of energy feLL by more than 8% and
oiI consumption by more than 182. The oiI share of energy consumption - which
the Community aims to cut back to 4O% by 1990 - has therefore come down from
54.5'l( in 1979 to 48.6% in 198?. At the same time, rh'i Le consumption of soLid
fuets heLd LeveL at around 220 miLLion toe, and consumption of gas sLipped
sLjghtLy from 17? niLLion toe in 1979 to 163 miLLion toe in 1982, eLectricity
speeded up its penetration of the market, consumption rising from 53 miLlion toe
in 1979 to 83 mi[Lion toe in 19E2 (an increase ot 56.7%).
By contrast, Community energy production increased by 34 miILion toe
Q.4J0 between 1979 and 1982, Largely owing to a rise of 21 mi LLion toe (23.5%)
in North Sea oiL production and of 30 miLLion toe $1%> in nucLear-generated
eLectricity, urhiLe the output of solid fuels grew by 5 miLLion toe, and natural
gas production continued its decLine with a drop of 22 miLLion toe (6ilr.
These trends in the Communityrs consumption and production of energy
added up to a sharp fa[[ in net energy imports, from 559 to 437 miLLion toe
between 1979 and 1982, i.e. a drop of cLose on 227(. Given the rise in net
imports of naturaL gas (up 11 miLtion toe) and soLid fuels (up 4 miLLion toe),
the neduction in net oiL imports is very substantial: from 487 miLLion toe
in 1979 to 350 miLLion toe in 1982, i.e. down 28.1%. The Communityrs depen-
dence on energy imports accord:ingly decLined f rom 64.2?( in 1973 to 55.2% in
1979 and 477( in 1982, and its dependence on imported oiL from 61.8% in 1973
to 48.1% in 1979 and 37.6% in 1982.
9.2 Energy Prices
The trend of energy prices, and more particuLarLy the thro successive
jumps in oiI prices, has quite cLearLy pLayed a significant part in the
Communityrs changing energy baLance. The Commission now has access to reLiable
Long-run (1960-60) price series for different energy sources in the various
categories of consumption in six countries (8, D, F, I, NL and UK), trhich help
put recent trends into better perspective.
To obtain an overaLL picture of the trend in energy prices, a weighted
average index has been caLcuLated which combines aLL products and aLI sectors.
This index'was deflated by the GDP impticit price index so as to show the
chanqe in the reaL price of energy over the Long term. Uith base of 1960 = 100,
r1o
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this c[earty shot{s a substantiat drop in the reaL price of energy in aLL the
countrjes throughout the 1960s and up to 1972 or 1973 (Graph 9.1): energy
therefore had a major anti-infLationary effect, and thus pLayed a part in
the expansion and direction of economic growth. The rise in prices from
1973 to 1975 broadly canceLLed out the previous faLL and brought energy prices
almost back to their 1960 LeveL re[ative to prrices for other goods and services.
The period 1975-78 uas a time of stabiLity or even of a renewed fa[[ in the
real price of energy. Then, as a resutt of the second oiL shock, prices
'increased in real terms in 1979 and 1980 to finish up at a Level" which is
generat[y, though onLy sLight[y, higher than the [eveL of reaL prices jn 1960.
The indices of energy prices by category of consumer 
= industry, raad
transport, househotds and services (smaLI users) - shotr up fariF[y wide
differences in trends which are worthy of comment. Firstty, it is evident
that inf[ation is mainLy responsib[e for divergent trends in nominaI prices
in different countries, wh'ich is why it is safer to rely on a study of reaL
prices' This shows that, broadty speak'ing, the reaI price of motor fueI
tended to fatL further than the price of other energy uses untiL 1973, but
especiatLy that it has increased [ess everywhere since 1973 and is noy in
many cases [ower than its reaL levet in 1960, giving road transport a definite
retative advantage. It shoutd be pointed out here that the long-run series nor
avaitab[e reLate to prices incLusive of att taxes (series net of tax are in
preparation, series net of VAT exist onLy for the period 1974-EO for industry).
In the case of motor fueLs, these "with-tax" prices are heaviLy affected by
a specific tax (excise duties), whose rate of increase since 1973 has tended
to faLt behind infLation in timing and [evet; this exp[ains the smaLLer reaL
price rise of these products. A second point is that between 196O and 1973
the reaL price of energy consumed by househoLds and services (smaLL users) feLL
everywhere to a Lesser extent than reaL prices for industry or road transport.
SubsequentLy, between 1973 and 1960, events took a different course in different
countries: in some countries the reaI price of energy used by househoLds and
services remained higher (D, F, UKr, white in others the reaL price of energy
to industriat users increased the most (I, NL, B).
ll l
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The average cost (cif) of oi L suppLies in the Community during the
period 1970-82 is presented jn TabLe 9.3 and Graph 9.2 in three different
Hays: in current doLLars, jn current ECU and in defLated ECU. This styLe
of presentation offers a comprehensive picture of the main features of the
trend in oiL prices as it affected the Community economy during that period,
as foLLows:
(i) the magnitude of the t|ro oiL price shocks, which resuLted in a virtuaL
quadrupling of prices in current doLLars in 1973-74, which in turn uere
almost tripted between 1979 and 1981, trith the resuLt that the average
cif price of oiI imported into the Community rose from USD 2.3 a barreL
in 1970 to USD 36.5 a barreL in 19E1 (a 16-foLd increase) before decti-
ning to USD 34 in '198?;
(ii) the effect of the doL[ar exchange rate over the period rhich vas the
changeover to fLoating exchange rates: when the dotLar vas ueak (from
1970 to 1973 and from 1977 to 1980) oiL prices expressed in ECU rose
much Less steep[y than the same prices expressed in doLLars; conversety,
nhen the doLlar was strong (fron 1974 to 1976, in 1981 and above atL in
'198D each rise in the dottar price of oiL uas ampLified and each reduction
absorbed by the movement of exchange rates. As a resuLt of this process,
in 19E2 the drop in the dot[ar price of oiL vas'more than offset by the
rise in the doLLar, to the extent that in that year the oiL price index
(97O 
= 100) was higher in ECU terms than in doLLar terms, tor the first
time since 1970. It wouLd however be wrong to concLude from this that
the price of oiL in doLlars is fixed rrithout any reference to the exchange
rate of the do[lar against other major currencies;
(iii) the ro[e pLayed by inflation (Graph g.2z prices in defLated ECU) in
moderating to some extent the real burden of the cost of oi t suppties,
The average reaL price in the Community in 1982, which is 6Z dovn on
1981, shows a five-foLd increase since 1970, compared uith an increase
by a factor of 15 in nominaL terms, It shouLd be noted that, in generaL,
the country-by-country trends throughout the Community remain fairLy
comparabLe because purchasing poyer parities have changed IittLe.
(tt)
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9.3 Energy investment
Any anaLysis of the trend of energy investment is beset by many
difficuLties of a statisticaL and theoreticat nature as regards the
definition of that category of jnvestment. For instance, the nationaL
accounts provide satisfactory data on investment in energy production
in the form of statistics of gross fixed capitaL formation by ownership
branch, but give us no information about investment in the efficjent use
of energy (energy saving or fue[-switching) .in any branch.
As regards investment in energy production, the trend from 1970
to 1980, as shoyn in Table I .4ris certainLy positive, but reveats no
ctear priority in favour of energy investment. The shbre of energy
investment in totaL GFCF'for the seven Community countries yhich have
provided data broken down by sector (8, D, F, rRL, r, NL and uK) increased
fron 7% in 1970 to 8.47( in 1980. Two countries shor a significant rise:
France (where the share of energy increased from 6.2% to 8.5% of GFcF),
and above aLt the United Kingdom (uhere the share greu from '10.97" to'ir4.11
of GFCF).
0n the other hand, the trend in the volume of energy investment
during the periods 197O-73, 1973-77 and 1977-EO shows hardLy any increase
in investment grotlth except, to some extent, in France and Germany. AdnittedLy,
in a generaL context of decLining investment ratios, energy investment stands
out as a notable exception and pLays a not insignificant supporting roLe to
activity as a whote, but it does not constitute the motive force, which might
have been expected. The grouth of investment in energy production has been
much stronger and faster in other industrjatized countries, particuLar[y
in the United states, uhere its share of GFCF, uhich yas aLready high at
13.5% in 1970' rose to 20.92 in 1979 and uas probabLy close on 25il in 1980.
The forecasts by Euroinvest as regards capitaL formation suggest
that the growth of investment in energy production has acceLerated in the
community, especiaLLy in 19E1 and 19Ez in Bel.gium, Germany and France, but
sloued down again in the United Kingdom.
r?3
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These data go to confirm the observed expression of energy production -
a sharp growth in North Sea oiI production related to a growth in investment
of 15.4X per annum in the United Kingdom from 1973 to 1977; an increase in
the generation of e[ectricity from nucLear fueL going hand in hand yith sus-
tained growth of investment in electricity generation in France: but the fact
remains that the substantiaL decLine in demand for energy per unit of GDP in
the Community is partLy due to a ratjonaLjzation of consumption and thus to
investment in energy efficiency. ltluch more information is needed about such
investment in order to exptain and above atI to forecast the trend of demand
for energy in the medjum and Long term.
9"4 0iL and energy biLLs
The sharp falI in demand for energy, together with the grorth 'in
Community production of energy and particuLarLy of oiL have brought about
a major reduction in the voLume of net imports of energy, fron 622 nlLLion toe
in 1973 to 559 miLLion toe in 1979 and onty 437 miLLion toe in 1962. Horever,
rith the exptosion in energy prices, the volume cutback in imports has not
been enough to hoLd dotrn the Communityrs energy biLL, particutarLy its oiL
bjtt (TabLe 9,.2>. The Communityrs oiL bitt increased from USD 16 300 miLLion
in 1973 <1.52 of GDP) to USD 97 000 miLlion in 1980 (5.52 of GDP), before
faLLing back to USD 85 000 miLLion in 1982. However, the highest Level as
a percentage of GDP ras reached in 1981, when the change in the dolLar exchange
rate raised the oiL biLL to 3.7X of GDP. The bi[L for aLL sources of energy
increased steadity reLative to the bjIL for oiL aLone LargeLy because of the
rise in net imports of so[id fueLs and naturaL gas. It rose from USD 16 900
miLtion in 1973 (1.52 of GDP) to USD 105 600 miLLion in 1980 (3.82 of GDP)
and USD 94 000 miL[ion in 1962 (3.8X of GDP). These figures show clearLy how
important it is for the Community not onty to replace oit by other sources but
aLso to foster both its ohrn energy production and energy efficiency so as to
reduce stiLI further the consumption of energy per unit of GDP.
Il CF
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The decLine jn net oiL imports into the Community and into most
industriaLised countries, combined with the expans'ion of oi L production
by non-gpEC countries has caused major changes on the oi L market since
1g7g-80. These changes have been accentuated since the third quarter of
1981, particuLarLy in the first half of 19E2, by the need for oiL companies
to adjust their stocks, in view of the Louer vorLd demand for oiL and the
very high cost of hotding stocks 'in a period of high interest rates. As
there is a gLut on the market2 most of the non-OPEC exporting countries
have adjusted their prices in order to keep their market share, }Jhich has
left the majn burden of voLume adjustment to the OPEC countries. These
have sought, by imposing production ceiLings and reducing the prices most
out of Line, to hoLd the market price of Arabian Light at USD 34 a barret.
This poLicy has resuLted in a further reduction in the quantities produced
and exported by OPEC.
The upshot is that 0PEC production has dropped from 31.6 mitLion
barreLs a day (1 5EO miLLion toe) in 1979 to around 20 miLLion barrels a
day (1 000 miLLion toe), i.e. a drop of more than 362: this has Led to a
neu shareout of the market whereby 0PEC countries, which supptied more
than 602 of demand in 1979, suppLied just over 4OZ 1n 1982.
This ner situation on the oiI market has Led to a sharp decLine in
the value of OPECIs exports and to a very rapid contraction in 0PECrs
current account surpLus (see Chapter 3).
rg5
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TabLe 9.1
Summary energy balance, EC 10 (mi LLion toe)
1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982(J'
Energy consumption
1. Gross inLand consumption
of which:
soLid fueIs
oiL
naturaL gas
primary eLectricity etc.
2. Bunkers (petroLeum products)
969
932
?22
566
116
28
37
890
859
195
487
140
38
3',1
942
912
?o3
507
154
48
31
1012
985
?23
537
172
53
27
970
944
273
494
169
58
?6
934 930
907 905
220 ?19450 44016s 1637? 83
27 25
Primary energy production
of vhi ch:
soLid fueIs
oiL
naturaL gas
primary eLectricity etc.
348
196
12
112
28
370
190
13
13?
36
415
180
49
140
46
458
180
89
138
51
46?
185
91
1?9
57
484 492
187 185
102 110
125 116
70 81
Net energy imports
of which:
soLid fueIs
oiL (crude + products)
naturaL gas
e[ectricity
622 527 538
?8
492
17
1
559 527
47
438
41
?
34
487
36
2
19 ?6
599 491
4901
445 437
4? 3E
358 350
43 47
22
Stock movements +1 +7 + 11 +5 +19 -5 -1
(1 ) Forecasts
Source: Commission departments.
rlb
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TabLe 9 .2
Energy and oiL in the Community economy, EC 'lO
1973 1s75 1977 1979 1980 1981 (1)tgga(1)
Cost of energy imports
Average import price (cif) o{
crude oi L in USD per barrel 3r9 1116 1317 lgr1 33rO 3615 34rO
Net import biLt for crude oit
and petro[eum products in 1613 4113 47 11 6810 gTrO g1r7 g5rg
USD 1000 mi[lion at current
exchange rates
Net inrport bi L[ for crude oi I
and petroleum products as Z 1'5 3'o 2'9 2'E 3'5 3t7 3t4
of GDP
Net import biLL for energy in
USD '000 mj [ lion at current 1619 4313 5Or3 7311 10516 99rO 94rO
exchange rates
Net import bi LL for energy as 1r5 3r1 3r1 3rO 3r8 4rO 3r8
Z of GDP
Suppty dependence
Share of oi L in the gross inLand
consumption of energy (Z) 6017 5617 55t6 54t5 5?t3 49'6 48t6
Share of Community oi I produ-
ction in the gross inland ?r1 216 9rT 1616 1814 ZZ.T ZS.O
consumption of oi I and petroLeum
products (r0
Dependence on i mported oi L (2) 61 ,E 55,1 5?rz 4811 45,2 3813 37 ,6
Dependence on imported energy(2) 6412 sgrz s711 ssr? s4r3 4T16 47ro
Consumpt i on
Gross rilLand energy consum-ption.-, I'Yt r'\'rr)un' 1O8r5 10010 10612 11416 10919 10516 1O514
Energy consumption per unit of
GDp at '1975 prices and exchange 1OE'9 10010 98'7 9919 9317 9Or? 88tl
rates (3)
0i I consumption per unit of 1o9rz 10010 96.8 9611 8616 lgr0 Tsrg
GDP at 1975 prices and exchange
rates (3)
(1) Estimates and forecasts.(2) Net imports as Z of gross inland consumption of energy ptus bunkers.(3) 1975 = 100.
Source: Eurostat and Commission departnents
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TabLe 9.3
Cif price per barreL of oiL imported into the Community
INDEX DEFLATED ECU
PxICE INDEX
CURRENT
DOLLARS
PTiICE
CURRENT
ECU INDEX
PRICE
2.2 100.0
124. 6
124.4
141.5
407. 8
42L.0
507. 5
540.5
10. B 487.8
t4.2 640. ?23.7 1068.3
32.'l r472.8
33.4 1505.5
1 970
7977
L972
Ls1 5
1 976
11.6
!2.6
19.5
33.0
36. 5
34.0
100.0
!27.8
136 .5
170.5
475.8
511.0
555.1
603. 5
60?. I
859.0
1453. 7
1607.9
1497. 8
2.8
2.8
3.1
9.1
9.3
11.3
L2.0
2.2
2.6
2.4
2.6
6.6
5.0
5.5
6.4
5.3
6.4
9.6
12.0
tL.2
100.0
116. 0
108. 5
114.9
298.1
27I.7
297,9
299.',|
240.7
288.7
431.4
542. 6
506.0
2.3
2.9
3.1
1973 3.9
1974 10.8
1977 r3.7
1 978 13.8
7979
1 980
1981
1 982
Source: Commission departments
r18
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TabLe .9,4
Gross fixed capitaI formation by ounership branch: energy
Share of energY
in totaL GFCF
Average annuaL rate of grouth in energy
i nvestment
1970 1 980 '1970-73 1973-77 1977-80 1981() 1982(1)
B
D
F
IRL
I
NL
UK
6tT
513
612
615
811
714
'l0rg
712
7,,1
815
116
8r3*
*
716
14 11
114
1216
315
'13t5
2rO
519
6,?
519
1t9
319
2415
211
1t5
'15 14
3r2 615
10,8 1517
15rO 1r5
7r1 :
9.6* :
or4* :
1r9 6rO
1 0r0
6r0
7ro
:
6ro
EC7 7rO 814 311 314 419 616 4t2
USA 13 15 ?org*
Source: Eurostat
* 
= 1979
(1) 
= Forecasts by Euroinvest
130'
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Graph 9.1
INDEX OF ENERGY PRICES IN REAL TERI'IS
(ALL PRoDUCTS, ALL SECToRS)
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Graph 9.2
PRICE INDICES FOR THE SUPPLY OF CRUDE OIL TO THE NINE
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10; ExternaL trade and competitiveness
Measured retrospectivety by the Communityrs and the Member Statesl
shares in OECD trade, Europers competitiveness, as compared with its major
partners Japan and the U.S., appears [ess threatened on the internationaL
markets than within its own borders. In spite of the intense competition
between the industriatized countries, the Community has since 1973 targety
maintained its share in internationaI exports. It has been forced, however,
to rety on a growing ftow of imports, particularty of equipment products,
in order to satisfy internaI demand for goods which domestic industry can
suppty onty at too high a cost or not at att. This is a sign of the
Communityts increasing integration into an internationaL division of Labour
which takes in not on[y the major industriatized countries but the newty
industriaIizing countries (NICs) as wetL, with Japan participating in one
roLe onLy, being one of the wortdrs three major exporters of capitaI goods,
aLong with Germany and the United States, and at the same time one of the
smaILest importers. The fact remains that the inadequate response of
Community industry to the changing structure of internaI demand, particu-
tarty for high-technotogy goods, is a consequence of its s[owness to adapt,
a process hetd back by the s[uggishness of investment.
10.1 The Community, the United States and Japan
Recent examples of the grave difficu[ties encountered by sensitive
industries such as textiLes or motor vehicles have made the generat pubLic
highty receptive to the idea that European products are becoming Less
competitive - witness the rising rates of penetration recorded for centain
goods.
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The trend observed in wortd trade between 1963 and 1980 appears to con-
firm this impression. The Communityrs share of the worLd export market has
indeed faLlen steadiLy since 1963, down to 167 of totaL trade in 1980.(1)
But the United Statesr share has aIso faILen; onty Japan regutarLy increased
its share between 1963 and 1973, which leveLLed off thereafter at about 6.5/.
(TabLe 10.1). This redistribution of wor[d market shares among the indus-
triaLized countries up to 1973, at the expense of the State-trading and
deveLoping countries, has been chaLLenged by the growth of new exporting
centres, the NICs and above aLL the petroLeum exporting countries, which
notl account for 15% of world trade. 0bviousLy aLL these devetopments were
strongLy influenced by changing prices in internationaI trade, particutarLy
those of energy products and raw nateria[s, and a more thorough study of
trade between the industriaLized countries in the 0ECD area revea[s impor-
tant quatifications to be made to the first generaL impression.
During the 1960s and earLy 1970s, the Communityrs export market share
in 0ECD externaI trade decLined steadiLy from 29.3% in 1963 to 25.7t in 1973,
the United Statest share fett more sharpLy, fron 23.7% in 1963 to 11.7% in
1972, and Japanrs share increased smoothly from 5.6% in 1963 to 102 in 1972
(Graph 10.1).
Under the combined impact of the breakdown of the Bretton lloods system,
the oiL price increases, and the slowdown in the growth of wortd trade
(from an annuaL average of 8% to 4t by votume), these smooth trends gave uay
to a much more irreguLar picture, which in the case of the Community was
marked mainLy by a succession of short periods of expansion and contraction.
These abrupt changes refLect the intense struggLe between the three major
industriaLized areas, which between them account for atmost 802 of the vaLue
of gECD trader(2) to maintain or improve their positions on the markets of
the rest of the world.
(1)
(2)
See box
Exc Iuding intra-Communi tY t rade.
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Yet none of these three economic powers can cLaim to have taken a
decisive [ead, and none has fatlen very far behind; in each case the end
resutt of the changes in their market shares is a pos'itive figurer 0.S per-
centage points for the U.S.A. and 0.95 for Japan from 1972 to 1980, and
as much as 1 percentage point for the Community from 1973 to 1980. The
United States and the Community have thus firmly consoLidated their positions
in 0ECD trade, ending the steady decLine of the previous decade. This is
further confirmed by the fact that the Community despite everything kept
its cLear [ead as the world's largest exporter; in 1980 the totaL value
of exports out of the Community was onty sLightLy beLow the combined American
and Japanese export figures.
This generaI improvement demonstrates the high overa[[ export competi-
tiveness of the three areas, operating at the expense of the other OECD
countries; but a more thorough anatysis reveaLs that these successes have
been obtained in different categories of goods, thus accentuating a certain
form of internationaL division of Labour.
Thus Japan, which between 1963 and 1973 had remarkabLe success vith
exports of both intermediate and equipment products, now bases its advance
essentiaLty on the Latter. The market share of Japanese equipment goods
in totaL OECD exports increased by 4 percentage points between 1973 and
1980, when it reached 17.3y" - ctose to the U.S. share of 192 but stitt some
way behind the Community share of 28.671. Japan is increasing its share
not onLy in the motor vehicte market <?1.7% in 1980) but also in almost a[[
industries producing investment goods: electricaL goods (242r, data pro-
cessing machines C17.4D, and agricuLturaL and industriaI machinery nO.6Zr.
It must be borne in mind, however, that Japanese penetration is essentiatLy
confined to non-Community markets, frequentLy in areas where untiI very
recentty the Community countries were the on[y exporters. The increase in
exports of equipment goods to the Community represents on[y 0.8 percentage
points out of Japanrs 4-point market share increase for this kind of pro-
duct. The 11 percentage point increase in Japan's share of motor vehicte
exports tikewise inctudes a 4-point increase in exports to the devetoping
countries, above aLL to the OPEC countries, a 4.5-point increase in exports
to the U.S., but onLy a 1.3-point increase in exports to the Community.
1u3
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The U.S.A. has increased its share more especiat[y in intermediate
products, such as steeI and chemicats, and current consumption goods such
as textiLes and cLothing. But on the whote its gains have been made in
exports to the Community, even of equipment products (TabLe ?0.5) - mainly
office machines and transport equipment other than motor vehictes - which
were offset by tosses in eXports to non-Community countries.
As for the Community, apart from good performances in particuLar in-
dustries such as buiLding materiats, wood, or more recent[y agricuLturaI
and food products Q6/. in 1980 as compared with 2?..57. in 1979r, it has been
bare[y maintaining its position in manufactured goods as a whote and making
gains onty in exports of agricutturaI products and energy products.
These data modify somewhat the assessment of the Communityrs competi-
tive position outLined earlier; in most of the qain manufacturing branches
the Community is at best maintaining its share, and suffering substantiaL
tosses in motor vehicLes Q7.9% in'1973 to 24.32 in 1980) and office machines
(24.O'l to 21.62>. However, this reLative stabiLity in terms both of overatI
market shares and of the breakdown by major categories of product disguises
deeper shifts in the geographicat distribution of exports from the Community.
Thus the Community has Lost one percentage point of its OECD market share
because of a faLL in exports to the United States; the Loss affects aLt
categories of product but particutarly motor vehjc[es, where it is rough[y
equaI to the corresponding Japanese gain, without any increase in the
reLative size of the Communityrs exports to Japan. 0n the other hand the
Community has been able to secure a sizeab[e increase in exports to the
OPEC countries, where a detai[ed comparison with the Japanese performance
is interesting (Tabte 10.?r. The data avaitab[e show that the Community
has taken much greater advantage of the increased absorption capacity of
the OPEC market than has Japan. Furthermore, whjLe Japants progress on
this market rests mainly on its exports of equipment goods, of only three
categories - metat products, etectricaL goods and motor vehictes - the
Community has performed weLL in atL branches
)oLr
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These resutts taken as a whote give totaL export market shares uhich
are atmost constant, and show that the Communityrs overaLL competitiveness
has not dec[ined. The Community wouLd not otherwise have been ab[e to
assert itself on the 0PEC market as it has. Nevertheless the [osses on
the American market, for exampte, suggest that the Community is there en-
countering difficuLt'ies which it is not easity abte to overcome, and which
are not unretated to the more unfavourabte movement of imports. For whi [e
the Community has been maintaining its positions in terms of exports, with
very good performances in certain market segements, the import figures are
more worrying. l{here markets are very open, a countryrs abiLity to timit
penetration by foreign products is a measure both of the match of domestic
production to the structure of domestic demand, and of price competitiveness,
offsetting any comparative advantages its main competitors may have.
In much the same t.lay as its share of the extra-Community export market,
the Communityts overa[|. share of the import market in products originating
in non-Member countries fetI drastica[[y between 1963 (33.?2, and 1972
(21.3Xr, refLecting the Member Statesr shift to intra-Community trade;
but from 1972 onuard the broad stabi Lity of the Communityre export market
share has been accompanied by a reguLar increase in the share of outside
'imports, which indeed has been acceterating rapidLy since 1977.
The Communityts dependence on energy imports certainLy expLains the
sudden increase in 1973 and 1974, and in 1979 and 1980; but the Community
import market share for manufactured products aLso rose tron 21.3X in 1972
to 25.1% in 1980, returning to its mid-sixties LeveL. This development is
quite unLike the trends for the United States and Japan. In the tast fifteen
years Japanrs import market share for manufactured products has oscitLated
between 6Z and 7% of the 0ECD total (or just a Littte over 502 of its export
market share); in the United States the trend shows marked cycIicaL vari-
ations, but remains stable in the tong term at around 177 or 18X (Graph 10.1).
14.6 )05
rt fotlous that in terms of export cover of imports (Graph 1o.z),
the Communityts externaI trade in manufactured products, which was tra-
ditionatLy in surpLus, has been substantiaLLy eroded. Having risen steadity
from 1963 u.16> to 1975 Q.57r, the ratio has faLl.en steadity since,
down to 1.25 in 1980, far short of what is needed to cover the deficits
in agricuLturaI products and above atI energy products. Thus for aLL trade
in 1980, exports from the Community covered onLy 84% of imports, the [owest
percentage since 1964. !'le must bear in mind, however, that since 1973
coverage rates have fLuctuated far more than in the past, so that it may
weLI be in order to describe this 1980 result as a cycLicaL minimum, which
shoutd improve substantiaLLy in 1981 and 1982.
Over the same period the Japanese tr,ade surp[us in manufactured pro-
ducts has been growing almost constantLy, and since 1975 the ratio has been
greater than 2 (2.4 in 19771 2.1 in 1980), though this was not enough to
ensure equitibrium in the overaLL batance of trade either in 1974 and 1975
or in 1979 and 1980. The manufactured products surptus of the United States
is a good dea[ more variabLe; in 1980 the ratio regained its 1976 teveL
of 1.1, with the overaLL trade batance remaining generaLty in deficit.
This grouth of Community import market shares appties to atmost atI
industries - intermediate products, mainLy steeL, current consumption goods,
particularty texti les and ctothing $2.32 in 1980 compared with ?414 in the
earty 1970s) and above aLt equipment goods (from 147 in 1977 to nearly 21'l
in 1980). The growing use of non-Community equipment products at a time
when investment rates are stagnating or faLl.ing in the trlember States confirms
the Communityrs technoLogy gap, which has to be fitLed by mone sophisticated
equipment of American or Japanese origin.(1) Even more than in the case of
motor vehicles (1O.9% in 1960), imports have become a necessary feature in
the etectricaL goods sector <17.6'l in 1971r 25.82 in 1980), machine too[s
(15.?l in 1972, 18.4% in 1980) and etectronic equipment Q2.42 in 1972,
?9.4t in 1980). This too is a trait peculiar to the Community, as the U.S.
share of the import market in equipment goods and current consumption goods
between 1973 and 1980 stayed steady and Japanrs share even fett.
(1) Between 1970 and 1980 the batance of
products rose from USD 6 000 miLtion
Community, but from USD 1 900 miLLion
case of Japan.
trade in very high technoLogy
to USD 20 000 mitl.ion for the
to USD 38 300 mi[tion in the
>o6
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These two countries are not the only ones to increase their penetration
of the Community market in equipment goods. Since the beginning of the
1970s goods originating in NICs have accounted for a rapidLy growing share,
which at 3.9% in 1980 rllas as big as that of Japan (3.82) (Tabte 10.3).
Here again Japan has practicaLLy no imports from the NICs. t',ith onLy a
3Z share of the totaL import market for capitaL goods, Japan is almost
compLeteLy cLosed to foreign products, except for a smatI voLume of American
origin. The USA|s and the Communityrs import market shares in this cate-
gory of product are both 217", and the Community's share is rising rapidty.
Thus it is far more in the form of a Lower resistance to imports than
that of a Loss of export shares on world markets that the probLem of Euro-
pean industryrs competitiveness against the rest of the wor[d emerges, and
it does so in terms wider than straightforward differences of price, cost
Or exchange rates. This lower resistance to imports is onty partiaLLy
attributabLe to imports from Japan, and may be the resuLt of the Communityrs
entering more fuLLy into the internationaL division of tabour. The voLume
of equipment goods suppLied by deveLoping and newLy industriaLizing coun-
tries to the Community market, but atso to the American market, seen to-
gether with the Communityrs satisfactory performances in these products
on the gpEC market for exampte, suggests that there are different speciaL-
izations for the two areas, and thus that there is in this fie[d an accen-
tuation of the division of Labour. If this is the case, the Communityrs
overatI competitiveness is not being chaLlenged, which does not mean that
we shoutd pay no attention to certain shortcomings in Community production
which are currentLy making themseLves feLt. This a[so confirms the obser-
vation that over a Long period competitiveness in terms of production costs
has not dectined, even if it has worsened at certain times, such as towards
the middLe of the 1970s (see Chapter 4). The fact remains that the Commu-
nityts production resources appear better geared to meeting the requirements
of growing externaI markets than certain types of demand on the internaL
market or other comparabte markets such as the United States.
In this internationaI confrontation the Member Statest behaviour has
not been uniform. This is not the place to consider in detaiL the extra-
Community trade of each Community country, but certain characteristic
features do emerge from the figures avai LabLe.
2ol
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As regards changes in export market shares in the course of the 1970s,
three groups of countries can be distinguished: the [argest one (Betgium,
Denmark, Greece, Iretand, the Nethertands and the United Kingdom) comprises
countries yhich in terms of manufactured products as a whote hotd practi-
caLLy the same share in 1980 as at the beginning of the 1970s; France and
Itaty, which have both increased their sharesl and the FederaL RepubLic
of Germany, whose share atone has fatten by 1.2 percentage points from
its highest levet, in 1974.
The position as regards imPorts of
the Community is very simi[ar: Litt[e
time inctud'ing ItaIy, whi Le both France
penetration increase, by one percentage
manufactured products from outside
change for the same countries, this
and Germany have seen outside
point and 1.5 points respectivety.
Given the weight of Germany in extra-Com4gnity trade, that countryrs
loss of export momentum and increased reLiance on imported products to-
gether go a Long uay touards exptaining the Communityrs poor perfornances.
The overaLL effect is [imited by ItaLyrs ga'ins in exports of current con-
sumption goods and by Francets gains in certain categories of equipment
products, but the trade surpLuses in investment goods, on which eiuitibrium
in trade in manufactured goods has been based, have been faLLing since 1975
in aLI llember States except Denmark. This is especiaILy true of Germany,
which is by far the largest exporter but also the Largest importer of these
goods: its export/import ratio has faLten from 5.1 in 1974 to 2.7'in 1980.
If we add an increase in the traditionaL deficit for current consumption
goods, its balance of extra-Community trade for aLI products even became
sLightLy negative in 1980 for the first time since 1963.
This is most striking in the case of Germany, but for most other
Community countries too it represents a growing mismatch between Europers
industriaL production and the requirements of Community demand, which
might become structuraL if it hrere to continue. Thus it is not so much
the rise of what is feLt to be unfair competition from certain countries
with abundant cheap Labour that has caused most of the Communityts diffi-
cuLties in maintaining equi Librium in the baLance of trade. Neither does
the main problem Lie in European industry's capacity to take advantage of
(1.)
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internationaI demand, which is often more dynamic than on the internat
market. The difficuLty is first and foremost in the ueakness of the
equipment products sector, on which the Community has based its strength
in internationaI trade. In the last five years exports of equipment goods
out of the Community have increased by 13.6% a year on average, whi Le im-
ports were rising by 23.57,.
The coverage rate in equipment goods remains high, certainty, but
at the time of the first oit crisis in 1974 the surptus reatized here
represented 847" of the net energy biLL; by 1980 and the second oiI crisis,
th'is percentage had fatten to 65.5'/..
10.2 Trade within the Community
After shouing a fairLy moderate rate of increase in the first hatf
of the 1960s, trade between Member States grew very rapidLy between 1968
and 1973, increasing by ?3% a year at current prices.
This spiLtover effect of the Community market had its greatest impact
on the orig'inaI Community of Six, up to the first oiL crisis. From 1963
to 1973 trade within the Community rose from 23.7% to 28.1/. of OECD trade,
import market shares breaking down fairly equaILy between intermediate
goods, equ'ipment goods and current consumption goods (TabLe 10.S>.
From 1973 onward the "common market effect" lost much of its force.
In spite of the entry of the United Kingdom, much of whose trade shifted
towards the Community, the rate of growth of intra-Community trade fe[[
to 15.77. a year between 1973 and 1978, and was exceeded by the growth in
extra-Commun'ity exports n7.37.>, with many dynamic externaI markets such
as the OPEC countries absorbing a growing share of European output.
Since 1978 intra-Community trade seems to be picking upr but there
has been hardty any difference between the growth of exports to the rest
of the Community and the growth of exports outside it, and, as we have
seen, manufactured products originating outside the Community account for
a growing share of Member Statesr imports. Indeed imports from outside
have grown by 23% a year between 1978 and 1980, as opposed to 192 in the
case of those originating within the Community (TabLe 10.7).
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There has been a remarkabLe degree of paraLtetism in the devetopment
of the Member Statesr externaI trade, and the structure of their market
shares is more or less the same not.l as it was in 1973. After a sLight
faLt, mainLy in the case of exports in 1975 and 1976, their market sharesjn 1980 were within a few tenths of a point of those of 1973, in aLL cate-
gories of product. 0nLy the united Kingdom increased its export share
Gron 2.6t in 1973 to 3.52 in 1980), and it increased its import share
even further (from 3.32 in 1973 to 4.52 in 1980); rtaty increased its
share of imported products fron 4X to 4.5X atthough this tras not matched
by any increase in its exports to the Community.
This high [eveI of stabiLity in market shares in trade between Member
States is cLearty one of the major characteristics in the pattern of their
economic retations. A dense network of trade has nou been estdbLished
for several years in rlhich no one Member State is abLe to increase its
penetration of its partnersr markets beyond certain timits, definitive
since the ear[y 1970s.
This assessment is confirmed by an anatysis of the trends in the ex-
port cover of imports, which with few exceptions remained constantLy'in
surptus or in deficit throughout the period.
Intra-Community export cover of imports
(manufactured products)
Ratio constantty ) 1
Federat lepubLic of Germany
(except in current consumpt'ion
goods)
Betgjum (except 1977 and 1978)
(except equipment goods)
Ratio constantty ( 1
France
(except agricuLturaI and food products,
and certain industries such as motor
vehi c Ies)
ItaIy (except 1978)
(etcept current consumption goods)
United Kingdom (except 1969-71)
(except intermediate goods)
Nether tands
(except agricuLturaL and food
and intermediate goods sjnce
Denmark (except 1980)
(except agricuIturaL and food products)
Ire land
(except agricutturaI and food products)
products,
't976>
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This consistent profi[e, which aLso impt'ies a high degree of stabitity
in the competitive positions of ftlember Statest industries, prompts the
question uhether the goods traded within the Community exhibit certain
features which distinguish them from the goods traded with the rest of
the wor[d.
Recent research does tend to confirm this impressjon.(1) An anaLys'is
of l4ember Statesr export and import speciatization choices has shown that
the main categories of products traded between Member States are not the
main ones sotd in non-member countries. CLassifying these products accor-
ding to skiLL intensity of production and technotogicaI content, the study
shows that trade within the Commun'ity has continued to consist more es-
peciaLLy of products with a Low skiLLed Labour content, or has come to
do so even more. As a general ruLe, however, the products of whieh reLa-
tivety larger voLumes have been exported out of the Commun'ity or imported
from outside it have been those with a high skiLL and techno[ogical con-
tent.
The expansion of trade between the Member States has thus encouraged
spec'iaIization in categories of products which are more exposed to inter-
nationaI competition from countries with abundant [abour and low labour
costs, at the expense of more sophisticated products. Geograph'icaI proxi-
mity does have the effect of encouraging trade in products with a low
vatue added content, but given the weight of intra-Community trade this
tendency ought to be stabi L'ized, i f not reversed. 
.::
This is not encouraged by the measures providing partia.L protection
of markets which have been taken in certain industries such as textiles or
stee[, and are be'ing sought by certain manufacturers against Japanese
products. They Limit the inducement to adapt structures towards the in-
dustries of the future. This may be one of the major causes of the increa-
sing scaLe of outside penetration of Community markets by h'igher-performance
equipment goods.
(1) "Sp6ciaIisation internationaLe et orientation 96o9raphique du Commerce
ext6rieur : une anaLyse des ph6nombnes de sp6ciatisation bitat6rate
de [a Communaut6 Europ6enne A 9, de La France, de ItALtemagne, du R.U.,
des U.S.A. et du Japon de 1963 e 1979:' - PhiLippe RoLLET, Attach6 de
recherche au C.N.R.S., 30 October 198'1, Centre Interuniversitaire de
Recherches en Sciences Humaines, LiLte.
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1. Definitions of market shares
The export market share (or import market share) of country i in category
of goods j is equaL to the quotient of the value of exports (or imports)
in that category of goods j by country i and the vatue of aL[ exports(or imports) in the same category of goods j by atI countries in the
reference area, here aLL OECD countries; or:
Itl: 'imports, cif, USD at current rates
2. Treatment of intra-Community trade
TotaL wor[d trade (TabLe 10.1) and totaL OECD trade (Tabtes10.2 ff.)
include the totaI externaI trade of each Member State, and thus incLude
intra-Community trade. Trade between the Community as a whoLe and the
rest of the worLd, however, excLudes intra-Community trade. Thus in
Section 1O1 the tommunity exports and imports discussed are those in
extra-CommunitY trade ontY.
There is thus a choice of approach to be made in catcutating the shares
of the Community or of any other country in total worLd or 0ECD trade-
gne might assume that in this kind of comparison intra-Community trade
is not reLevant and on that ground shouLd be exctuded from the worLd or
oECD totaL. In that case there Lroutd be changes in the percentages given
in TabLe 10.1, reflecting deve[opments in the vaLue of trade between
Community countries:
rri = xl or
x6Eco
E.C. 21.3
u.s.A. 7.5
J apan 4.2
1lPM'l = Mi''t'l
Ml
"OECD 'i :
j:
X:
Expo rt s
1963 1973 1980
21.O 19.0
15.4 13.58.0 8.0
exporting countrY
category of goods
exports, fob, USD at current rates
Import s
1963 1973 1980
Shares of the E.C., the U.S.A- and Japan i-n world trade
?5.O
12.6
5.0
23.4
15.2
8.6
24.2
15.2
8.9
This approach has not been adopted here, howeverl intra-Community tradeis retained in the wor[d and 0ECD totals and the totaL market shares of
each Member State and of the Community are then subdivided into their tuo
component parts, intra- and extra-Community (TabLes 10.4 to 1q6).
In TabLe 10.5 the entries for the United States and Japan show the share
of their trade with the Community, and in Table 10.6 they show the share
of their trade with the rest of the worLd-
Thus each percentage in TabLe 10.4 is equal to the sum of the correspon-
ding percentages in TabLes 10-5 and 10.6.
>\L
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Tabte 10.1
GeographicaI structure of worLd trade (1)
Export s
196s 1973
Import s
1963 't973 19801 980
1. IndustriaLized countries
of which:
- E.C.
of which:
ext ra-E. C.
u. s. A.
J apan
67.3
33.8
18.7
13.4
3.4
70.8
36.6
17.5
11.9
6.4
63.5
33.3
16.O
19:6
6.6
66.9
34.7
20*7.
11.0
3.7
7',t.0 67.3
35.7 34.6
17.4 18.3
n.a n.1
6.0 6.2
?. Devetoping countries
of which:
pet ro Leum-export i ng
countries
?0.6
5.9
'19.2
7.3
27.5
15.0
20.5
2.9
17.6 23.2
3.5 6.5
3. State-trading countries 12.1 10.0 9.0 11.5 9.8 8.5
Tota t 1 00.0 1 00.0 1 00.0 1 00.0 100.0 100.0
(1) IncIuding intra-Community trade
Source: Internationat Trade 1980/81, GATT/ Geneva 19g1
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TabLe 1Q.2
Export market shares of. EC and Japan in 0PEC area
EC J APANProduct s
Market shares
1973 1980
Gain Market
1973-80 1973
shares Gain
1980 1973-80
AI I products
Manufactured Products
- Intermediate products
- Equipment Products
. MetaI Products
. IndustriaI machinerY
. 0ffice machines
. ELectricaL goods
. Motor vehicIes
.0ther transport
equi pment
- Food products
- Current consumption
product s
2.0 4.3
2.2 4.5
2.1 3.6
2.6 5.4
3.5 10.1
3.5 6.4
1.2 2.2
2.5 5.4
2.5 5.0
1.8 3.3
2.O 6.2
1.5 3.0
?.3
2.3
1.5
2.8
6.6
2.9
1.0
2.9
2.5
1.5
3.8
2.7
o.7
0.7
1.0
0.7
0.9
o.7
0.4
1.0
o.7
0.6
0.1
0.7
1.6
1.9
1.8
2.4
2.8
1.8
0.9
3.3
3.3
1.4
0.4
1.3
0.9
1.2
0.8
1.7
1.9
1.1
0.5
2.3
2.6
0.8
0.3
0.6
Source: Commission departments, based on OECD externaL trade figures
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Tabte 10.3
GeographicaL distribution of import market shares in
equipment products
Impo rt s
Country or
area of origin
EC(externa I trade)
(1 ) (2)
USA
(1) Q'
JAPAN
(1) Q'
EC
USA
J apan
Rest OECD
State-trading countries
DCs and NICs
6.6
3.7
6.3
0.5
3.8
0.8
1.7
o.7
0.0
2.4
5.3
7.3
4.9
0.0
3.5
- 0.5
2.1
- 2.?
0.0
1.5
0.8
1.6
0.2
0.0
0.
0.1
0.1
- 0.1
0.0
0.2
Tota t 20.9 5.7 21.0 0.8 3.1 0.0
(1) ltlarket share in 1980(2) Change in market shares between 1973
Source: Commission departments, based on
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EXports: totaL manufactured products(average annuaL growth rate at current prices and exchange rates)
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Graph 10.1 : MARKET SHARES IN
TotaI products
10.20
OECD TRADE AND RATE OF COVER
Manufactured products
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